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Abstract: 
 
Having the author been involved in banking and finance for 
almost 25 years, this thesis intends to reflect on the role of banks with 
emphasis on cross border lending and credit rating, their effectiveness 
and the impacts of cultural differences. Perhaps this would not differ 
substantially from a researcher or a scholar, yet the exploratory 
approach taken in this research will be somewhat different as it 
deliberately seeks to answer a number of questions relevant to 
practitioners in today’s banking. In trying to achieve this goal, this 
thesis hopefully may find its way to international bankers wondering 
about the perspectives of their business in general and their profession 
in specific. It even may perhaps improve the understanding of their 
clients. 
The Basel committee which published the new Basel II framework 
on bank regulation and supervision was the result of long and careful 
discussions, wide consultations and comprehensive impact studies.  
Whereas Basel II covers the entire risk profile and supervision of 
financial institutions, this research is limited to the cross border 
lending by banks to companies and provides the views from both 
practicing international bankers and their customers on their 
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expectations regarding Basel II, credit rating and the relevance of 
context and culture differences.  
Bankers all over the world are being trained on  how to read 
balance sheets, yet less attention is being paid as to by whom they are 
being created and how precisely these balance sheets came into 
existence, other than the accountancy standards applied.  
Bankers furthermore seem to agree on the fact that credit risks in 
large part are related to the management competencies, effective 
corporate governance and integrity of management and organization. 
The argument could be made that the assessment of management 
capabilities, governance and integrity may be hindered in those cases 
where the culture is little understood.  
In a three days conferences titled; “The Future of Relationship 
Banking”, 80 senior executives from international banks and large 
companies were gathered in Punta del Este, Uruguay and were asked to 
speak about these aspects. A transcript of the conference is provided as 
annex to this thesis (Annex 1) and serves to triangulate the findings of 
the research. Main findings of three management papers were presented 
by the researcher during the conference. A survey was performed 
during the conference and in addition, through an online survey, in 
total over 100 practitioners in the field participated in the survey. 
Results show a variation of conclusions, but very especially seem to 
confirm the view, contrary to the approach taken in Basel II, that 
cultural differences and context are felt to be highly relevant in cross 
border lending.   
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What is a DBA; 
 
The DBA or Doctor in Business Administration can be described 
as an alternative route to a doctorate (Ph.D.) in management. Whereas 
the profile of a Ph.D. student tends to be more academic, the profile of a 
DBA candidate and the nature of the research project are different. The 
DBA program at the University of Bradford is designed to attract 
practicing managers, who would use the workplace as a testing ground 
for their research. Ph.D. students often do not possess working 
experiences. The commonalities and differences are explained in the 
following table: 
Table 1 Outline of differences DBA and PhD 
Common Ground DBA and PhD 
· Academic Research-based degree 
· Internationally recognized 
· Four year program 
· Internal and external supervision 
 
DBA – Academic Professional 
· Professional doctorate 
· Peer Group meetings with 
fellow DBA’s 
· Prepares for strategic 
business leadership or 
academic career 
· Makes high calibre general 
managers 
· Leading change 
· Taught in the USA and UK  
Ph.D. – Professional Academic 
· Academic doctorate 
· Solitary quest 
· Prepares for Academic 
career 
· Analysis 
· For Academia 
· Offered worldwide   
(1) Adapted from Nimbas/Bradford DBA program 2001  
 
 
Requirements of a doctorate thesis: 
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The term thesis refers to an orderly and scholarly presentation of 
an argument. It is the core submission to the examiners by a candidate 
seeking a research degree. Although there are no universal standards 
for a thesis, it usually requires students to make a substantial 
contribution to knowledge in a specific field of research. It should 
therefore also reflect the standards of originality required for a doctorate 
(University of Bradford, Butler module 1). 
A thesis furthermore should take the reader through an argument 
and needs to be in conversation with existing literature in the chosen 
fields of research. Whatever the method used and whatever the problem 
investigated, we need to understand how other scholars and 
practitioners have thought about similar issues in the past and how we 
can build upon this understanding, sometimes referred to as a body of 
knowledge, to develop improved insights and methods and thus make a 
contribution to science, even if very small.  
This is important and reading through the thesis you will 
regularly find references to other publications, such as books and 
academic journals and other public sources.  The purpose of this is to 
guide the reader through the structure and the arguments of the thesis, 
such “in conversation” with previous findings. Academic requirements 
furthermore demand that only evidence and findings of research do 
matter and that personal opinions, feelings, or impressions should be 
avoided as much as possible. 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction and development of Theory 
 
1.1. Introduction: 
 
The relationship between banks, credit rating and culture is not 
an area that has been thoroughly explored by scholars and 
practitioners.  Cross border lending, however, cannot be undertaken 
without crossing cultures. This research explores this particular 
relationship (lending to other cultures) but first seeks to explain the role 
and position of banks, through combining existing economic theories.  
New international regulation, referred to as Basel II, strives to 
improve on existing international standards (Basel I), which only set 
minimum capital standards for banks, and tries to implement by 2006, 
in over more than 100 countries, a new set of rules which seeks to 
balance capital adequacy with the specific risk profiles of the banks. It 
does not require national supervisors to impose capital requirements 
automatically, but they have significant flexibility to determine how best 
to ensure that banks are sufficiently capitalized relative to their unique 
risk. To measure the risk of the individual banks, internal credit ratings 
systems are being developed which must ensure that risks are 
appropriately measured and accounted for. Here lies one of the 
problems.  
Grunert et al (2005) have found that even in domestic lending, the 
role of non-financial factors in internal credit ratings remain 
ambiguous, whilst the eligibility of financial factors as inputs for 
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internal credit ratings is widely accepted. Analyzing credit file data from 
four major German banks, they found evidence that the combined use 
of financial and non-financial factors leads to a more accurate 
prediction of future default events than the single use of each of these 
factors. It is argued in this thesis that in case of cross border lending, 
these non-financial factors may be even more relevant.  
The role of culture and the ways of coping with its differences with 
its differences is still being debated.  In the field of cross-cultural 
studies, scholars still argue on concepts and adequate or inadequate 
methodologies, whereas practitioners in business and politics continue 
to display relative little interest in its concept and consequences. 
“Possibly one of the many reasons why the culture concept has been 
resisted”, Hall (1960), writes, “is that it throws doubt on many 
established beliefs. Fundamental beliefs….. are shown to vary widely 
from one culture to the next. It is easier to avoid the idea of the culture 
concept than to face up to it”. 
Prominent publications in cross cultural studies are reviewed and 
an understanding of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
different methodologies in this field is being sought. Key authors in the 
field are Hall, Hofstede, Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, Landis, Lewin, Segalla 
and Fischer, Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner.  The argument will be 
made that within the context of banks and credit – culture seems to be 
receiving little attention from practitioners (as well as scholars) which in 
part is reflected through the Basel II accords, but also can be easily 
observed through day-to-day practices. Bankers all over the world are 
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being trained on  how to read balance sheets, yet little attention is being 
paid as to by whom they are being created and how precisely these 
balance sheets came into existence, other than the accountancy 
standards applied, but even there existing research suggests that 
cultural factors come in play.  
Bankers furthermore seem to agree on the fact that credit risks in 
large part are related to the management competencies, effective 
corporate governance and integrity of management and organization. 
The argument can however be made that the assessment of 
management capabilities, governance and integrity may be hindered in 
those cases where the culture is little understood. In other words, how 
do bankers evaluate management of another culture, if they understand 
little of it? 
1.2. The background of the research: 
 
After having spent more than 25 years in international banking as 
regional manager (Rabobank) responsible for Latin America and later on 
as a General Manager in Argentina, the author moved on to become an 
advisor of the board of several rather large Latin American companies. 
All of these companies were dependent on external finance, mainly from 
European Banks. Whilst travelling with these clients throughout 
Europe, he noticed that it took them years to realize how different each 
of these European countries actually was. Later, similar experiences 
were observed whilst travelling with European bankers through the 
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different countries of Latin America: there, too, differences were notable 
between one country and/or region and the other.  
These experiences led him in 1998 to take part in the creation of 
DBA Corporate Finance S.A., a company constituted in Montevideo, 
that has since its beginning successfully worked in the Mercosur 
countries (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay) advising companies on their 
approach to international financial markets, multilateral agencies for 
project financing and - mainly - European financial institutions for their 
medium-term and working capital requirements.  
This has allowed the author to gain further experience and insight 
into the relations of companies with their international banks. The role 
of the company and its managers focuses on the appropriate design and 
implementation of strategies in order to ensure the optimization of the 
relationship between the client and international banks and other 
multilateral institutions. As an intermediate, DBA Corporate Finance 
S.A. builds on relationship, know-how and “know–who”, in order to 
ensure that companies are able to attract the best available financial 
services. It can only be successful as a good intermediary if it fully 
understands the objectives, motivations, possibilities and limitations of 
both parties. They have learned, to a relative extend, that they need to 
fully capture and understand what works and what does not, given the 
complexity of human relations and also given the volatility with which 
Latin American markets have operated in recent years. Several of these 
countries have since the outbreak of the Latin American debt crisis 
(1982) gone from crisis to crisis. 
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At the same time they have witnessed in the last decade a high 
consolidation of the European banking sector, which has limited the 
number of European banks considerably. In connection with this 
process and an increasing number of financial crises, an overemphasis 
on investment banking during several years and subsequent bank 
losses world-wide, further regulation in the banking sector has led 
banks to have become more restrictive in the way they perform their 
lending functions. These processes are the result of discussions and the 
accord by the Bank for International Settlements, known as Basel II, 
which effectively will require all major financial institutions in the world 
(as of 2006) to use (more) sophisticated credit models. This new 
paradigm in international finance seeks to better regulate and control 
the lending by banks, and will place a heavy emphasis on the ability of 
financial institutions to assess credit risk.  
This research will first be reviewing the question of why banks 
exist, the role and functions they perform, as well as relevant economic 
theories. This is considered important as banks continue to be the main 
source or channel for international lending. Explanation is being 
provided as to why this seems to be the case. Secondly, there will be a 
short review and understanding of what Basel II, credit rating and 
credit modelling implies and also a review of their relative strengths and 
weaknesses. Credit ratings are expected to gain in importance because 
of their potential use for determining regulatory capital adequacy and 
banks’ increasing focus on the risk-return profile in the commercial 
lending. Thirdly, this thesis will provide a literature review on cultural 
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studies, in order to explore why perhaps this field has not gained too 
much influence in the field of international finance thus far. 
Strangely enough to the author of this thesis, culture and coping 
with its differences is still debated. Even in the particular field of cross-
cultural studies, scholars still argue on concepts and adequate or 
inadequate methodologies, whereas practitioners in business and 
politics continue to display relative little interest to its concepts and 
consequences. Hall (1960) writes:  “Possibly one of the many reasons 
why the culture concept has been resisted is that it throws doubt on 
many established beliefs. Fundamental beliefs….. are shown to vary 
widely from one culture to the next. It is easier to avoid the idea of the 
culture concept than to face up to it”. 
All these experiences have led to this research which is embedded 
in practice (empirical) and which focuses on practitioners from both the 
banking as well as the corporate world.  This is in order to explore 
whether the implicit views underpinning the direction of Basel II are 
shared by the colleagues in the field.  
1.3. Research problem and hypotheses: 
 
The key argument of this research is that within the context of 
banks and credit – culture seems to be receiving little attention from 
practitioners as well as scholars.  This is in part reflected through the 
Basel II accords, but can also be observed in published work in the field 
of finance. Bankers all over the world however seem to agree on the fact 
that corporate credit risks in large part are related to the competencies 
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of management of companies and organizations. The argument can 
however be made that the assessment of management capabilities may 
be hindered in those cases where the culture is little understood. In 
other words, how do banks evaluate management of another culture for 
example, if they understand little of it? 
1.3.1. On the notion why banks exist 
 
Banking has existed and has stood the test of time for thousands 
of years and given the fact that their key function has been an 
intermediary one, this could not have been otherwise possible had 
markets not been imperfect till this very day. The first sign of banking 
originated in Babylon some three thousand years BC.  They started out 
in temples and palaces and, even today, banks are mainly housed in 
impressive buildings in order to provide the perception of credibility, 
trust and solvency. This status alone has never been enough, as already 
during the Reign of Hammurabi (1792 – 1750 BC) banking operations 
were regulated – and thereby protected – through laws.  
Throughout history, banks have had arguable positions in 
societies and it was Jesus Christ (30 AD) as mentioned in Mathew 
(21.12) who overturned the money changers tables in and around the 
temple. Still today many feel banks to be a necessary evil, instead of a 
public good.  History on banking records numerous crises, individual as 
well as national, from time to time causing profound and prolonged 
consequences to societies. At the centre of most financial and economic 
crises we always find the banks. Banks exist by the grace of a whole 
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framework of laws, regulations, and supervisory institutions, both at 
national as well as international level, which – altogether - make them 
rather different from other businesses.  
The paradigm used in the theory of financial intermediation will 
be reviewed. Since the early experience of the deposit-taking institutions 
of the 19th century, banks have issued debt instruments that are 
accepted as means of exchange and payment on the basis of a fiduciary 
relationship among the agents using them, and between the agents and 
the issuing banks.  
Supplying transaction and portfolio management services is what 
defines banking according to Fama (1980), while Kareken (1985) 
emphasises the central role of banks in managing the payment system.  
Corrigan (1982) adds to these functions the banks' twofold role of 
backup sources of liquidity for all enterprises in the economy and of 
transmission mechanism for monetary policy. Borsonne (2001) 
expanded the theory elaborating on the key functions of banks 
consisting of liquidity, credit and integrated functions, which resulted in 
circuit theory, emphasising the unique character of banks of creating 
money and that money creation makes banks differ from any other 
intermediaries (Bossone 2001). Intermediation theory helps to 
understand how intermediaries operate, but fails to answer more 
fundamental questions as to why.  
In understanding these aspects of why banks exist, both 
transactions cost theory as well as agency theory is considered to be of 
fundamental importance. Transaction cost theory (TCT) rests on two 
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essential assumptions about economic actors engaged in transactions: 
bounded rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality means that 
those who engage in economic transactions are extendedly rational, but 
only limitedly so. Opportunism according to Williamson (1985:47) 
includes lying, stealing and cheating, but it more generally refers to the 
incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculate 
efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse 
partners in an exchange. TCT does not assume that all economic actors 
are always opportunistic. Rather, all it assumes is that some of these 
actors may have opportunistic behaviour and that it is costly to 
distinguish those who are prone to opportunism from those who are 
not. TCT explains why organisations exist and that, sometimes, the cost 
of managing economic exchanges across markets is greater than the 
costs of managing economic exchanges within the boundaries of an 
organisation. This simple logic seems to have worked for banks. TCT 
also has its limitations as it focuses on cost minimisation, whereby 
economising is more fundamental than strategizing (Williamson 1975). 
It furthermore neglects the role of social relationship in economic 
transactions (highly relevant for banking) that discounts the impact of 
social relationships and culture. Granovetter (1985) for example pointed 
out that transactions are influenced by expectations that are formed by 
the history of the relationship.  
Given the complexity of banks, their large history, the central role 
in economies, and the interdependency of various relationships, agency 
theory comes in play and helps analyse what motivates different 
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principals and agents to organise themselves in the ways they do.  
Agency relationships occur whenever one partner in a transaction (the 
principal) delegate authority to another (agent) and the welfare of the 
principal is affected by the choices of the agent (Arrow 1985).  Applied 
to the banking sector – the general public delegates authority to the 
government – and through it to the central bank, or other supervisory 
institution (agent) – and the welfare of the principal (the public) is 
affected by the choice of the agent (Central Bank). Secondary is the 
principal - agent relationship between the central bank and the 
individual bank, whereby the Central Bank (principal) delegates 
authority to the individual bank (agent) in order to control and monitor 
branches, internal processes, and management. The delegation of 
decision making authority from principal to agent is problematic in 
that: (1) the interest of principal and agent will typically diverge; (2) the 
principal cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor the actions of the 
agent; and (3) the principal cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor and 
acquire information available to or possessed by the agent.  Taken 
together, these conditions constitute the agency problem – the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour on the agent’s part that works 
against the welfare of the principal. Arrow (1985) notes two essential 
sources of agency problems: moral hazard, which he equates to hidden 
actions, and adverse selection, which he equates to hidden information, 
a not uncommon phenomena in the relationship between Central Bank 
and banks. Moral hazard involves situations in which much of the 
agent’s actions is either hidden from the principal or is costly to 
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observe. Thus, it is either impossible or costly for the principal to fully 
monitor the agent’s actions.  
Barth et al (2004) provide helpful insights in the supervision of 
banks and agency problems, indicating, first, that banks are costly and 
difficult to monitor. This leads to too little monitoring of banks, which 
implies sub-optimal performance and stability. Official supervision can 
ameliorate this market failure. Second, because of informational 
asymmetries, banks are prone to contagious and socially costly bank 
runs (Argentina 2001, Uruguay 2002).  Supervision in a situation such 
as this serves a socially efficient role. Third, many countries choose to 
adopt deposit insurance schemes. This situation (1) creates incentives 
for excessive risk-taking by banks, and (2) reduces the incentives for 
depositors to monitor banks. Strong, official supervision under such 
circumstances can help prevent banks from engaging in excessive risk-
taking behaviour and thus improve bank development, performance 
and stability.  
Alternatively, powerful supervisors may exert a negative influence 
on bank performance. Powerful supervisors may use their powers to 
benefit favoured constituents, attract campaign donations, and extract 
bribes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Djankov et al., 2002 and Quintyn 
and Taylor, 2002). Under these circumstances, powerful supervision 
will be positively related to corruption and will not improve bank 
development, performance and stability. From a different perspective , 
Kane (1990) and Boot and Thakor (1993) focus on the agency problem 
between taxpayers and bank supervisors. In particular, rather than 
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focusing on political influence, Boot and Thakor (1993) model the 
behaviour of a self-interested bank supervisor when there is uncertainty 
about the supervisor's ability to monitor banks. Under these conditions, 
they show that supervisors may undertake socially sub-optimal actions. 
Thus, depending on the incentives facing bank supervisors and the 
ability of taxpayers to monitor supervision, greater supervisory power 
could hinder bank operations (Barth et al, 2004). 
Intermediation theory, transaction cost theory and agency theory 
combined helps us understand why banks exist and why they appear to 
have been doing so for more than 5.000 years.  
1.3.2. On credit and credit rating: 
 
Credit risk, or the risk of default, has always been a major topic of 
concern for banks and other financial intermediaries, and any agent 
committed to a financial contract for that matter. While concern for the 
possible default of counterparty on an agreed-upon financial contract is 
centuries old, modern techniques and models have arisen in the last 
decades that help master the problem. An outline of the differences 
between external and internal rating systems and the influence of Basel 
II accords (Bank of International Settlements) will be provided in 
chapter 2, section 2.2, in order to stress the relevance and the 
connections between both. Whereas external credit rating has existed 
for already 100 years, only in recent years have banks started to 
formalize their own internal credit rating, urged by changing regulatory 
frameworks.  
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Before credit rating and credit ratings agencies came into play, all 
financing was either done on a transactional basis, i.e. commodity 
finances for example, or on the basis of a relationship between borrower 
and financier. At the beginning of the relationship, as in Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981), there is no possibility to select borrowers according to 
their quality. Hence, problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
have to be considered. It will be questioned whether Basel II improved 
regulation will help to resolve these problems, and – in addition - to 
what extent they may become counterproductive to the suggested 
strengths and the position of housebanks1 (relationship banking) – in a 
close long-term relationship with the borrower.   
The issuance of bonds by corporations is a 20th-century 
phenomenon. It started at the beginning of the century, at 
approximately the same time that the first papers and articles were 
published on the analysis of accounting ratios, as a means of 
diagnosing the financial strength of a company. By the 1920s, this 
approach had been commercialised and specialised firms were offering 
their services, and promoting the merits of ratio analysis. This was also 
                                                 
1 A growing body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, has focused on the role of relationship 
lending as a determinant of corporate performance. In an early contribution, Cable (1985) relates the rapid 
path of industrialization and economic growth in 19th century Germany to the active role of its banking 
system. In particular, close connections between industry and their major banks, or housebanks, is 
credited with some of industrialization success in the late 19th century. Tilly (1989) reports results on the 
contribution of German universal banks to industrial investment in large corporations. His findings 
support the view that housebanks play an imp ortant, and largely positive, role in the process of corporate 
control, and of industry-wide merger activities.  
In this literature, a housebank is regarded as the premier lender of a firm, being equipped with more 
relevant, and more timely information than any "normal", nonhousebank institution. Furthermore, a 
housebank is more committed to its client, enlarging their role as financier if the firm faces sudden and 
temporary difficulties. The importance of long-term commitment in the bank–customer relationship is 
stressed by Mayer, 1988 and Hellwig, 1989 and Boot and Thakor (1994), just to name a selection of the 
extant relationship lending literature.  
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the period when Moody's (1909), Standard and Poor (1916), and other 
agencies had started to rate public debt issues. Over the last 30 years, 
the introduction of new financial products has led to the development of 
new methodologies and criteria for credit rating: Standard and Poor 
(S&P was the first rating company to rate mortgage-backed bonds 
(1975), mutual funds (1983) and asset-backed securities (1985).  
A credit rating is not, in general, an investment recommendation 
concerning a given security. In the words of S&P, "A credit rating is 
S&P's opinion of the general creditworthiness of an obligor, or the 
creditworthiness of an obligor with respect to a particular debt security 
or other financial obligation, based on relevant risk factors." A rating in 
Moody's words is ...an opinion on the future ability and legal obligation 
of an issuer to make timely payments of principal and interest on a 
specific fixed income security." Moody's ratings of industrial and 
financial companies have primarily reflected default probability, while 
expected severity of loss in the event of default has played an important 
secondary role. While the rating agencies use similar methods and 
approaches to rate debt, they sometimes come up with different ratings 
of the same debt investment. In their studies of the credit rating 
industry Cantor and Packer (1994) have illustrated this. This issue of 
ratings differences is an important one. It raises two questions. First, to 
what extent is the rating quantitatively based and what is the role of 
judgement? The second question concerns the independence of the 
rating agencies. Since the rated companies pay to be rated, there is a 
perceived danger that business pressures will affect the process. 
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Furthermore, many question the influence of rating agencies, especially 
given the fact that their influence on markets is considered to be very 
high (especially in rating countries) and, on the other hand, the fact 
that there are effectively only three major ones, who dominate 
approximately 80% of the market.  
The dominant paradigm seems to suggest that by increasing 
application of technology and modelling, whilst measuring credit risk, in 
large part inspired by market developments, such as derivative market 
development, globalisation, the liberalisation of financial markets, and, 
last but not least, that by applying stricter controls, through Central 
Bank and Basel II regulation, credit risk and secondary systemic risks 
may be better managed. 
It will be argued in this thesis that evidence so far has not 
confirmed the same. Ferri et al (2001) suggested moreover that the 
Basel II proposals would increase the volatility of capital needs of banks 
in non-high-income countries vs. high-income countries' banks. In fact, 
bank and corporate ratings in non-high-income countries appear to be 
strongly related –in an asymmetric way – to changes in sovereign 
ratings. We have seen financial sectors in emerging markets being 
severely affected, despite often above-average Basel II capital adequacy, 
whereas – for example – the German financial sector, has continued 
operating without seemingly much sense of urgency with an average 
Tier 1 capital ratio of only 6.8%, which is less than half the 13.4% of 
OECD banks excluding Japan, according to The Banker (2003). What 
 31 
this seems to indicate is that Basel II may further enhance the gap 
between OECD and non-OECD countries.   
Chapter 2 section 2.2 of this thesis also intends to illustrate to 
which extent the dominant paradigm in this particular field seems to 
reinforce the belief that improved regulation and an even more refined 
approach to credit and credit rating, both internal as well as external, 
may improve agency costs. It has been suggested that for the particular 
field of finance and, consistent with the positivist paradigm – especially 
the functionalist approach –, the field seems to run the risk of 
producing more and more facts confirming a status-quo of the science 
and its belief systems. Any adequate analysis of the nature and role of 
the mathematical language in finance necessarily requires fundamental 
understanding of the worldviews underlying the views expressed with 
respect to the nature and role of language (Ardalan, 2002) 
Ardalan (2002) recommends serious conscious thinking about the 
social philosophy upon which finance is based and of the alternative 
avenues for development. The knowledge of the different paradigms is of 
paramount importance to any scientist, because the process of learning 
about a favoured paradigm is also the process of learning about what 
that paradigm is not. The knowledge of paradigms makes scientists 
aware of the boundaries within which they approach their subject. Each 
of the different paradigms implies a different way of social theorising in 
general, and finance in particular. 
Academic finance can gain much by exploiting the new 
perspectives coming from other paradigms. An understanding of 
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different paradigms leads to a better understanding of the multi-faceted 
nature of finance. Although a researcher may decide to conduct 
research from the point of view of a certain paradigm, an understanding 
of the nature of other paradigms leads to a better understanding of 
what one is doing. Knowledge of finance is ultimately a product of the 
researcher's paradigmatic approach to this multifaceted phenomenon. 
Viewed from this angle, the pursuit of financial knowledge is seen as 
being as much an ethical, moral, ideological and political activity as a 
technical one. A purely functionalist approach however, runs the severe 
risk of believing that it is only a technical activity.  
Basel II and the direction which it has taken indicate that there 
will be more regulation and control on banks and finance, with the 
intent to more appropriately manage and understand risks. It will be 
argued here that there are serious drawbacks to the universal approach 
taken, thereby measuring with seemingly different standards toward 
OECD and non-OECD countries. Publications of recent years on credit 
defaults – especially high profile cases in OECD countries -, instability 
of financial- and capital markets and their participants, all seem to 
demonstrate problems of asymmetry of information, including adverse 
selection and moral hazard, as well as agency cost. All these facts seem 
to indicate that more and better regulation currently in the making will 
not be able to resolve these challenges. 
1.3.3. On cross cultural differences: 
Cross-cultural research deals primarily with the similarities and 
differences between cultures. The best research of this kind is 
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multicultural (e.g., more than three cultures) in focus and more than 
likely deals with fairly basic psychological processes. Intercultural 
research tends to focus on the penetration by a member of one culture 
into another culture. So, while cross-cultural research has a fairly long 
history in psychology (Klineberg, 1980), intercultural studies are fairly 
recent. This thesis will mainly cover cross-cultural research.  
In most Western languages, “culture” commonly means 
“civilisation” or “refinement of the mind” and in particular the results of 
such refinement, like education, art, and literature. Hofstede (1991) 
describes this as culture in the narrow sense, sometimes referred to as 
"culture one". Cultural as “mental software”, however, correspondents 
to a much broader use of the word which is common among social 
anthropologists: this Hofstede (1991) describes as "culture two" and is 
the catchword for all the patterns of thinking, feeling and acting, overt 
and covert behaviour explicit and implicit. Not only those activities 
supposed to refine the mind are included in culture two, but also the 
ordinary and menial things in life: greetings, eating, showing or not 
showing feelings, keeping a certain physical distance from others, 
making love, or maintaining body hygiene. Culture understood in this 
way deals with much more fundamental human processes than culture 
one. 
Everybody looks at the world from behind the windows of a 
cultural home and everybody prefers to act as if people from other 
countries (cultures) have something special about them, but that home 
is normal. Unfortunately, there is no normal position in cultural 
 34 
matters. “Possibly one of the many reasons why the culture concept has 
been resisted”, Hall (1960), writes, “is that it throws doubt on many 
established beliefs. Fundamental beliefs….. are shown to vary widely 
from one culture to the next. It is easier to avoid the idea of the culture 
concept than to face up to it”. In addition, “the concepts of culture … 
touch upon such intimate matters that they are often brushed aside at 
the very point where people begin to comprehend their implications” 
(Hall, 1960).  
Chapter 2, section 2.3., reviews some of the more prominent 
publications, deals with some of the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of the different methodologies in research, and outlines some of the 
current issues in cross-cultural research. Hall (1976) describes his 
views on low- and high context cultures (very much in line with 
Trompenaars’s dimension of universalism and particularism) and 
suggests that if one could get behind the scenes one would find context 
dependant results in the majority of research projects. Western science, 
according to Hall (1976) is striving for replicability and rigor in methods 
and is conducted with a view to eliminating context.  
Clearly there are many relations of previous findings to the 
current research.  Adhering to the Dionysian approach to research, 
different research findings will be combined as to approach this 
research embedded in the proper context of the field of banking and 
credit, thereby considering that all theoretical models are incomplete.  
The focus of this research could not be otherwise than 
exploratory, given that the relationship between culture and cross 
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border lending has not been investigated thus far. Explanation is being 
sought as to why this could be the case.  
The research is moderate in its ambition, as it will hopefully 
provide for an indication –a direction at most- in which ways culture 
and its differences influence banking and credit. 
1.4. Methodology: 
 
According to Hall (1976), it is never possible to understand 
completely another human being: and no individual will ever really 
understand himself – the complexity is too great and there is not 
enough time to constantly take things apart and examine them. This is 
the beginning of wisdom in human relations. However, understanding 
oneself and understanding others are closely related processes. To do 
one, you must start with the other, and vice versa (Hall, 1976 page 69). 
This observation by Hall serves as one of the perspectives on which this 
thesis has been built.  
Fay (1996) suggests that there is no self-understanding without 
other-understanding, and the extent of our self-consciousness is limited 
to the extent of our knowledge of others. To identify others as different 
requires that we also identify the ways we are similar. Much social 
thought consists of oppositional categories, such as the case in cross 
cultural research (self versus other, particular vs. universal, insider vs. 
outsider etc). The same dualistic thinking mars meta-theories in the 
philosophy of social science: atomism vs. holism, cause vs. meaning etc. 
Fay (1996) warns against those pernicious dualisms and argues that 
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such thinking promotes an “either – or” mentality in which one category 
precludes it’s supposed opposite. Often, one side of a dichotomy 
depends on and invokes the other – in which case the dichotomy is 
subverted.  
Within the context of this argument and this thesis it is perhaps 
illustrative to quote van Deventer and Imai (2005) in their book: Credit 
risk Models and the Basel Accords, (page 135), where  referring to 
different researchers having found the different levels of statistical 
significance, the write; 
“What we do believe is that quantitative credit models provide 
cheaper, faster and more accurate indices of credit quality than the 
traditional credit analysis practiced by most financial institutions”. 
 It can be argued here that depending on the context they may be 
right. This would be the case in a large domestic market such as the 
USA, where financial institutions using large databases for consumer 
lending (credit card business, mortgage lending), as well as for the 
credit market to the small and medium sized companies, can be 
efficient users of (sophisticated) credit models. This may perhaps not be 
the case with the larger issuers of debt instruments, such as for 
example the cases of Parmalat, Enron, Worldcom and the like 
(Economist, 2005). A similar argument can be made for cross border 
lending.  
The other pillar perhaps is the philosophical perspective referred 
to as relativism, which is the doctrine that states that either experience 
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(in the case of epistemological relativism) or reality (in the case of 
ontological relativism) is a function of a particular conceptual scheme.  
Epistemological and ontological relativism taken together imply 
that so deep are the differences which separate those within different 
frameworks, that their experiences and beliefs would be fundamentally 
incommensurable (Fay, 1996).  This branch of thinking and research, to 
which the author of this thesis subscribes, claims that things are 
different from different points of view and the idea that different 
viewpoints are equally valid. Moreover, contrary viewpoints may well be 
equally valid across particular and peculiar societal settings.  
This research has been guided by the idea that the objective of 
this research is exploratory; it aims to be a qualitative enquiry and an 
advisable first step to be taken before a real enquiry –a quantitative 
enquiry– can be undertaken. The hypotheses formulated and the 
applied methodology, which will be explained further, both combined, 
intend to establish a reasonable and plausible argument as to whether 
practitioners share the view that cultural impacts influence the 
effectiveness of cross border lending and whether further credit rating 
(of hard factors), as a result of Basel II, will sufficiently, according to 
Grunert et al (2005); “alleviate asymmetric information problems 
between borrowers and lenders”.  
1.5. Outline of the Thesis: 
 
Figure 1 Outline of Thesis 
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1.6. Hypotheses and key assumptions: 
 
According to Titscher et al (2000) hypotheses are predictions that 
relate to a particular population, where no general validity is being 
claimed. Research hypotheses are tested on particular objects of 
investigation that are representative of the populations in question.  
Titscher et al (2000) describe three assumptions derived from this 
approach: 
1)  Hypotheses can only be tested by those investigations that are 
either designed as censuses or that target a representative sample.  
2)  The question of how the target population is to be defined 
arises from the assumptions that drive the particular research. 
Chapter 2, section 
2.1. 
Why banks exist 
Chapter 2, section 
2.3. 
Cross Cultural Studies 
Chapter 2, section 
2.2. 
Credit and credit 
rating 
Chapter 3. 
Methodology, philosophical considerations,  
Methods and approach to research 
Chapter 5.  
Discussion, limitations and recommendations to further research and 
conclusions 
Chapter 4.  
Research Findings 
Chapter 1. 
Introduction and development of theory,   
Research problem and hypotheses 
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3)  It is only possible to make statements about the particular 
population through controlled sampling.  
 
Please find below a summary of the entire key hypothesis and 
sub-hypotheses; 
H.1.1. In general banks seem to be very competent with regard to 
understanding risks.  
H.1.2. Clients of banks would be benefited if banks were rated in 
terms of client’s satisfaction. 
H.1.3. The long history in banking and the lack of alternatives 
means that banks will continue to exist for many more years. 
H.1.4. With current supervision and regulation on banks one can 
be confident about low systemic risks. 
H.1.5. Banks play a crucial, mostly constructive role within the 
world economy. 
H.1.6. With increased knowledge and modern techniques in 
finance the role of relationship in bank -client relations will diminish. 
 
And the sub-hypotheses;  
H.1.6.1. Most companies tend to act opportunistically in their 
bank-relations.   
H.1.6.2. Banks are considered by most clients as a necessary evil. 
H.16.3. Housebanks play an important and largely positive role in 
the process of corporate control; and borrowers with a strong bank–
borrower relationship receive more competitive credit on average. 
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The role of rating agencies such as Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s 
and Fitch-IBCA has increased during the last decades. Both country 
credit ratings as well as company credit ratings have become 
indispensable tools in today’ s finance. 
H.2.1. The role of credit rating agencies generally can be 
described as constructive and a valuable complementary tool.    
H.2.2. Credit rating agencies, despite their long history and 
expertise do not really possess competencies, which may prevent 
default risk.          
H.2.3. The role of credit rating agencies should be more critically 
assessed and their influence (oligopoly) in finance should be reduced.  
  
H.2.4. The credit analysis process of a credit rating agency and 
those of a housebank are comparable in terms of depth and quality. 
  
H.2.5. The new Basel II regulations, to be implemented in 2006, 
will further contribute to a better risk management and control of 
financial institutions and markets.  
H.2.6. The new Basel II regulations carry the risk of a further 
widening of the gap between high income and low income countries.  
 
Following the above chapter on the topic of cross cultural 
research, the following hypotheses were formulated: 
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H.3.1. Cultural differences have played a role in there having been 
so many accidents (defaults) throughout history in international 
finance.   
H.3.2. If the bank does not understand the cultural context of a 
particular country or region, it becomes highly doubtful it will 
understand the risks.  
H.3.3. Capabilities to make friends, combined with common sense 
ensure healthy bank-client relations.  
 
And sub-hypotheses; 
H.3.3.1 Clients of banks would be benefited if banks were rated in 
terms of clients’ satisfaction.   
H.3.3.2. The commitment of most relationship banks depends 
largely on the weather (Umbrella whilst the sun is out, requesting it 
back when clouds appear).  
 
The following key assumptions have been applied to the research: 
Hypotheses were derived from literature study and brought to the 
test in a survey amongst both bankers and their clients, all of which are 
active in cross border lending. Some of the concepts and hypothesis 
were discussed and worked out during a three-day conference where 80 
executives from banks and companies were gathered, also for the 
purpose of this thesis. 
The sample can be considered representative for banks and 
companies active in cross border lending.  
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Cross border lending is highly regulated through Central Bank 
and BIS regulation, and (internal) credit rating, its effectiveness and the 
impacts of cultural differences is considered problematic, as to the 
expected positive effects of further regulation through Basel II (2006). 
Although the relevance of culture differences has been studied by 
many scholars, no previous studies have been found on the 
relationships between cross border lending and cultural differences. 
Given this identified gap in the specific field of banking and 
finance and culture studies, the objective of the research could not be 
other than exploratory.   
1.7. Summary: 
 
The research project focuses on the various aspects which may be 
considered important within the relationships of cross-border lending, 
both at the level of companies as well as for the banks. Very especially 
regarding the way in which banks – and supervisors – believe the 
evaluation of the quality of the borrowers should be conducted. It was 
felt that (more) attention should be paid to soft factors, especially to 
understanding the cultural background and the culture concept itself.   
Secondly, the research focussed at the relationship between credit 
ratings agencies and banks, the role of credit rating agencies and their 
effectiveness.  
Thirdly the objective of this research has aimed at what can be 
expected from the implementation of Basel II. Markets, especially those 
operating in cross border lending, are not yet convinced about the 
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possible positive outcome of this new regulation, as it seems to produce 
more regulation and control. No consideration seems to exist within the 
new Basel II framework as to the soft factors (Grunert et al, 2005), 
including the cultural differences, whilst evaluating credit risk.    
1.7.1. Conceptual framework to the research: 
 
As can be observed from the conceptual framework given below, 
cross border lending is a complex field, which demands careful 
processes and controls. In this thesis, cross border lending is limited to 
the lending by banks to companies across borders. Given the specific 
responsibility of banks towards their depositors, their stakeholders, the 
regulatory authorities and perhaps society at large, due consideration 
needs to given as to if credit is being granted and risks are being 
assumed.   
 
 
 
Figure 2 Conceptual framework
 
 
BANKS: 
Decision making, 
responsibility, 
organisational and 
strategic issues, 
credit origination, 
evaluation, rating, 
control 
Cross border 
lending 
International legal 
and regulatory 
setting (Basel II) 
National legal and 
regulatory setting 
Cross cultural risks, 
due to cultural 
differences 
Corporate risks, 
risks of default, 
industry risks 
Country Risks, 
political, currency, 
social & economic  
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As can be derived from the above figure, cross cultural risks 
resulting from cultural differences are not considered by regulators and 
banks. This research explores whether the exclusion of these risks is 
considered acceptable by practitioners. At the same time, it seeks to 
understand whether the other implicit views underpinning the Basel II 
accords are being shared.   
Similar to capital market investors that rely on credit ratings 
provided by ratings agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor and Fitch 
IPCA), banks assign internal credit ratings to appraise the 
creditworthiness of their borrowers. In both cases, ratings can be 
interpreted as a screenings technology that is applied to alleviate 
asymmetric information problems between borrowers and lenders 
(Grunert et al, 2005).  Internal credit ratings for corporate borrowers 
represent the basis for loan approval, pricing, monitoring and loan loss 
provisioning. Traditional rating or conventional evaluation of 
creditworthiness can be based on the following aspects: 
Financial factors: 
· Solvency of the borrower 
· Profitability of the borrower 
· Liquidity of borrower 
· Cash flow generation  
· Debt to equity ratio’s 
· Size of the company in terms of sales 
 
Non financial factors: 
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· Management capabilities of the companies, including 
reputation and corporate governance 
· Industry perspectives, including market position, 
competition, risks of new entrants, government regulation, 
environmental issues 
· Country risks to be duly separated in sovereign risk, 
political risks, transfers risks and corporate risks.  
· Transaction risks, such as structure and availability of 
collateral 
Consideration of non-financial factors is beyond controversy (see 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000a and Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2001). There is however a lack of quantitative 
research on this issue (Günther and Grüning, 2000). With respect to 
these “soft” factors, bankers often refer to their experience and distrust 
the sole use of financial criteria. A first investigation of the importance 
of soft information in borrower-bank relationship is conducted by 
Berger et al. (2002) and Stein (2002). Depending on bank size, Berger et 
al. (2002) explore a bank’s ability to act in projects that require the 
evaluation of soft information. They find that small banks are more 
capable of collecting and acting on soft information than large banks. 
Stein (2002) points out that decentralized banking hierarchies are likely 
to be more attractive when project’s soft factors are to be evaluated. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Section 2.1. - WHY BANKS EXIST 
 
2.1.1. Introduction:  
 
This section will first be reviewing the question of why banks 
exist, the role and functions they perform, as well as relevant economic 
theories. This is considered important as banks continue to be the main 
source or channel for international lending. Explanation is being 
provided as to why this seems to be the case. In section 2.2. there will 
be a short review and understanding of what Basel II, credit rating and 
credit modelling implies and also a review of their relative strengths and 
weaknesses. Credit ratings are expected to gain in importance because 
of their potential use for determining regulatory capital adequacy and 
banks’ increasing focus on the risk-return profile in the commercial 
lending. Thirdly section 2.3. of this Chapter provides a literature review 
on cultural studies, in order to explore why perhaps this field has not 
gained too much influence in the field of international finance thus far. 
 
Throughout the author’s 25 years in banking and finance, he 
seldom came across a colleague interested in the origin of banking.  
This appears to confirm the popular view that bankers seem to have a 
short memory, yet a very long horizon.  
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Interestingly, the author has spent most of his career in the 
international trade and commodity finance and according to the data 
provided by Davies and Davies (1998) this seems to be the start – and 
the basis upon which banking – and later on money and credit, was 
built. Actually lots of economic theory is built on commodity principles 
(Smith, Walras, and Keynes). Keynes (1953 p.222), for example, 
explains the money rate of interest, to be nothing more than the 
percentage excess of a sum of money contracted for a forward delivery, 
e.g. a year hence, over what we may call the “spot” or cash price of the 
sum thus contracted for forward delivery. He uses the spot and forward 
prices of wheat to explain this concept.   
It would be impossible to reproduce all the facts from Davies 
(1998) yet some of the more relevant occurrences related to banking 
and credit, are outlined below.  
 
2.1.1.1 Key conclusions from the history of banking – and banks: 
“Everything has been said before, but since nobody listens we 
have to keep going back and beginning all over again”. - André 
Gide, French critic (1869 – 1951)  
 
And so this seems to be holding truth also for banking. The first 
sign of banking originated in Babylon some three thousand years B.C. 
and started out of temples and palaces that provided safe places for the 
storage of valuables.2 Still today banks are housed in the mostly 
                                                 
2 Pythius (600 BC) and Pasion’s  (career 394-371 BC) were two of the first prominent 
bankers, the first being referred to as a merchant banker, and the later, Pasion, 
becoming the wealthiest and most famous Greek banker, gaining his freedom as a 
slave. Already at 200 BC, reference is made to the prominent banking centre Delos, a 
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impressive buildings in order to provide the perception of credibility, 
trust and solvency. To this extent they try to reflect the temple and 
palace status of bygone days. Yet, this status alone was never enough, 
as already during the Reign of Hammurabi (1792 – 1750 BC) banking 
operations were regulated – and thereby protected – through laws.  
Clear reference to macroeconomic policies is made in reference to 
the Reign of Diocletian (Rome 284-305) making vigorous attempts to 
halt inflation. Direct controls of prices and wages were mentioned, as 
well as a failed introduction of new coinage, whilst the older coins 
remained in use. Market forces already at that time appeared to be too 
strong.  Successful, however, was the introduction of the world’s first 
system of annual budgets.  
Some five hundred years later China first introduced paper 
money, which was only learned of by Marco Polo (1275-1292) when he 
lived in China. The Chinese also were the first to allow too many note-
issuing institutions, which led to the first recorded hyperinflation in 
1166. It took China however approximately 300 years for this 
experiment to finally lead to hyperinflation. A more recent example of 
similar magnitude would be Argentina, which during 1989 – 2003 lived 
through a comparable experience.  
History on banking records numerous crises, systems being 
tested, system failing, systems rising. Not only economic problems as 
inflation and hyperinflation, changing monetary systems, speculation 
                                                                                                                                               
combination of a magnificent harbour and housing the famous temple of Apollo. A 
normal rate of interest during those days would be 10%.  
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[Tulip mania (1634-1637)], but also numerous individual, national as 
well as international banking crises follow (including bank panics 1837 
US, 1857 world wide, 1873 US and Germany, 1890 Barings first crises 
from over investments in South America, 1907 international banking 
crises starting in New York, 1929 Wall Street Great Crash, 1982 Latin 
American debt crisis, 1991 BCCI, 1993 Beginning of Japanese Banking 
Crises, Argentina 2002 largest sovereign default in history), and several 
attempts for long lasting monetary unions (Latin Monetary Union – 
1865-1926), Scandinavian Monetary Union (1873-1924), European 
Monetary Union  and single currency (2002 - …..). 
At the centre of each of these crises we always find the banks. 
From the first European bank founded in 1401 in Barcelona, to the 
financial powerhouses that rule financial and capital markets today, 
some observations seem to have remained stable over time. Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1996, 2003) report on 117 systemic banking crises (defined 
as much or all of bank capital being exhausted) that have occurred in 
93 countries since the late 1970s. They also report, in addition, 51 
borderline and smaller (non-systemic) banking crises in 45 countries 
during that same period. Their findings furthermore indicate that most 
episodes of insolvency are caused by a mixture of bad luck, bad policies 
– both microeconomic (regulatory) and macroeconomic – and bad 
banking.  Banks mainly work with other people’s money, and do so with 
fragile capital bases.  This, in times of crisis, easily provokes panic and 
liquidity shortages. Banks continue to market a perception of trust, of 
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solvency, which when called upon massively, usually does not stand the 
test, leading to yet another crisis.  
Banks exist by the grace of a whole framework of laws and 
regulations, which makes them different from other businesses. When a 
banking crisis occurs, depositors and taxpayers usually end up paying 
for the damage. This, too, tends to indicate that banks are special. 
 
2.1.2. Economic perspective on banks: 
 
Information economics and banking theories provide us with 
various insights into why banks exist in the economy. The key theories, 
besides classical and neo-classical economic theories, are transaction 
cost theory, and intermediation theory in combination with agency 
theory. Assuming these theories apply, banks exist because they 
perform certain special functions that no other financial institutions 
can replicate.  
For decades, researchers have studied the question of why banks 
exist (transaction cost theory) and have made considerable progress in 
developing banking theories (Diamond (1984). The critical role banks 
perform in economies becomes most obvious and can be understood 
well in times of economic crisis and reference can be made to more 
recent events, for example the Asia crisis (1997/1998), the prolonging 
Japanese economic crisis, the Argentine financial and economic crisis 
(2001) (source: The Economist). In each of these examples banks have 
played a crucial role: One of the causes of the Asia crisis was the fact 
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that local banks appeared to have granted abundant amounts on 
financing large economic groups, whose debts could not be serviced 
when economic growth slowed down. The Japanese banking crisis was 
a direct consequence of Japanese banks over-extending finance to many 
Japanese companies, including those operating in real estate until the 
real estate bubble burst. This caused the Japanese banks to drop from 
once being the largest banks in the world to the rather insignificant 
status of today. Argentine banks had for years been buying Argentine 
government bonds and other sovereign debt instruments, until the 
Argentine government defaulted on its debt servicing, as a result of 
impossible high interest rates to refinance its already too high debt, and 
sky rising public deficits. In all three cases it has been taking years for 
the banks (tax payers, stockholders, depositors and the like)  to make 
up for the bad loan portfolios incurred by the banks during the good 
times, causing tremendous damage to local, regional and often 
international economies.  It could be argued here that the role of banks 
- at least in these examples – have had a net negative impact on the 
economies at hand, and this for a considerable long period of time.  
Although many may take the existence of banks for granted, in a 
”perfect” world, where savers could channel their surplus funds to 
borrowers (or other investments) without friction, financial 
intermediaries such as banks would not be needed. As a corollary, 
banks’ existence must be motivated by certain economic frictions, so 
that banks, as financial intermediaries, can provide some value added 
from the special functions they claim to have. At the core of the value 
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added, is dealing with information problems with borrowers, caused by 
the moral hazard behaviour. Because the lender must evaluate a 
borrower’s creditworthiness, banks’ investments in information 
technology, human resources, and (risk management) systems, allow 
them to achieve scale economies making them more efficient than 
others. Banks are furthermore considered credible monitors because 
their returns are more predictable due to the diversification effects of 
making large numbers of loans (Diamond, 1984). A similar argument 
can be made to those who wish to place their savings with banks, 
without having to bother too much about the related risks. 
Despite last decades’ “financial innovation” and emphasis on 
investment banking, whereby banks were increasingly active in 
origination of loans without putting the loans on their own balance 
through either securitization of their assets or outright sales trying to 
shift from interest-based income to fee-based income, we still (again) 
have lending at the core of the banks.  As illustrated in the previous 
chapter, historically we have always found the lending function or 
transformation function at the heart of the banking operations even 
before the coinage was introduced. Obviously, lending starts after the 
individual or institution obtains the resources to be able to lend. Theory 
on lending often refers to this function as the transformation function; 
transforming deposits of money (irrespective of which form) to loans. An 
often referred to paper has been Corrigan (1982) in his essay: Are Banks 
Special? As president of the US Federal Reserve Bank he argued that 
specialisation of financial institutions had worked well and, at least in 
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some cases, that specialisation may still be more efficient and may also 
better serve the public interest. This view is associated with the 
historical separation of banking from commerce and from investment 
banking. In general, this "separation doctrine" in banking grew out of 
concerns about concentration of financial power, possible conflicts of 
interest, and the appropriate scope of risks banks should incur in the 
face of the special trusteeship falling on institutions that engage in the 
lending of depositors' money. He furthermore specified what makes 
banks to be special and gave three characteristics that distinguish 
banks from all other classes of institutions -- both financial and non-
financial.  
 
Banks offer transaction accounts.  
 
Only banks issue transaction accounts; that is, they incur  in 
liabilities payable on demand at par and readily transferable by the 
owner to third parties. The owner of a transaction account can demand 
and receive currency in the face amount deposited in the account; write 
a check in the full amount of the account; or perhaps most importantly, 
he can transfer the full amount of the account to a third party almost 
instantaneously by wire transfer. The liquidity, mobility, and 
acceptability of bank-issued transaction accounts permit our diverse 
economic and financial system to work with the relative ease and 
efficiency to which we are accustomed. Moreover, in periods of financial 
stress, the capacity to quickly move transaction account balances to 
third parties acquires special significance by providing elements of 
flexibility and certainty in making and receiving payments that help to 
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insure that financial disruptions do not spread. Individual banks can 
also create these highly liquid and mobile balances through their 
lending function. The capacity to "create" liabilities with these 
characteristics is vital to the ongoing needs of commerce, but it takes 
on special significance in periods of financial stress. 
 
Banks are the backup source of liquidity for all other institutions.  
 
Banks' ability to supply credit and liquidity, particularly in 
situations where other institutions or markets may be unwilling or 
unable to do so, arises because the deposit-creating function of banks 
(in tandem with banks' relationship with the central bank) provides an 
element of credit and liquidity elasticity which is not immediately 
available to other institutions. As a matter of fact, the extent and 
frequency with which banks have had to directly rely on extraordinary 
funding by the central bank (either through the discount window or via 
open market operations) has been quite limited. In the normal course 
and even in periods of stress, individual banks, and the banking system 
as a whole, are able to provide necessary liquidity because of their 
ability to quickly fund loans through a variety of market sources 
including the domestic and foreign interbank market, RPs, the issuance 
of large certificates of deposit (CDs), and so on. For many banks, access 
to these markets has become the primary source of bank liquidity. 
Virtually all other financial markets and other classes of institutions are 
directly or indirectly dependent on the banking system as their standby 
or backup source of credit and liquidity. Banks can fulfil this function 
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for a variety of reasons, including their relative ease of access to deposit 
and non-deposit sources of funding. This role of banks as a standby 
source of liquidity takes on special significance in periods of stress and 
in this light underscores the importance of rigorous and impartial credit 
judgements by banks.  
 
Banks are the transmission mechanism for monetary policy.  
 
There is a direct link between banks and the central bank arising 
in part from the central banks' lender of last resort function. More 
broadly, the fact that banks are subject to reserve requirements places 
the banking system in the unique position of being the transmission 
mechanism, through which the actions and policies of the central bank 
have their effect on financial market conditions, money and credit 
creation, and economic conditions generally. To put it somewhat 
differently, the required reserves of the banking system have often been 
described as the pivot upon which the monetary authority operates 
monetary policy. The reserves in the banking system also serve the 
complementary purpose of providing the working balances which permit 
our highly efficient financial markets to function and to affect the 
orderly end-of-day settlement of the hundreds of billions of dollars of 
transactions that occur over the course of each business day. It is 
clear that these essential characteristics are highly complementary and 
furthermore that it is the relationship among them that best captures 
the essence of what makes banks special.  
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2.1.3. Definition and understanding of banks: 
 
Barron’s Dictionary of Banking Terms (2000) defines a bank as an 
organisation, usually a corporation that accepts deposits, makes loans, 
pays checks and performs related services for the public. The US Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 defines a bank as any depository 
financial institution that accepts checking accounts (checks) and makes 
commercial loans, and its deposits are insured by the federal deposit 
insurance agency. A bank acts as a middleman between suppliers of 
funds and users of funds, substituting its own credit judgement for that 
of the ultimate suppliers of funds, collecting those funds from three 
sources: checking accounts, saving and time deposits; short term 
borrowings from other banks; and equity capital. A bank earns money 
by reinvesting these funds gathered from depositors and other sources 
mainly in loans. An investment bank manages securities for clients and 
for its own trading account. In making loans, a bank assumes both 
interest rate risk and credit risk; market rates may rise above the net 
interest margin a bank earns on its portfolio and investments, and 
borrowers may default.  
The above description only refers to the general definition, there 
are, however, a wide range of different types of banks. Some specific 
types of banks are explained here below (adapted from Barron’s 2000). 
Besides, in literature on banks one finds that authors often do not 
precisely explain what type of bank, banking sector or activities and 
functions are considered whilst discussing the notion and role of banks: 
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Saving bank – the most traditional form of banking, whereby the 
institution accepts deposits (grain or money) and invests or issues loans 
or other basic credit instruments.    
Retail bank – banking services offered to the general public, 
(individuals and households) and these include different types of 
accounts and loans, residential mortgages, deposit services, investment 
advice and (relative standard) products, credit card and sometimes 
insurance. Usually retail banking is a high volume business with many 
services providers competing for market share.  
Wholesale bank – banking services offered to corporations and 
institutional customers such as pension funds, government agencies, 
but also other banks. Services include lending, different types of 
accounts (cash management, online banking services) commercial 
mortgages and can contain, depending on the bank’s strategy:  
investment, merchant and commercial banking services. 
Investment bank – sometimes this type of banking (mainly US 
banks) is concentrated in one specific banking organisation, and the 
services include sale and distribution (new offering) of securities, 
usually buying securities from the issuer as principal and assuming the 
risks of distributing the securities to investors. The process of 
purchasing and distributing the securities to the investors is known as 
underwriting. The Glass-Stegall Act of 1933 (shortly after the outbreak 
of financial crisis) prohibited commercial banks from underwriting 
securities and required banks to sell their underwriting affiliates, 
because of abuses by some commercial bankers in selling securities 
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(this seems a recurring theme over times).  The 1933 act was removed 
by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which authorised commercial 
banks again through affiliated companies (ensuring the existence of so-
called Chinese walls) to underwriting commercial paper, corporate debt, 
and equity securities.  
Merchant bank – A type of banking mainly recognised in Europe 
as a separate banking type, which invests its own capital in leverage 
buy-outs, corporate acquisitions and structured finance transactions. 
Merchant banking is a purely fee-based business, where a bank 
assumes market risks, but no long-term credit risk. In France this 
banking type is referred to a banque d’affaire, and holds considerably 
more powers than its British counterpart. 
Commercial bank – a full service bank, which can entail both 
retail and wholesale banking. Many commercial banks supply loans, 
accept deposits, provide different account services and provide trust 
services, trade finance, and international banking.  
Bank holding company – entity controlling one or more 
commercial banks, investment advisory as well as insurance related 
services. The widening of the scope of services became possible thanks 
to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. This opened the possibilities for 
a financial holding company to have different functions under one – 
holding – structure. Citibank has become a good example lately. In 
Europe these institutions are often referred to as All-Finanz groups, 
holdings which contain both an insurance company as well as a 
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banking arm. Allianz Group, ING Group and Fortis Group are good 
examples.   
The above mentioned classification of banks brings us to the 
following historical sequence of bank type: 
Figure 3 Development in banking 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.4. Why do organisations exist? 
 
Classical and neo classical theories, beginning with Adam Smith, 
point to the amazing ability of markets to co-ordinate economic 
production and exchange at very low costs and without government 
planning. Simply stated, Smith’s fundamental proposition was that an 
economy could be co-ordinated by a decentralised system of prices (the 
invisible hand). Given that markets are so effective in co-ordinating 
economic exchanges, it has always been a bit of a mystery why not all 
exchanges are managed by markets, i.e. why economic exchange (such 
as lending and borrowing) would ever be managed through firms (Coase 
1937).  Remarkably, an answer to the question “why do organisations 
exist?” was formulated by Ronald Coase (1937) in The Nature of the 
Firm, where he claimed that the reason why organisations exist is that, 
sometimes, the cost of managing economic exchanges across markets is 
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greater than the cost of managing them within the boundaries of an 
organisation. This simple logic seems to have applied to banks.  
The costs of using the price system involves such activities as 
discovering what prices are, negotiating contracts, inspection and 
settling disputes. The most lasting contribution of Coase’s work was to 
place transaction costs at the centre of the analysis of the question why 
firms exist and to suggest that markets and organisations are (mutually 
exclusive) alternatives for managing the same transactions. The Nature 
of the Firm was most cited and little used, by Coase's own admission, 
and this early lack of influence stems largely from Coase's failure to 
make his approach operational, and his lack of precision about which 
transactions will be left to the market and which will be internalised 
within firms (Barney and Hesterley, 1996). Later theorists addressed 
these deficiencies by developing a more complete model of the costs 
using a market to manage economic exchanges. This work has come to 
be known as transaction costs theory, and it is Williamson (1975) who 
answers and approaches what is now considered to be the core of 
transaction costs economics.  The transaction cost theory rests on two 
essential assumptions about economic actors (be they individuals or 
firms) engaged in transactions: bounded rationality and opportunism 
(Barney and Hesterley, 1996). Bounded rationality means that those 
who engage in economic transactions are “intendedly rational, but only 
limitedly so” (Simon 1947: xxiv). 
Opportunism is also a departure from the behavioural 
assumptions used in mainstream economics.  While traditional 
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economics assumes simply that economic actors behave out of self-
interest, TCT assumes the possibility of self-interest seeking with guile 
(Williamson 1975:26). For Williamson (1985:47), opportunism includes 
lying, stealing and cheating, but it more generally refers to the 
incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially calculated 
efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse 
partners in an exchange. TCT does not assume that all economic actors 
are always opportunistic.  Rather, all it assumes is that some of these 
actors may have opportunistic behaviour and that it is costly to 
distinguish those who are prone to opportunism from those who are 
not. Stiglitz (2000) claimed that information economics over the last 25 
years has – beyond a wealth of specific results- changed the way we 
think about many aspects of economic theory and quotes Hayek (1945) 
that the central problem of economics was a problem of knowledge or 
information: “the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its 
totality”. Stiglitz, in the same paper (2000), explains that the equity 
markets do a better job of risk sharing than do bond markets or loans. 
Yet relatively little new capital is raised through equity, and few 
countries have stock markets with diversified share ownership (which 
would presumably do better at spreading risk). Why – Stiglitz asks, is 
equity not more widely used? Information economics provides a 
convincing set of explanations.   
In economies where companies’ books cannot be well audited – 
which includes most developing countries –  the costly state verification 
model provides a convincing explanation for the limited use of equity. 
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When insiders in a firm have more information than outsiders – a not 
uncommon situation – then the controlling insiders’ willingness to issue 
equity conveys a (noisy) signal that says that on average the shares are 
overpriced, and the market responds by lowering the price (conversely 
when firms buy back shares). Once it is recognised that for whatever 
reasons firms have limited access to (or choose to make limited use of) 
equity - then certain consequences follow. Firms resort to borrowing in 
order to raise funds; they may (and typically do) borrow enough so that 
there is some probability of bankruptcy. Issues of what happens when 
bankruptcy occur come to the fore – and determines in part how much 
the firm is willing to borrow. If bankruptcy imposes a cost on 
shareholders or managers, then firms will act in a risk-averse manner, 
explaining some of the seemingly anomalous behaviour of firms.  Here, 
Stiglitz illustrates the important connection to the asymmetries of 
information between principals and agents, and unintendedly also 
demonstrates the weaknesses of his argument, as we are now writing in 
2005 and capital markets are not what they used to be at the time he 
wrote this article (Stiglitz, 2000). It could also be questioned whether in 
current banking practice - despite technology and innovation – there is 
sufficient acknowledgement of the problems of “asymmetric” 
information, opportunistic behaviour (of all participants) and the 
consequences of TCT and Agency theory.  Not just involving markets 
and participants but likewise the role and function of banks themselves.  
Illustrative is the fact that during the 1870-1970 period, 
transactions costs consistently increased.  This seems to go hand-in-
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hand with the increase of the role of services in economies as illustrated 
in the following paragraph.  
In modern economies, transaction costs have become equally (and 
perhaps more) important than production costs. This is quite a 
development considering that early economic theory focused entirely on 
production costs assuming that transaction costs did not exist. It has 
become relatively more sensible to do research in transaction cost 
dynamics rather than production cost dynamics. This is perhaps also 
contributing to the surge of interest for research in corporate 
governance that clearly has more to say about transaction cost 
dynamics rather than production cost dynamics.  
The method used to calculate the numbers in the table below is 
roughly this: For each sector in the national account, the number of 
workers in different occupations and a percentage of transactional work 
in each occupation are estimated. Then the salaries of these workers 
are used to calculate the transactional part of the GDP in each sector. 
The weighted average of these figures is the numbers shown in this 
table. To illustrate, the following occupations have been deemed to be 
100% transactional: accountants, lawyers and judges, personal and 
labour relations, farm managers, managers, clerical, sales workers, 
foremen, inspectors, guards, police, military, and postal service. 
Industries with many non-transactional jobs are agriculture, mining, 
construction, manufacturing, and even transportation. 
Table 2 Development transaction costs 
Year Transaction costs from 
private sector  
Transaction costs from 
public sector  
Total transaction cost 
sector in % of US GDP  
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1870 22.5% 3.6% 26.1% 
1890 29.1% 3.6% 32.7% 
1910 31.5% 3.7% 35.2% 
1930 38.2% 8.2% 46.3% 
1950 40.3% 10.9% 51.2% 
1970 40.8% 13.9% 54.7% 
 
 
Source: Wallis, J., and D. C. North (Nobel laureate in economics) [1986, page 121]. 
“Measuring the Transactions Sector in the American Economy,” in Long Term Factors 
in American Economic Growth, S. Engerman, and R. Gallman eds., University of 
Chicago Press.  
 
2.1.5. Decomposing costs into transaction costs and 
production cost: 
 
Introduction: This exhibition shows how total production can be 
decomposed into production costs and transaction costs. Furthermore, 
transaction costs can in turn be decomposed in motivation costs and 
co-ordination. The definition of production and transaction costs is 
found in Wallis and North [1986, page 97]. They use the term 
“transformation cost” instead of “production cost”.  
 
Figure 4 Decomposing transaction costs 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
Production costs; 
The costs of transforming 
inputs into outputs or the 
direct production expenses. 
 
Transaction costs; 
The costs of making 
exchange or the indirect 
production expenses. 
Motivation costs; 
The costs of motivating 
specialised agents to align their 
interests, e.g.: 
· Cost of cheating or 
opportunistic behaviour, 
Williamson [1975, 85]. 
· Agency cost among owners, 
managers, and debt holders, 
Co-ordination costs; 
The costs of co-ordinating the 
actions between specialised 
agents, e.g.: 
· Cost of obtaining information, 
Stigler [1961]. 
· Cost of coordinating input in 
production, Alchian and 
Demsetz [1972]. 
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Note (1): Figure  adopted from H. Mathiesen, /www.encycogov.com  1997. 
 
 
2.1.6. The financial system and its agency relations: 
 
In order to answer the question of why banks exist, it is suggested 
that besides understanding TCT, it is also necessary to develop a 
profound understanding of principal – agent relationships which exist 
in these markets. In order to be able to understand these relationships, 
you will find below a chart that outlines which general relations exist.  
The arrows represent capital flows. The corporate governance 
literature usually focuses on relation [3] and [4]. Indeed, relation [3] is 
becoming more important since financial institutions finance an 
increasing fraction of the average firm’s total capital - more than 50% in 
most OECD countries. 
Figure 5 Agency relations 
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Note (1): Figure  adopted from H. Mathiesen, /www.encycogov.com  1997. 
 
2.1.6.1 Basic economic players: 
 
Agents:  People who get paid to execute a job for other people (the 
principals). In corporate governance the relevant agents are 
the managers and the directors. In the case of banking 
these would be the same 
Principals:  People who pay other people (the agents) to do a job for 
them. In corporate governance the principals usually are 
the owners of the firm. However, if for example the creditors 
are very powerful compared to the owners it may be more 
relevant to treat them as the managers' principals rather 
than the owners.  
Particular : Of particular importance regarding banks, is in my view the 
role and responsibility of the Central Bank, who as an often 
independent government organisation acts as the agent to 
the public in executing its role.  In case of banking crises 
often the agent-principal role is being put to the test (BCCI, 
Japan, Argentina, Uruguay).    
 
2.1.7. Criticism of transaction cost theory: 
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Transaction cost theory has attracted its share of critics (Perrow 
(1986) and others. Of the many critical remarks directed at TCT, three 
are particularly central: 
TCT focuses on cost minimisation; Williamson argued (1976); 
“economising is more fundamental than strategizing”, or put differently, 
economy is the best strategy. Resource based theory – for example – 
particularly takes exception to this emphasis.    
It understates the cost of organising: The use of authority is 
assumed to resolve internal disputes more efficiently than the market 
(Jones and Hill 1988). Clearly this is not always the case.  Lengthy and 
costly handling may often be more severe within a firm than between 
firms, as Eccless’s (1985) study of transfer pricing shows. Indeed, 
internal organisation is often susceptible to costly bargaining and 
influence behaviour. Even where authority may efficiently resolve some 
disputes, it also may be abused opportunistically (Dow 1987). Banks 
are typical – mechanistic organisations with very specific internal – by 
definition bureaucratic cultures, where internal politics, may be very 
important. Assuming that banks are special (Corrigan 1982) and 
historically have seldom been substituted by alternative forms of 
organisations or its transactions left to the market, seems to indicate 
that applying TCT alone would not sufficiently explain why banks exist.    
It neglects the role of social relationship in economic transactions 
(highly relevant for banking): TCT seeks to adopt realistic assumptions 
of the human nature; but takes a decidedly calculative view (Williamson 
1993a) of humans that discounts the impact of social relationships and 
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culture. Granovetter (1985) pointed out that contrary to the atomistic 
view of economic exchange; transactions are influenced by expectations 
that are formed by the history of the relationship. These are highly 
relevant in banking services, as both status, as well as other aspects 
such as reputation, trust, confidentiality, standing, and yes, history of 
the relationship, are highly influential factors. Besides, friendship may 
trade co-specialised assets without hierarchy, a formal contract, or 
other tangible credible commitments, because they trust one another.  
Despite these criticisms, the TCT answer to the fundamental 
question of why firms exist has been undeniably influential. 
Historically, economic theory viewed the organisation as irrelevant and 
unworthy of economic science (Stiglitz 1991), while organisation theory 
took the existence of organisation for granted.  It is noteworthy that 
Corrigan (1982) has not made any reference to, for example, TCT 
and/or agency theory to explain why he believed banks were special.  
2.1.8. Agency theory: 
 
Agency theory draws heavily from the property rights literature 
(Alchian and Demzetz 1972) and to a lesser extent from transaction cost 
(Barney and Hesterly (1996). Like TCT, agency theory assumes that 
humans are bounded rational, self-interested and prone to opportunism 
(Eisenhardt 1989). The theories are also similar in their emphasis on 
information asymmetry problems in contracting and on efficiency as the 
engine that drives the governance of economic transactions (Barney and 
Ouchi 1986; Eisenhardt 1989). Agency theory however differs from TCT 
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in its emphasis on the risk attitudes of principals and agents 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
As it originally developed, agency theory research focused on the 
relationship between managers and stockholders (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). In this form, the theory has been used to analyse corporate 
governance, including issues such as the role of boards of directors and 
the role of top management compensation. More recently, agency theory 
has been applied to relationships between many stakeholders in a firm 
such as those between different managers within the same firm, 
between employees and customers (Grinblatt and Titman 1987), and 
between employees and different groups of stockholders and debt-
holders (Copeland and Weston 1983). All these conflicts have important 
effects on a variety of attributes of organisations, including corporate 
governance, compensation and organisational structure.  
Agency relationships occur whenever one partner in a transaction 
(the principal) delegates authority to another (the agent), and the 
welfare of the principal is affected by the choices of the agent (Arrow 
1985). An obvious example is the relationship between outside investors 
in a firm and its manager. The investor delegates management authority 
to managers who may or may not have any equity ownership in the 
firm. Likewise – applying to the banking sector – the general public 
delegates authority to the government – and through this to the central 
bank, or other supervisory institutions (agent) – and the welfare of the 
principal (the public) is affected by the choice of the agent (Central 
Bank).  Secondary is the principal - agent relationship between the 
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central bank and the individual bank, whereby the Central Bank 
(principal) delegates authority to the individual bank (agent) in order to 
control and monitor branches, internal processes, and management. 
The delegation of decision-making authority from principal to agent is 
problematic in that: (1) the interest of principal and agent will typically 
diverge; (2) the principal cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor the 
actions of the agent; and (3) the principal cannot perfectly and 
costlessly monitor and acquire information available to or possessed by 
the agent.  Taken together, these conditions constitute the agency 
problem – the possibility of opportunistic behaviour on the agent’s part 
that works against the welfare of the principal.  Jensen and Meckling 
view the agency problem as central to both economics in general and to 
organisation theory specifically. 
It is worthwhile to point out the generality of the agency problem. 
The problem of inducing an agent to behave as if he were maximising 
the principal’s welfare is quite general. It exists in all organisations and 
in all co-operative efforts – at every level of the management in firms 
(Barney and Hesterly (1996). The development of theories tries to 
explain the form in which agency costs take in each of these situations 
(where contractual relations differ significantly) and how and why they 
are born will lead to a rich theory of organisations which is now 
generally lacking in economics and the social sciences (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976:309). 
To protect the principal’s interest, attempts must be made to 
reduce the possibility that agents will misbehave. In this attempt, costs 
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are incurred. These costs are called agency costs. Total agency costs are 
the monitoring expenditures by principals, the bonding expenditures by 
agents, and the residual loss of the principal. The residual loss 
acknowledges that in many situations, it would be simply too costly for 
principals to completely monitor agents and too costly for agents to 
completely assure principals that interests do not diverge (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). This logic also applies integrally to the relations 
between the public, the central bank (as supervisor, and agent to the 
public) and the banks operating under the supervision of the Central 
Bank. Agency costs and in particular residual costs can result 
extremely high in such cases whereby deposits are guaranteed through 
government guarantees (such is the case in many OECD countries), and 
in which a bank failure leads to the government (or government fund) 
having to pay for the deposits. There have been many examples in 
history illustrating this situation.   
Assuming that agency costs exist, it is clear that principals have a 
strong incentive to minimize these costs (i.e. to minimize the sum of 
monitoring, bonding and residual agency costs).  However, agents also 
have an incentive to minimize these costs.  Where significant savings in 
agency costs are possible, these benefits may be shared between agents 
and principals. In the case of banks, clearly the agents (banks) in a 
particular setting have common goals in order to preserve the credibility 
of the system as a whole. Obviously this comes at a cost. And therefore, 
the principal and agent may have common interest in defining a 
monitoring and incentive structure that produces outcomes as close as 
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possible to what would be the case if information exchange were 
costless (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985).  
Arrow (1985) notes two essential sources of agency problems: 
moral hazard, which he equates to hidden actions, and adverse 
selection, which he equates to hidden information (not uncommon 
phenomenon in the relationship between Central Bank and Banks). 
Moral hazard involves situations in which much of the agent’s actions is 
either hidden from the principal or is costly to observe. Thus, it is either 
impossible or costly for the principal to fully monitor the agent’s 
actions. This seems true for much of the trading that banks do for their 
own accounts, especially off-balance and so-called new products, such 
as derivatives. Stockholders or even directors, for example, might find it 
prohibitively costly to fully monitor the behaviour of their top 
management team. Indeed employment relation in general is one in 
which both effort and ability is difficult to observe. There are several 
high profile cases of bond, equity and/or derivative traders for which 
this has been the case.  
Agency problems may also involve adverse selection. In adverse 
selection, the agent possesses information that is, for the principal, 
unobservable or costly to obtain.  Consequently, principals cannot fully 
ascertain whether or not their interests are best served by agents’ 
decision. At the most general level, principals and agents resolve agency 
problems through monitoring and bonding. Monitoring involves 
observing the behaviour and/or the performance of the agents. Bonding 
refers to the arrangement that penalises agents for acting in ways that 
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violate the interests of principals and rewards them for achieving 
principals’ goals. The contract between agents and principals specify 
the monitoring and the bonding arrangements. Indeed contracts are 
central in agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that most 
organisations are simply legal fictions that serve as a nexus for a set of 
contracting relationships among individuals. Within this nexus, 
however, firms adopt rules about monitoring and bonding. Given this 
general description of agency problems and their costly solutions, three 
important questions come to mind (Barney and Hesterly (1996) : 
1) Why do principals delegate authority to agents, when they know 
that such delegation of authority will inevitably lead to agency 
problems?  
Given agency costs, principals will not delegate authority to 
agents unless they find compelling reasons to do so. Sometimes there 
are no compelling reasons and single economic actors engage in a full 
range of economic activities. For example in proprietorships, small 
partnerships and closed corporations that operate on a small scale, it 
may be possible for a single individual to engage in the full range of 
economic activities from conceiving a business opportunity, obtaining 
the funding, and implementing all business decisions in exploiting that 
opportunity. More in general, one could also approach this dilemma by 
applying TCT. The decision for a firm to engage in outsourcing or not, 
involves the combination of agency problems and transaction cost 
theory, as well as direct cost efficiency, the outcome thereof not being 
static but a continuous dynamic process.  
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2) What specific monitoring mechanisms can principals put in place 
to minimize these agency problems?  
Given the existence of agency costs, principals will find it in their 
self-interest to try to monitor agents (Eisenhardt 1985). One way that 
principals can try to monitor agents is by collecting relatively complete 
information about an agent’s decisions and actions – an agent’s 
behaviour. From this behavioural information, principals can thereafter 
form a judgment about the underlying goals and objectives of agents. In 
particular, principals can attempt to judge how similar their agents’ 
goals and objectives are to their own goals and objectives. Obviously 
these guiding principals do very well apply to the principal – agent 
relationship between Central Bank and individual bank. Barney and 
Hesterly (1996) hold the view that monitoring agent’s behaviour will 
rarely generate perfect information about the agent’s decisions and 
actions, let alone about an agent’s goals and objectives. This is 
especially unlikely if agents are engaging in relatively complex, highly 
unstructured tasks.  As an alternative (or supplement) to monitoring 
agent’s behaviour, principals can also monitor the consequences of 
agent behaviour. In general, monitoring performance or output is more 
efficient when tasks are not highly programmable (Eisenhardt 1985, 
Mahoney 1992). This too applies to the relationship between Central 
Bank and banks.  
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3) What specific bonding mechanisms can agents use to reassure 
principals?  
The existence of agency costs suggests that principals have an 
incentive to monitor agents. However, agents also have an incentive to 
assure principals that they are behaving in ways consistent with the 
principals’ interest. Recall that in many situations, principals and 
agents both absorb some agency costs associated with the delegation of 
authority. In general, principals can use bonding mechanisms to 
reassure principals. Frequently, bonding mechanisms take the form of 
incentives that agents create for themselves – incentives that make it in 
their self-interest to behave in ways consistent with the interest of 
principals.  Obviously in the relationship between Central Bank 
(principal) and the supervised bank (agent) the bonding rests in the way 
the Central Bank allows the agent to perform the functions of the bank 
(through licence). If the agent fails to comply with the objectives and 
goals of the principals, the Central Bank usually has the authority to 
intervene the bank, and to have management of the bank removed from 
its position. It could be argued that this is a two-way relationship, in 
which also the Central Bank depends on its relationship with the public 
in its role as controller of the financial system and henceforth depends 
on the banks to duly perform their tasks. It is, as with most dilemmas, 
a question of equilibrium, i.e. a balance of power and interests.  
Barth et al (2004) provide helpful insights in the supervision of 
banks and agency problems, indicating that, first, banks are costly and 
difficult to monitor. This leads to too little monitoring of banks, which 
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implies sub-optimal performance and stability.  These insights are 
consistent with the findings of Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), where they 
report on systemic banking crises in both non-OECD as well as high 
income OECD countries among which we find Japan (1991 – present), 
Finland (1991-1994), Norway (1987-1993), Spain (1977-1985), Sweden 
(1991), and for example on border-line non-systemic banking crises like 
in the United Stated (1984-1991) with the savings and loan institution, 
where 1,300 banks failed (costs US$ 180 billion or 3% of GDP).  
Official supervision can ameliorate this market failure. Second, 
because of informational asymmetries, banks are prone to contagious 
and socially costly bank runs (for example Argentina 2001, Uruguay 
2002).  Supervision in such a situation serves a socially efficient role. 
Third, many countries choose to adopt deposit insurance schemes. This 
situation (1) creates incentives for excessive risk-taking by banks, and 
(2) reduces the incentives for depositors to monitor banks. Strong, 
official supervision under such circumstances can help prevent banks 
from engaging in excessive risk-taking behaviour and thus improve 
bank development, performance and stability.  
Alternatively, powerful supervisors may exert a negative influence 
on bank performance. Powerful supervisors may use their powers to 
benefit favoured constituents, attract campaign donations, and extract 
bribes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Djankov et al., 2002 and Quintyn 
and Taylor, 2002). Under these circumstances, powerful supervision 
will be positively related to corruption and will not improve bank 
development, performance and stability. From a different perspective 
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Kane (1990) and Boot and Thakor (1993) focus on the agency problem 
between taxpayers and bank supervisors. In particular, rather than 
focusing on political influence, Boot and Thakor (1993) model the 
behaviour of a self-interested bank supervisor when there is uncertainty 
about the supervisor's ability to monitor banks. Under these conditions, 
they show that supervisors may undertake socially sub-optimal actions. 
Thus, depending on the incentives facing bank supervisors and the 
ability of taxpayers to monitor supervision, greater supervisory power 
could hinder bank operations (Barth et al, 2004). This has also been 
confirmed in a report (CSFI, 2005) where 440 respondents rank the rise 
of regulation to be the number risk facing the (banking) industry and 
the costs and distractions of regulation as well as the false sense of 
security it brings were the main reasons cited for its strong showing.  
The industry according to this report clearly believes that regulators are 
getting it wrong both from a cost perspective, driven by what banks see 
as an excessive focus on consumer protection, and from too much 
complexity, which is seen as killing competition and promoting a herd 
instinct in financial institutions (CSFI, 2005).    
2.1.9. Criticism of agency theory: 
 
Though the empirical evidence is on balance supportive of agency 
theory, important questions have been raised about the set of ideas. 
Foremost among these is that agency theory seems to adopt an 
unrealistic view of humans and organisations (Hirsch et al. 1990). In 
agency theory, humans are primarily motivated by financial gain. Much 
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of the early research particularly ignored the other behavioural studies.  
Studies combining agency theory with ideas from other disciplines such 
as institutions theory (Eisenhardt 1988), equity theory (Zenger 1992) 
and social influence (Wade et al 1990 and Davies 1991) have yielded 
additional insights and questions about the theory. Another criticism of 
the agency theory is of a more philosophical nature. Perrow (1986) and 
others (Hirsch et al 1990) argue that agency theory has an inherent 
investor focus. This criticism is true of most research in the area, but as 
argued by Barley and Hesterly (1996), may not be inherent in the 
theory. The framework of agency theory is in itself neutral. It could just 
as well be used to examine issues that focus on the concerns of agents 
(Hesterly 1990).  
After having discussed TCT and Agency Theory, the other theory 
which is relevant when looking at the banking industry over time, is 
intermediation theory. These three combined, then, give sufficient 
theoretical body as to be able to apprehend why banks exist.  
 
2.1.10. Intermediation theory: 
 
In the traditional Arrow–Debreu model of resource allocation, 
firms and households interact through markets, and financial 
intermediaries play no role. When markets are perfect and complete, the 
allocation of resources is Pareto efficient and there is no scope for 
intermediaries to improve welfare. Moreover, the Modigliani–Miller 
theorem applied in this context asserts that financial structure does not 
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matter: households can construct portfolios which offset any position 
taken by an intermediary and intermediation cannot create value (Fama 
1980).  
A traditional criticism of this standard market-based theory is 
that a large number of securities are needed for it to hold except in 
special cases. However, the development of continuous time techniques 
for option pricing models and the extension of these ideas to general 
equilibrium theory have negated this criticism. Dynamic trading 
strategies allow markets to be effectively complete even though a limited 
number of securities exist.  
Such an extreme view – that financial markets allow an efficient 
allocation and intermediaries have no role to play – is clearly at odds 
with what is observed in practice. Historically, banks and insurance 
companies have played a central role. This appears to be true in 
virtually all economies except emerging economies, which are at a very 
early stage. Even here, however, the development of intermediaries 
tends to lead to the development of financial markets themselves 
(McKinnon 1973).  
In short, banks have existed since ancient times as demonstrated 
in previous chapters, taking deposits from households and making 
loans to economic agents requiring capital. Insurance, and in particular 
marine insurance, also has a very long history. In contrast, financial 
markets have only been important recently, and then only in a few 
countries, primarily the UK and the US. Even there, banks and 
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insurance companies have played a major role in the transformation of 
savings from the household sector into investments in real assets.  
Our understanding of the role or roles played by these 
intermediaries in the financial sector is found in the many and varied 
models in the area known as intermediation theory. These theories of 
intermediation have been built on the models of resource allocation 
based on perfect and complete markets by suggesting that it is frictions 
such as transaction costs and asymmetric information that are 
important in understanding intermediation. Gurley and Shaw (1960) 
and many subsequent authors have stressed the role of transaction 
costs. For example, fixed costs of asset evaluation mean that 
intermediaries have an advantage over individuals because they allow 
such costs to be shared. Similarly, trading costs mean that 
intermediaries can more easily be diversified than individuals.  
Looking for frictions that relate more to investors' information 
sets, numerous authors have stressed the role of asymmetric 
information as an alternative rationalisation for the importance of 
intermediaries. One of the earliest and most cited papers, Leland and 
Pyle (1977), suggests that an intermediary can signal its informed 
status by investing its wealth in assets about which it has special 
knowledge. In another important paper, Diamond (1984) has argued 
that intermediaries overcome asymmetric information problems by 
acting as "delegated monitors." Many others followed, expanding on 
these two contributions and advancing the literature in substantive 
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ways (e.g., see Gale and Hellwig, 1985; Campbell and Kracaw, 1980, 
and Boyd and Prescott, 1986).  
Allen and Santomero (1997) argue that the financial systems in 
many countries have undergone a dramatic transformation. It is widely 
acknowledged that there has been an unprecedented amount of 
financial innovation (Miller, 1986). However, financial innovation has 
been occurring for many centuries albeit at a slower pace.  
Allen and Gale (1994a) offer a detailed historical account of 
financial innovation. They point out that numerous different types of 
instruments were developed over time but relatively few survived. By the 
1930s what might be named as the traditional financial instruments 
had been developed and had demonstrated some robustness.  
 
Financial markets such as the stock and bond markets have 
grown in size using nearly any metric, such as the value of companies 
listed or any other conceivable measure of their importance. At the 
same time, there has been extensive financial innovation acceleration in 
the 1970s and 1980s. This includes the introduction of new financial 
products, such as various mortgage backed securities and other 
securitized assets, as well as derivative instruments such as swaps and 
complex options. These have all had a virtual explosion in volume. At 
the same time, new exchanges for financial futures, options and other 
derivative securities have appeared and become major markets.  
Starting in the 1960s but primarily in the 1970s and 1980s, 
markets themselves have changed significantly. Arguably the most 
 82 
successful type of innovation has been the development of various kinds 
of derivative securities which have been introduced over this period.  
Interestingly, this increase in the broadness and depth of 
financial markets has been the result of increased use of these 
instruments by financial intermediaries and firms. They have not been 
used by households to any significant extent. In fact, the increased size 
of the financial market has coincided with a dramatic shift away from 
direct participation by individuals in financial markets towards 
participation through various kinds of intermediaries (Allen and 
Santomero 1998). 
The importance of different types of intermediaries over this same 
time period has also undergone a significant change. The share of 
assets held by banks and insurance companies has fallen, while mutual 
funds and pension funds have dramatically increased in size. New types 
of intermediary such as non-bank financial firms like GE Capital have 
emerged which raise money entirely by issuing securities and not at all 
by taking deposits. In short, traditional intermediaries have declined in 
importance even as the sector itself has been expanding.  
Perhaps in response, but clearly contemporaneously, the activities 
of traditional institutions such as banks and insurance companies have 
also changed. Banks which used to take deposits and make loans found 
that the possibilities for securitising loans meant that they did not need 
to keep on their balance sheet all the loans they could originate. At the 
same time, insurance firms realised – assisted by a further liberalisation 
and deregulation of capital markets - that their actuarial function was 
 83 
but a minor part of their asset management capabilities and these firms 
too innovated and broadened their products and services.  
Allen and Santomero (1998) have suggested that some of these 
changes in the volume of financial activity, along with the relative 
importance of some institutions and the changes in others can be 
explained using traditional theories which are based on transaction 
costs and asymmetric information. But, others cannot and they suggest 
that a whole new market between intermediaries was created. 
Merton and Bodie (1995) suggest that financial systems should be 
analysed in terms of a "functional perspective" rather than an 
"institutional perspective." A functional perspective is one based on the 
services provided by the financial system, such as providing a way to 
transfer economic resources through time. In contrast, an institutional 
perspective is one where the central focus is on the activities of existing 
institutions such as banks and insurance companies. The argument in 
favour of focusing on the functional rather than the institutional 
perspective is that over long periods of time, functions have been much 
more stable than institutions. This has clearly been a characteristic of 
the intermediary sector in the recent past. Institutions have come and 
gone, evolved and changed, but functional needs persist while packaged 
differently and delivered in substantially different ways.  
This constancy of functional needs has led Oldfield and 
Santomero (1997) to argue that financial services such as origination, 
distribution, servicing and funding are more stable than either the 
institutions that provide services or the specific products they offer in 
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order to satisfy customer requirements. The financial services may be 
packaged differently both across competitive institutions and over time, 
but the functions are far more stable.  
Using this functional approach to the financial sector, the 
literature that explains its activities can be seen as focusing on one or 
another function performed by it. The literature on transaction costs 
can be seen to be rationalising the role of these institutions in the 
distribution function.  
Allen and Santomero (1998) recognised the importance of 
intermediation theories, but have suggested that these need to reflect 
and account for the fact that financial systems in many countries have 
changed substantially over the past 30 years. Over this period many 
traditional financial markets have expanded and new markets have 
come into existence. They argued that transaction costs have been 
relatively reduced in relevance and that information has become 
cheaper and more available. However, these changes have not coincided 
with a reduction in intermediation. In fact, quite the reverse has 
happened. Intermediaries have become more important in traditional 
markets and account for a very large majority of the trading in new 
markets, such as those for various types of derivatives. Standard 
theories of intermediation based on transaction costs and asymmetric 
information are difficult to reconcile with those specific changes that 
have taken place. They have argued that participation costs are crucial 
to understanding the current activities of intermediaries and in 
particular their focus on risk management.  It appears that whilst 
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making these valuable contributions, they could have expanded TCT 
and have specified the difference of participation costs to TCT, i.e. 
motivation costs and co-ordination costs.  Besides, and in line with the 
findings of Allen and Gale (1994a), we should question the long-term 
viability of the new products which are traded on these markets 
between intermediaries.  Recent decline in what banks refer to as 
investment banking, tends to indicate that yet another bubble has 
burst. (Economist 2002).  
 
2.1.11. Are banks special? 
 
The speciality of banks has traditionally been traced back to the 
monetary nature of their (demand deposit) liabilities and to their 
running the economy's payment system. Since the early experience of 
the deposit-taking institutions of the 19th century, banks have issued 
debt instruments that are accepted as means of exchange and payment 
on the basis of a fiduciary relationship among the agents using them, 
and between the agents and the issuing banks.  
Supplying transaction and portfolio management services is what 
defines banking according to Fama (1980), while Kareken (1985) 
emphasises the central role of banks in managing the payment system.  
Corrigan (1982) adds to these functions the banks' twofold role of 
backup sources of liquidity for all enterprises in the economy and of 
transmission mechanism for monetary policy.  Others have objected 
that, with the evolution of financial markets and institutions, none of 
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the above functions is compellingly and exclusively pertinent to banks 
as such.  In advanced economies, transaction account facilities are 
supplied by non-depository (and even non-financial) institutions with 
access to payment clearing and settlement systems. Likewise, various 
other financial and non-financial entities can provide credit to business, 
while the backup-source-of-liquidity function in times of economic 
distress is in principle inconsistent with bank regulations aimed to 
prevent or forestall bank failures. Finally, where monetary policy is 
mainly conducted via open-market operations, government securities 
dealers (even more than banks) may act as transmission mechanisms of 
monetary policy signals to the economy.  Research according to 
Borsonne (2001) has thus looked for other features that may more 
specifically characterise banks as special financial intermediaries.  
 
2.1.12. The credit function: 
 
Diamond (1984) finds a special feature in banks acting as 
delegated monitors of borrowers (principals), on behalf of the ultimate 
lenders (depositors), in the presence of costly monitoring. Essentially, 
banks produce a net social benefit by exploiting scale economies in 
processing the information involved in monitoring and enforcing 
contracts with borrowers. Banks reduce the delegation costs through a 
sufficient diversification of their loan portfolio. Bossone (2001) argues 
that even if Diamond's result shows that banks' specialisation in 
monitoring credits improves social welfare, it does not prove to hold for 
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banks exclusively, since any kind of intermediary equally benefits from 
portfolio diversification. Also, it does not explain why loan contracts are 
not replaced by more efficient risk sharing, more complete state-
contingent contracts that reduce asymmetric information (such as 
equities).  
What is characteristic of bank loans is that their value is fixed in 
nominal terms and includes collateral requirement clauses as well as 
costly bankruptcy provisions. By factoring ex-post information 
asymmetries and agency cost in the credit-making process, Gale and 
Hellwig (1985) show that such contract types, which they call standard 
debt contracts (SDCs), are optimal financial arrangements. These, on 
the one hand, save on the creditor's costs of monitoring states of nature 
throughout the life of the loan and, on the other, give borrowers an 
incentive to minimise the risk of default and discourage them from 
hiding their true business performance.  
The optimality of SDC’s suggests a powerful argument to explain 
why banks have historically emerged as the first form of financial 
intermediation virtually everywhere in the world whenever capitalistic 
production had taken place. However, SDC optimality is not robust 
against changes in the universal risk-neutrality assumption used by 
Gale and Hellwig (1985) in their model, and does not hold in the case of 
ex-ante information asymmetries, where SDC’s become exposed to 
adverse selection and moral-hazard risks. Besides, as information and 
contract performance are crucial to the SDC optimality result, one 
would expect bank speciality to fade with the development of financial 
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infrastructure, since this provides agents with better information and 
more efficient contract enforcement technologies leading investors to 
prefer non-SDC contract types (e.g., equity). Bank speciality is therefore 
a product of history, much like its own disappearance at some point.  
Terlizzese (1988) uses the presence of ex-ante asymmetric 
information as a rationale for the depositors' preference to lend 
indirectly (writing a SDC with a bank) over direct financing of individual 
entrepreneurs. As depositors are faced with a "lemon" problem, they 
generate a demand for delegated screening which banks have a 
comparative advantage to perform. In a repeated-game situation, the 
related agency problem is solved through reputation incentives. 
Interestingly, due to the ex-ante information asymmetry, banks should 
not find it possible to have depositors agree on deposit contracts 
contingent on states of nature. This provides an enlightening 
explanation for the reason why banks commonly use SDC’s to finance 
their assets.  
Through the credit function and the associated access to private 
information, banks tend to establish long-term relationships with fund 
users, based on mutual trust and mutually beneficial incentives. Quite 
correctly, Bossonne (2001) argues that relationships ensure borrowers 
with a steady and reliable supply of funding, even at times of adverse 
contingencies, while they generate for the banks safe sources of (quasi-
monopolistic) rents. As relationships consolidate over time, it becomes 
costly for both parties to exit and replace them with different 
counterparties. Relationships, however, are not necessarily a unique 
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feature of banks and can be replicated by other types of non-bank 
financial intermediaries; especially those specialised in term lending. 
 
2.1.13. The liquidity function: 
 
The credit view of bank speciality underscores the relevance of 
banks' informational advantage vis-à-vis the ultimate investors 
(depositors). Banks specialise in extracting and processing information 
concerning borrowers in a way that is not replicable by individual 
investors. In fact, bank information may be very exclusive and made 
unavailable to others. This is tantamount to saying that loans are 
illiquid to investors and non-negotiable in the market. In spite of this, 
banks finance their loans with liquid deposits bearing nominal fixed 
value and available to their holders on demand. The speciality of banks 
must thus rest with their capacity to provide liquidity services.  
The provision of liquidity services pre-eminently characterises 
banks in the classical contribution by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). 
Instead of placing their endowments in an illiquid production 
technology, individuals deposit them with banks in exchange for 
(interest-bearing) claims entitling them to withdraw the deposits to 
finance future, unanticipated consumption needs (with uninsurable 
risk of occurrence). Depositors gain consumption flexibility. Their 
requests of withdrawals, however, are served sequentially, on a first-
come-first-serve basis, until the bank runs out of (liquid) assets; thus, 
each depositor faces a positive risk of being unable to exercise his claim 
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if the bank runs out of assets before his request is submitted. The 
return on deposits, on the other hand, enables depositors to achieve 
higher future consumption than if they realised the illiquid assets. 
Banks therefore provide depositors with a liquidity insurance service, 
and allow money to be transferred from patient holders to impatient 
consumers. (Bossonne, 2001) 
However, any non-deposit type of money (say, cash) would provide 
at least the same kind of consumption flexibility that the Diamond–
Dybvig (1983) deposits provide (although at a different risk–return trade 
off). The speciality of banks must therefore originate from their being 
able to transform liquidity into “optimal illiquidity” in the agent 
portfolios, by efficiently exploiting at the margin the depositors' 
preferred trade-off between consumption flexibility and inter-temporal 
consumption. The result is an instrument, which is riskier and higher 
paying than cash, but which works like cash. This is possible if the 
banks use deposits to finance illiquid assets that would not be financed 
by investors directly, and if they extract from these assets enough rents 
to remunerate the depositors. Banks are therefore pure intermediaries, 
and their speciality must be traced to their ability of integrating optimal 
illiquidity creation for depositors with rent-extraction power from 
borrowers.  
In his last testament on money, Sir Hicks (1989) saw the 
speciality of banks in their acquired ability to make deposits 
withdrawable at sight and usable in payments. He understood that this 
allowed both banks and depositors to use deposits as money. He also 
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saw this as enabling banks to hand over money when they make loans 
without giving up any cash (or third-party liabilities) but, simply, by 
increasing their liabilities: deposit withdrawability and their use for 
payments allow banks to create money.  
In an innovative contribution, McAndrews and Roberts (1999) 
emphasize the power of banks to create liquidity through their role as 
payment intermediaries between buyers and sellers. As long as the 
agents hold deposits with banks and accept to be paid by book-entry 
transfers, banks can exploit the offsetting nature of multilateral 
payments and issue overdrafts on their books (thus creating liquidity) to 
depositors who demand to make payments in excess of their deposit 
claims. Bank deposits therefore remain a superior and cheaper means 
of payment than alternative instruments (e.g., mutual fund shares) 
which abjure the use of netting credit. In addition to what has been 
argued before, many depositors are driven to banks because of a 
combination of transaction costs and the virtue that in most countries – 
especially OECD – some kind of deposit insurance applies. 
Furthermore, banks have expanded in their services to clients, such as 
internet banking, credit card services and insurances, which make 
them interesting to depositors for a one stop shop. (All-Finanz concept).  
    
2.1.14. Integrated functions: 
 
Fama (1985) points to the speciality of banks as deriving from 
integrating credit and liquidity provision functions. By having borrowers 
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hold deposits with them, banks can observe cash-flow movements and 
gain private information on borrowers, which they then feed into the 
processing of new loans. This gives banks a special role as information 
providers to capital market participants, who incorporate the 
information embedded in banks' lending decisions into their own 
investment evaluations. Though Fama's theory may explain why 
transaction- and credit-related services have historically been integrated 
within the same type of institution, it is not hard to imagine these 
services being increasingly provided by non-bank institutions 
specialised in extracting information on payment records of individual 
borrowers.  
Goodhart (1987) looks at the peculiar asset and liability structure 
of banks. Bank assets determine the nature of bank liabilities: holding 
assets mainly in the form of nominally fixed loans induces banks to 
issue liabilities largely in the form of deposits with guaranteed nominal 
capital value. This makes banks particularly vulnerable to perceptions 
of asset deterioration, to an extent that even requires the setting up of 
special safety nets. Goodhart (1987) emphasises the effect that the 
exclusive nature of the information banks have on borrowers as the 
cause for the opaqueness and non-marketability of loans. It is not clear 
though, in Goodhart's explanation, why banks should not be able to use 
more efficient risk-sharing types of contract and stick, instead, to SDC 
types for lending. If the information inferiority and risk aversion of small 
depositors justify the banks' use of SDC’s for liabilities, the same does 
not hold for their assets since banks do have access to information on 
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borrowers. Moreover, if banks diversify their assets sufficiently, there 
are not compelling reasons why they should not issue SDC’s as 
liabilities and not use non-SDC’s for their investment.  
Calomeris and Kahn (1991) investigate the specific liability issued 
by banks in the form of demandable debt to finance illiquid assets. They 
show that, under costly and asymmetric information, demandable debt 
provides an incentive-compatible solution to the potential conflict of 
interest between (informed) bankers and (uninformed) bank depositors: 
the depositors' right to withdraw their claims from a bank, if they 
become dissatisfied with their deposit returns, gives them an incentive 
to monitor the bank. If enough of them agree on a negative assessment 
of the bank's performance, this can result in a bank’s liquidation. As a 
result, demandable debt induces bankers to pre-commit to a set of 
agreeable payoffs to depositors. Obviously, the incentive property of 
demandable debt is less and less peculiar of banks, as claims on any 
(non-bank) financial intermediary become negotiable in efficient 
secondary markets and grant to their holders the power to "walk out" of 
the intermediary at any time. 
Integrating information-intensive lending and payment services 
distinguishes banks from other intermediaries, according to Goodfriend 
(1991). Systems to evaluate, monitor, and enforce loan agreements are 
useful both for processing loans and for managing the implicit or 
explicit lending associated with the provision of payment services. As a 
result, payment services can be provided at lower costs by entities that 
also offer credit services.  
 94 
Diamond and Rajan (1998) introduce banks as superior devices to 
tie human capital with real (illiquid) assets. Like Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), they, too, focus on the liquidity insurance services provided by 
banks but take the further step of integrating the two sides of the bank 
balance sheet: banks create liquidity both for the depositors and the 
entrepreneurs.  
Diamond and Rajan (1998) show that the peculiar bank capital 
structure works as a disciplinarian device: banks possess specific 
talents to collect the maximal value of loans to entrepreneurs and to 
attract deposits from individual investors, as they can credibly commit 
to pass on to them the rents they expect to collect from borrowers. 
Banks can do so because their capital structure exposes depositors to 
liquidity and credit risks, and makes depositors prone to run on banks 
if they perceive banks to become insolvent. Since a run would drive 
bank rents to zero, the risk of runs provides banks with an incentive to 
be credible borrowers. In this respect, runs are no longer an 
undesirable by-product of deposit contracts but an essential 
inducement to sound banking. This only applies under normal 
circumstances, mainly OECD countries for the last decades, as this is 
however not the reality for most non-OECD countries.  
 
2.1.15. The circuit approach: 
 
Integrating bank credit and liquidity functions, as proposed by 
the theories just reviewed, is necessary to gain an understanding of how 
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banks interact with the real economy. Yet these theories share one 
limitation: all implicitly assume the pre-existence of some form of 
outside (commodity or reserve) money that is deposited with banks and 
is used by banks to extend loans. All these theories therefore take 
banks as intermediaries of outside money. Almost none of them, with 
few notable exceptions, point out that banks create money and that 
money creation makes banks differ from other intermediaries (Bossone 
2001). 
Like many economists before, Schumpeter (1934) explained this 
clearly, but his message did not make it through to today's mainstream 
theory of banking. Schumpeter understood banks as being uniquely 
capable of adding to the existing stock of money by lending promises to 
pay, so that the total credit in the system can exceed what is possible if 
credit has to be fully covered. And he understood that, through money 
creation, banks generate purchasing power in anticipation of, and for 
the production of, new output: bank money is made up of claims on 
output yet to be produced. Schumpeter saw that banks do not confine 
themselves to transferring existing purchasing power from depositors to 
borrowers. However, his model was not articulated enough to identify 
the different roles of banking and non-banking financial intermediation. 
Banks are thus special because they, only, create money in the 
form of claims on their own debt, which they inject in the system by 
lending. Their speciality lies on their ability to economise on the (costly) 
use of outside money with their own deposit liabilities. For over four 
decades, this has been the core idea of the theory of the monetary 
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circuit (Bossonne, 2001a). This theory integrates the real and financial 
sides of a monetary production economy in a sequential, flow-of-funds, 
general equilibrium framework. With some structural amendments, the 
theory sheds light on the different and complementary roles that 
banking and non-banking intermediation provides in servicing the real 
economy. Circuit theory is not inconsistent with the theories of banking 
discussed above that essentially identify the special role of banks with 
information and liquidity insurance provision, and contributes to 
understanding the links between the (micro) functions of banks and the 
macro economy. 
 
2.1.16. Non-bank finance and the relevance of banking: 
 
Bossone (2001) has clearly demonstrated the role of non-bank 
finance and the continuing relevance of banking, and argues that 
although in the industrial world, non-bank financial intermediaries 
have taken away considerable business from commercial banks, 
increases have been observed in the market share of institutions 
holding securities instead of loans. At the same time, banks themselves 
have heavily shifted their activity from traditional banking to other 
financial intermediation services. Lending to production, in particular, 
has become less important as more and more firms can directly access 
the market for short-term funds. Also, following financial liberalisation, 
domestic banking sectors have undergone large reorganisation, with 
banks consolidating into fewer and larger units.  
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An interesting interpretation of the disintermediation problem is 
the core-deposit theory of Berlin and Mester (1996). Liberalisation has 
led banks to pay market rates on an increasing portion of their funds, 
core deposits have shrunk, and relationship lending has become less 
and less feasible. Accordingly, banks have lost some of their 
comparative advantage vis-à-vis non-bank intermediaries3. Circuit 
theory suggests an alternative hypothesis to explain disintermediation 
and consolidation. As liberalisation reduces the demand for core 
deposits, banks tend to run increasing inter-bank open debit positions 
associated with their lending. As a result, banks incur in higher 
reserves holding costs to protect themselves against the risk of 
defaulting on inter-bank obligations. This puts pressure on banks to 
reduce lending and/or to expand their scale in an attempt to capture a 
larger deposit base from competitors. Bossone (2001) suggests that in 
any case, banks seem bound to become less in number and bigger in 
size.  
Aside from the arguments discussed earlier under the narrow 
banking rubric, pointing to the real cost of money creation, there are 
important additional factors to consider in answering this question. In 
an environment where bank lending to production is less relevant, 
                                                 
3 The concept of ‘core deposits’ must be used cautiously. In a 
circuit process, increases in the interest elasticity of the demand for 
deposits do not imply destruction of existing deposits, but simply their 
increasing velocity of circulation. In principle, to the extent that banks 
extend sufficient credit to each other, and/or that their size allows them 
to minimise inter-bank exposures, the decline of core deposits should 
not upset lending. 
 
 98 
banks perform their key money creation function through alternative 
(and more wholesale type of) instruments. These include credit to non-
bank intermediaries (including credit card issuers and industrial 
corporations offering financial intermediation services) and contingent 
credit.  
By lending to non-bank intermediaries, banks indirectly supply 
the economy with fresh money to absorb production and services. This 
is typical of bank lending to intermediaries that provide credit for 
consumption, second-hand asset purchases, and financial services 
(including for speculation and hedging). This credit is essential as 
industrial productivity growth requires ways to expand and accelerate 
consumption of durables and physical capital renewal, and the demand 
for financial investment and risk- and portfolio-management services 
increases rapidly. Banks advance short-term loans to the intermediaries 
with ready and deep access to the capital market. The intermediaries 
on-lend the loan proceeds (on longer-term conditions) to households 
and firms planning to buy durables, second-hand assets, or financial 
services. As sales are executed, selling firms can cash the sale proceeds 
and invest the income, which generates capital market funds. The 
intermediaries can refinance their position from the capital market and 
match their asset–liability maturity and the system overall has more 
liquidity in it. A new flow of funds takes place wherein the selling firms 
are the net savers (investors), the buyers of goods and services are net 
dissevers (fund users and borrowers), and banks remain the suppliers 
of money.  
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Banks are thus essential for a growing real and financial economy 
(Bossone 2001). 
Banks create money also through contingent liabilities (such as 
guarantees and warranties) that they issue to protect financial and non-
financial institutions against contingencies that could disrupt their 
solvency. These liabilities are stand-by commitments to issue money to 
their holders if and when those contingencies happen. Their diffusion 
confirms the continuing speciality of banks: first of all, they enable the 
economy to use the existing liquidity more efficiently by supporting the 
extension of quasi-money and short-term borrowing instruments to an 
extent that would not be feasible without banks' stand-by commitment 
guarantees. Second, through these types of liabilities banks act as 
backup sources of liquidity for all other institutions in the system 
(Corrigan, 2000), and are in a position to support circuit closure in the 
event of payment failures. This underscores the banks' continuing 
importance in spite of the historical decline of their traditional activities. 
It also emphasises their key role as market agents specialised to 
validate the credit-worthiness of issuers of quasi-monies and short-term 
borrowing instruments.  
Through money creation banks complete the economy's financial 
market structure by transforming liquidity and maturity (at a risk).  
2.1.17. Research questions: 
 
Following the above chapter on the question why banks exists, 
the following hypotheses were formulated: 
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H.1.1. In general banks seem to be very competent with regard to 
understanding risks.  
H.1.2. Clients of banks would be benefited if banks were rated in 
terms of client’s satisfaction. 
H.1.3. The long history in banking and the lack of alternatives 
means that banks will continue to exist for many more years. 
H.1.4. With current supervision and regulation on banks one can 
be confident about low systemic risks. 
H.1.5. Banks play a crucial, mostly constructive role within the 
world economy. 
H.1.6. With increased knowledge and modern techniques in 
finance the role of relationship in bank-client relations will diminish. 
 
And the sub-hypotheses;  
H.1.6.1. Most companies tend to act opportunistically in their 
bank-relations. 
H.1.6.2. Banks are considered by most clients as a necessary evil. 
H.16.3. Housebanks play an important and largely positive role in 
the process of corporate control; and borrowers with a strong bank–
borrower relationship receive more competitive credit on average.  
2.1.18. Concluding remarks: 
 
In this section 2.1. a thorough explanation has been given as to 
why banks exist, using a variation of existing economic theories. This 
was considered to be of importance given that banks are the main 
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channel through which cross border lending takes place. A critical 
analysis of their role in society has been provided and subsequent 
hypotheses have been formulated. In the next section of this Chapter 2, 
credit and credit risk will be further explored and analysed as it is credit 
and credit risk which represent the core aspects in the field of cross 
border lending. Also the role of credit rating will be discussed as credit 
rating will become more important in view of the new Basel II 
regulations to be implemented by 2006.   
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 Section 2.2 - CREDIT AND CREDIT RISK 
 
2.2.1. Introduction:  
 
In this section of Chapter 2 a literature survey will be provided on 
the relation between credit and credit risks as well as how credit risk 
can be measured will be discussed. Obviously the instrument of credit 
rating comes to mind, as credit rating will become even more important 
in view of the upcoming Basel II regulations. Also the role of 
relationship banking comes in play as well as the role of external credit 
rating agencies, their techniques, the strengths and weaknesses thereof 
and their added value to markets and companies will be reviewed.  
  
Credit risk measuring and credit risk ratings are not new 
phenomena. Credit rating agencies are as old as 100 years, whereas 
credit risk measuring is as old as the origin of financing.  What seems 
to be new in recent years is the increasing application of technology and 
modelling, whilst measuring credit risk is in large part inspired by 
market developments, such as derivative market development, 
globalisation, the liberalisation of financial markets, and, last but not 
least, the suggestion that with stricter controls, through Central Bank 
and BIS regulation, credit risk and secondary systemic risks may be 
better managed, as is shown in the following paragraph quoted from 
IMF and World Bank: 
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“Since 1997, financial sector crises in a number of countries, for 
instance Argentina, Ecuador, Indonesia, Korea, Russia, Thailand, and 
Turkey, have highlighted linkages between financial sector crises and 
weak macroeconomic policies, while also showing the adverse effects of 
poor lending practices, weak corporate governance, inadequate loan 
provisioning, accounting and auditing practices, and insufficient 
supervisory independence. In many cases, the preconditions for 
effective banking supervision, which include sound and sustainable 
macroeconomic policies, a well-developed public infrastructure, effective 
market discipline, procedures for effective bank resolution, and 
systemic protection or a safety net, had not been met sufficiently (IMF 
and World Bank, 2002).” 
This chapter describes key issues related to credit and credit 
rating as well as supervision, without discussing the technical content 
of the different models and methodologies. Also, within the context of 
this field, theories such as intermediation theory and agency theory are 
relevant, but those aspects will not be addressed here. Reading through 
the enormous amount of publications on the subject, one observes that 
there is plenty of discussion on technical aspects and considerations, 
yet that perhaps there is less discussion on the concept itself and rather 
few critical considerations. It will be argued that this is somehow due to 
the dominant epistemology governing the field of finance, where 
researchers mainly seem to adhere to the functionalist paradigm.  
 Before credit rating and credit ratings agencies came into play, 
all financing was either done on a transactional basis, i.e. commodity 
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finances for example, or on the basis of a relationship between borrower 
and financier. At the beginning of the relationship, as in Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981), there is no possibility of selecting borrowers according to 
their quality. Hence, problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
have to be considered. These problems can be solved by charging low 
interest rates at the beginning. In later stages of the relationship, 
borrower selection problems are resolved by having monitored former 
successful projects of surviving borrowers. With these borrowers, higher 
interest rates can be achieved. These higher interest rates are still low 
compared to interest rate offers of competing banks with no earlier 
relationship to these customers. These competing banks have to rely on 
an assessment of the average default probability of possible new 
borrowers, which is higher because no pre-selection of borrower quality 
has taken place. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explain restrictive lending policies of 
banks as a consequence of asymmetric information on borrower quality. 
Models such as Bester (1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1987) solve this 
problem by introducing collateral as a sorting device to identify 
borrower quality. Petersen and Rajan (1995), and Petersen and Rajan 
(1994), show theoretically and empirically that another key to 
overcoming this phenomenon is the possibility of learning about 
borrower quality through time. As a consequence borrowers with a 
strong bank–borrower relationship receive more credit on average. This 
conclusion is sustained by evidence from Japan provided by Hoshi et al. 
(1990) and Hoshi et al. (1991). 
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A growing body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, has 
focused on the role of relationship lending as a determinant of corporate 
performance. In an early contribution, Cable (1985), for example, relates 
the rapid path of industrialisation and economic growth in 19th century 
Germany to the active role of its banking system. In particular, close 
connections between industry and their major banks, or housebanks4, 
are credited with some of industrialisation success in the late 19th 
century. Tilly (1989) reports results on the contribution of German 
universal banks to industrial investment in large corporations. His 
findings support the view that housebanks play an important, and 
largely positive, role in the process of corporate control, and of industry-
wide merger activities.  
In this literature, a housebank is regarded as the premier lender 
of a firm, being equipped with more relevant and timelier information 
than any "normal", non-housebank institution. Furthermore, a 
housebank is more committed to its client, enlarging their role as 
financier if the firm faces sudden and temporary difficulties. The 
importance of long-term commitment in the bank–customer relationship 
is stressed by Mayer (1988) and Hellwig (1989), and Boot and Thakor 
(1994), just to name a selection of the extant relationship lending 
literature.  
This literature usually makes no distinction between housebank 
relations and normal bank relations. In this sense, modern banking 
theory has largely focused on homogeneous banking relations. Firms 
                                                 
4 Housebank is a term which is known especially in Germany (and surrounding countries) as reported by 
Tilly (1989) and others. A housebank is regarded as the premier lender of a firm 
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have an exclusive outside financier, their housebank, and all corporate 
customers of commercial banks are presumably housebank–clients. 
However, theoretical as well as empirical arguments suggest that firms 
have a multitude of banks supplying credit (von Thadden, 1992). Thus, 
the case of "relationship lending" or "housebank financing" is a specific 
implicit contractual arrangement among a broader range of financial 
relations.  
 
 
2.2.2. A survey on relationship banking: 
 
Various models of the banking firm stress their role in reducing 
costly information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders (see the 
surveys by Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993 and Thakor, 1995). Under 
certain assumptions, financial intermediaries are able to realise 
economies of scale and scope concerning production, and use of 
information. One important line of reasoning focuses on the structure of 
long-term debt contracts. As complete and state-contingent contracts 
are not feasible in a world of asymmetric information, intermediaries 
may restore efficiency through the use of relationship lending. In 
particular, a bank is able to offer a technology for low cost 
renegotiations of debt contracts: “…by close and continued interaction, 
a firm may provide a lender with sufficient information about, and a 
voice in, the firm's affairs so as to lower the cost of and increase the 
availability of credit” (Petersen and Rajan, 1995, p. 5). Here, private 
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information helps to establish commitment by the lender vis-à-vis the 
borrower. The resulting optimal contract allows for intertemporal 
arrangements, lowering aggregate financing costs and reducing credit 
rationing (see Greenbaum et al., 1989; Sharpe, 1990; Fischer, 1990; 
Boot and Thakor, 1994 and Petersen and Rajan, 1995).  
Relationship lending with long-term commitment and 
informational monopoly by the lender has some similarity with the so-
called housebanking principle. As pointed out by Edwards and Fischer, 
housebanks in Germany are said to bear a special responsibility if their 
customer face financial distress (Edwards and Fischer, 1994, pp. 8–10, 
157). The housebank is regarded as the premier lender of a firm, with 
more intensive and more timely information production than under a 
comparable normal debt contract.  
A large proportion of the literature implies exclusivity as a 
fundamental characteristic of debt financing, thereby identifying bank 
loans a priori with relational financing. In Diamond (1984), an 
intermediary realises economies of scale with respect to monitoring. 
There is no direct competition from a second intermediary. In the model 
of Fischer (1990), banks need an exclusive relation with their clients to 
support an intertemporal trade-off between loan availability and loan 
pricing. With competition between several banks that cater for the 
financial needs of a firm, the special long-term relation to clients breaks 
down. In this sense, modern banking theory has largely focused on 
homogeneous banking relations. Firms have an exclusive outside 
financier, their housebank, and all corporate customers of commercial 
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banks are presumably housebank-clients. However, in most papers, 
competition is indirectly introduced by imposing a zero-profit condition 
for the banks.  
The available evidence suggests that exclusive financing relation 
between banks and firms are extremely rare. Even in the small firms-
sample utilised by Berger and Udell (1993) and Petersen and Rajan 
(1994), the average number of bank relations at any moment in time is 
a function of firm size, varying between 1 and 6. Boot and Thakor 
(1997) analyse a more complete model, where banks engage in both 
transaction-based and relationship-based banking. The model allows 
studying the bank's optimal choice of relationship financing. 
Nevertheless, it is partial in that the borrower does not have a choice 
between different kinds of bank debt.  
The information monopoly of housebanks potentially poses a risk 
for the borrower, since the former has ex post superior bargaining 
power. The debtor is informationally captured and might loose future 
benefits of an enhanced creditworthiness (Mayer, 1988 and Rajan, 
1992). These extra-costs of lending may explain why borrowers 
establish relations with a multitude of lenders. Von Thadden (1992) 
argues that competition from a second lender ("duplicated monitoring") 
may reduce the rents from hold-up situations. Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1996) analyse the process of debt renegotiations with many lenders 
and the role of collateral therein. Their results are consistent with the 
assumptions and implications of the relationship lending literature, 
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although the driving forces in their model are differences in property 
rights on collateral.  
In summary, relationship lending is an information-intensive type 
of debt financing, which can affect credit costs and credit availability in 
a predictable way. It is based on the idea of an intertemporal implicit 
contract, which is facilitated by a certain degree of (ex post) bargaining 
power of the lender. However according to Elsas and Krahnen (1999) 
housebanking is not necessarily synonymous to exclusive financing. 
Firms may have a multitude of lenders, but they will have at most a 
single housebank.  
Turning to the relevant empirical literature, one finds it largely 
concerned with the analysis of bank uniqueness, rather than 
relationship lending. For example, James, 1987 and Lummer and 
McConnel, 1989 and Billett et al. (1995) provide some evidence on 
abnormal positive market returns after announcements of new bank 
debt, or renewal of existing bank debt. These studies do not differentiate 
between housebank contracts and normal bank contracts and thus do 
not provide insights into the specific role of relationship lending. 
Systematic attempts to analyse the implications of relationships can be 
found in Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995). These 
papers draw on a data set from the National Survey of Small Business 
Finance. They examine determinants of loan pricing in a cross-section. 
Blackwell and Winters (1997) use credit-file data from a number of 
banks in the U.S. Unlike the data in Elsas and Krahnen (1999), there is 
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no information on internal risk assessments (credit ratings), and there 
is only one year of observations.  
In all these papers, housebanks and normal banks are identified 
by the duration of the firm's relationship with the bank. It is implicitly 
assumed that duration of a relationship is a sufficient statistic for 
information intensity. However, the suitability of duration as a 
relationship lending proxy may be questioned. Elsas and Krahnen 
(1999) indicated that they are not aware of a theoretical argument 
predicting different lengths of time for housebank and normal bank 
financial relations. Though there are models predicting housebanks to 
behave differently from normal banks, e.g. in situations of financial 
distress, they do not predict an early discontinuation of normal bank 
lending (though they may predict a tightening of credit availability). 
Note that the duration-proxy captures only the length of a relationship, 
not its intensity. Second, recent direct empirical evidence disputes the 
validity of duration as a proxy for relationship lending altogether. In a 
study on the Norwegian credit market, Ongena and Smith (1997) find 
no significant influence of contract duration on the likelihood of 
relationship termination. The authors argue that this finding is 
inconsistent with duration being a good measure of relationship 
intensity. For Elsas and Krahnen (1999) they found no significant 
difference of mean contract duration between the sub-samples of 
housebanks and normal banks.  
One recent attempt to control for the dynamic aspects of 
relationship lending is the analysis of Berlin and Mester (1997a). Based 
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on a data set of 600.000 small business loans and an observation 
period of 12 years, the authors try to examine the idea of an 
intertemporal compensating scheme. Their results do not provide 
evidence in support of the existence of relationship lending (Berlin and 
Mester, 1997a, pp. 15, 16). However, the analysis does not directly 
compare relationship-based and normal bank debt. Berlin and Mester 
estimate cost functions and profit functions for each bank in their 
sample. The link to relationship lending is provided by the idea that 
relationship lending is reflected by loan rate smoothing, leading to 
higher costs and higher profitability simultaneously. Moreover, by 
relying on bank loans with contractual interest rates above the prime 
rate, the authors in fact use a censored sample. As argued by Gorton 
and Kahn (1996), banks may, under certain circumstances, charge 
below-prime rates under an optimal arrangement.  
Preece and Mullineaux (1996) address the issue of multi-lender 
relations empirically. They examine the market response to 
announcements of private financing with different numbers of lenders. 
Abnormal returns are observed only if the number of lenders is 
sufficiently low, i.e. smaller than 4. This is consistent with the idea that 
a small number of lenders have stronger incentives for a close 
monitoring over time, and that they have lower costs of renegotiation. 
Once again, their analysis does not differentiate between housebanks 
and normal banks.  
The relationship between the number of lenders and a firm's 
sensitivity to cash flow variations is analysed by Houston and James 
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(1996). The authors find that firms relying on a single bank are more 
cash flow constrained and appear to hold larger stocks of liquid assets 
as a means of liquidity insurance than firms with several banks. This 
finding casts doubt on the insurance hypothesis as implied by 
relationship lending. However, one cannot conclude immediately that 
firms with a single lending bank are better off by employing additional 
lenders. The observed financing structure could well reflect equilibrium 
and, thus, by increasing the number of lenders, the firm's situation 
might deteriorate (Houston and James, 1996, p. 21).  
Overall, the empirical evidence for the existence of relationship 
lending appears to be mixed. Due to the utilisation of duration as a 
proxy for relationship intensity, most studies to date have to be 
evaluated carefully. Only few papers control directly the dynamic 
character of the bank–borrower relationship or the number of lenders a 
given borrower contracts with simultaneously.  
2.2.3. Introduction to credit rating: 
 
The rating of borrowers is a widespread practice in capital 
markets. It is meant to summarise the quality of a debtor and, in 
particular, to inform the market about repayment prospects. Apart from 
so-called external ratings by agencies, there are also internal ratings by 
banks and other financial intermediaries providing debt finance to 
corporations. While external ratings by agencies have been available for 
many years, in fact since 1910 in the case of Moody's, the oldest 
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agency, internal ratings by commercial banks are a more recent 
development. Their history in most cases does not exceed 5–10 years.  
Rating categories, typically letter labelled (AAA or Aaa for prime 
quality), or simply numbered (1 to 10, say), are a shorthand to quantify 
credit risk. On the basis of historical data, ratings can be related to the 
relative frequency of defaults (default-mode paradigm), or they become 
the basis for the valuation of an asset (mark-to-model paradigm). The 
most prominent application relates to corporate asset-liability 
management, where risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC) numbers 
is used to benchmark divisional performance. Ratings allow to measure 
credit risk, and to manage consistently a bank's credit portfolio, i.e. to 
alter the banks' exposure with respect to type of risk. In particular, 
ratings are useful for the pricing of a bond or a loan, reflecting an 
intended positive relation between expected credit risk and nominal 
return.  
For all these reasons, the quality of a financial institution's rating 
system has attracted attention from many parties. Auditing firms 
discuss the risk reporting systems of a corporation in the annual report, 
rating agencies evaluate the risk assessment system of a borrower who 
wants to issue asset backed securities, and supervisory authorities 
(under the guidance of the BIS) are expected to start soon to certify 
institutional rating systems and credit risk models.  
A final remark is in order about the differences between two types 
of ratings: internal and external. Rating agencies generate external 
ratings. These agencies specialise in the production of rating 
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information about corporate or sovereign borrowers, they do not engage 
in the underwriting of these risks. The rating information is made 
public, while the rating process itself remains non-disclosed. Internal 
ratings, in contrast, are produced by financial intermediaries (notably 
banks) to evaluate the risks they take into their own books. The rating 
information is seen as a source of competitive advantage, because it is 
believed to contain proprietary information, and is therefore not made 
public. Even the firm being rated is typically not informed about its 
current internal rating.  
While there is a growing empirical literature on the validity and 
the reliability of external ratings (see notably Ederington et al.,1987 and 
Blume et al., 1998), and on the informational content of external rating 
changes (see Hand., 1992 and Liu et al., 1999), there is still very little 
published work on the methodology and the empiricism of internal 
ratings. A notable exception that relies on data from the US is Treacy 
and Carey (1998) and Carey (1998).  
 
2.2.4. Rating agencies: 
 
2.2.4.1. The external agency rating process: 
 
The issuance of bonds by corporations is a 20th-century 
phenomenon. It started at the beginning of the century, at 
approximately the same time that the first papers and articles were 
published on the analysis of accounting ratios, as a means of 
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diagnosing the financial strength of a company. By the 1920s, this 
approach had been commercialised and specialised firms were offering 
their services, and promoting the merits of ratio analysis. This was also 
the period when Moody's (1909), S&P (1916), and other agencies started 
to rate public debt issues. Over the last 30 years, the introduction of 
new financial products has led to the development of new methodologies 
and criteria for credit rating: S&P was the first rating company to rate 
mortgage-backed bonds (1975), mutual funds (1983) and asset-backed 
securities (1985).  
A credit rating is not, in general, an investment recommendation 
concerning a given security. In the words of S&P, "A credit rating is 
S&P's opinion of the general creditworthiness of an obligor, or the 
creditworthiness of an obligor with respect to a particular debt security 
or other financial obligation, based on relevant risk factors." A rating in 
Moody's words is "...an opinion on the future ability and legal obligation 
of an issuer to make timely payments of principal and interest on a 
specific fixed income security." "Moody's ratings of industrial and 
financial companies have primarily reflected default probability, while 
expected severity of loss in the event of default has played an important 
secondary role. In the speculative-grade portion of the market, which 
has been developing into a distinct sector, Moody's ratings place more 
emphasis on expected loss than on relative default risk." Since S&P and 
Moody's are considered to have expertise in credit rating and are 
regarded as unbiased evaluators, their ratings are widely accepted by 
market participants and regulatory agencies. Financial institutions, 
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when required to hold investment-grade bonds by their regulators, use 
the ratings of credit agencies such as S&P and Moody's to determine 
which bonds are of investment grade.  
The subject of a credit rating might be a company issuing debt 
obligations. In the case of such "issuer credit ratings", the rating is an 
opinion on the obligor's overall capacity to meet its financial obligations. 
The opinion is not specific to any particular liability of the company, nor 
does it consider the merits of having guarantors for some of the 
obligations. In the issuer credit rating category there are counterparty 
ratings, corporate credit ratings, and sovereign credit ratings.  
Another class of rating is "issue-specific credit ratings". In this 
case, the rating agency makes a distinction, in its rating system and 
symbols, between long-term and short-term credits. The short-term 
ratings apply to commercial paper (CP), certificates of deposits (CD) and 
put bonds. In rating a specific issue the attributes of the issuer, as well 
as the specific terms of the issue, the quality of the collateral and the 
creditworthiness of the guarantors, are taken into account.  
The rating process includes quantitative, qualitative and legal 
analyses. The quantitative analysis is mainly financial analysis and is 
based on the firm's financial reports. The qualitative analysis is 
concerned with the quality of management, and includes a thorough 
review of the firm's competitiveness within its industry as well as the 
expected growth of the industry and its vulnerability to technological 
changes, regulatory changes and labour relations. 
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When rating a company, the nature of competition within its 
industry is a very important consideration. In trying to illustrate its 
evaluation process, S&P uses an example of a firm from the airline 
industry. For such a firm, the analysis concentrates on issues such as 
market position in specific markets locally and internationally, 
including barriers to entry, revenue generation (including pricing, 
utilisation of capacity, service reputation, and productivity), cost control 
(for labour, fuel, commissions) and the quality of the aircraft fleet.  
The assessment of management, although subjective in nature, 
investigates how likely it is that it will achieve operational success, and 
its risk tolerance. The rating process includes meetings with the 
management of the issuer to review operating and financial plans, 
policies and strategies. All the information is reviewed and discussed by 
a rating committee with appropriate expertise in the relevant industry, 
which then votes on the recommendation. The issuer can appeal 
against the rating before it is made public by supplying new 
information. The rating decision is usually issued four to six weeks after 
the agency is asked to rate a debt issue.  
Usually the ratings are reviewed once a year based on new 
financial reports, new business information and review meetings with 
management. A "credit watch" or "rating review" notice is issued if there 
is reason to believe that the review may lead to a credit rating change. A 
change of rating has to be approved by the rating committee.  
2.2.5. The differences in ratings: 
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While the rating agencies use similar methods and approaches to 
rate debt, they sometimes come up with different ratings of the same 
debt investment. In their studies of the credit rating industry, Cantor 
and Packer (1996) show that for 1.168 firms rated by both Moody's and 
S&P at the end of 1993, only 53% of the firms rated AA or Aa and AAA 
or Aaa were  rated the same by both agencies. For other investment-
grade issues, only 36% were rated in the same way, while 41% of those 
rated below investment grade had been awarded the same ratings.  
This issue of ratings' differences is an important one. It raises two 
questions: First, to what extent is the rating quantitatively based and 
what is the role of judgement? The second question concerns the 
independence of the rating agencies. Since the rated companies pay to 
be rated, there is a perceived danger that business pressures will affect 
the process.  
Cantor and Packer (1996) studied differences of opinion in the 
credit ratings industry and suggest that often ignored in the debate has 
been the fact that observed rating differences need not imply different 
credit standards, but rather could be the result of sample selection 
bias. While for decades Moody’s and S&P have automatically assigned 
ratings to all corporations issuing in the U.S. public bond markets, 
Fitch and Duff & Phelps-the two other major agencies-have issued 
ratings only upon request. These “third” agencies have argued that their 
ratings have often been sought when there is a strong expectation by 
issuers of improving upon Moody’s and S&P’s ratings. However, 
whenever Fitch and Duff & Phelps would have rated lower, their ratings 
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would not have been purchased. Certainly, the mechanism of 
reputation should serve as a powerful incentive to maintain ratings that 
are not too out-of-line with established standards. The rationale for 
obtaining credit ratings has traditionally been viewed in the finance 
literature to be the economies of scale in information collection and the 
reduction of agency costs in the issuance of debt (Wakeman 1984, 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984, Millon and Thakor 1985). If investors 
were to lose confidence in an agency’s ratings, issuers would no longer 
believe they could lower their funding costs by obtaining its ratings. To 
this extent, we might expect the credit rating agency’s reputation in the 
bond market to play a role similar to that of the underwriter’s in the 
initial public offering (lP0) market, where reputation checks the degree 
to which low-quality issues are brought to the market (Beatty and Ritter 
1986; Carter and Manaster 1990). 
Cantor and Packer (1996) found that third agencies, such as 
Fitch and Duff & Phelps, on average assign higher ratings than Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor’s. This pattern may result because the third 
agencies have more lenient standards or because their policy of rating 
only on request induces selection bias. Their results suggest that 
although there is evidence of sample selection in the data, the majority 
of the observed differences in average ratings appear to reflect 
differences in standards. Considerations about reputation apparently do 
not ensure equivalence across agency scales, and financial industry 
regulations that assume such equivalence may be misconceived (Cantor 
and Packer, 1996). 
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The rating agency business already constitutes an oligopoly. The 
issue of who rates the rating agencies has been debated since the 
industry was first established. Linnell (2001) believes that the proposed 
changes to the Capital Accord will further fuel this debate given the 
perception of increased power for the industry. However, it is unlikely 
that the Accord will add to the formal regulatory burden of rating 
agencies. Credit Rating agencies are already regulated at the point of 
entry, i.e. in order to establish a presence in a local market; virtually 
every country operates a formal approval process from the local 
securities authorities. Once this has been received, whilst the ongoing 
burden of regulation is negligible, agencies are still responsible to the 
local authorities and may be expelled from a market if found to be 
acting in an inappropriate or irresponsible manner. In addition, any 
increased formal regulation would have to overcome formidable 
practical obstacles, not least how can opinions be regulated?  
Whilst formal regulation of the industry is minimal, informal 
regulation is ever present. Specifically, market forces, confidence and 
judgement are by far the most significant regulatory influences affecting 
the ratings industry. No rating agency can afford to lose its market 
credibility since; ultimately, it is merely a formal mechanism for 
expressing credit opinions. Without its reputation, therefore, those 
opinions become worthless and its franchise eroded. Consequently, a 
ratings agency has to behave responsibly and clearly articulate its 
policies and decisions; otherwise the market will judge it harshly and 
quickly marginalise its activities.  
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Cantor (2001), now employed by Moody’s, confirms that the credit 
rating agency industry is subject to moral hazard. Every rating agency 
has a business incentive to assign high ratings to issuers, who are free 
to choose among the agencies. This incentive is offset by a rating 
agency's need to maintain its reputation in the market with investors, 
who drive the issuers' demand for credit ratings. Pressure on issuers to 
"shop" for the highest rating is increased by their use in regulation. 
Such practices could undermine the reliability of ratings over time. 
 
2.2.6. Rating through the cycle versus current condition rating: 
 
Rating agencies such as Fitch, Moody's or Standard & Poor's play 
an important role for the functioning of credit markets. Their ratings are 
used to price risky debt, to compute economic and regulatory capital, or 
to calibrate internal ratings of banks and other financial institutions (for 
the latter see Carey and Hrycay, 2001). When using agency ratings for 
such purposes, two main requirements should be met. The nature of a 
rating should be properly understood, i.e., it should be clear what kind 
of information rating agencies intend to summarise. Secondly, ratings 
should efficiently aggregate this information.  
As for informational efficiency, there is plenty of academic and 
anecdotal evidence, which suggests that agency ratings do not fully 
reflect available information. Altman and Kao (1992) and Lando and 
Skødeberg (2002) document serial dependence in rating changes, while 
Delianedis and Geske (1999) conclude that borrower fundamentals 
predict future rating changes. Other evidence which points to 
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inefficiencies is the high stability of agency ratings (Kealhofer et al., 
1998), or the agencies' performance in the Asian crises (IMF, 1999).  
The peculiarities of the agencies' rating method, on the other 
hand, have received little attention in the literature. It is commonplace 
to note that agency ratings are not estimates of short-term default risk, 
but should rather be characterised as looking through the cycle (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000). Carey and Hrycay (2001), 
however, are the first to study the nature and consequences of the 
agencies' rating architecture. They examine problems that arise if the 
default history of through-the-cycle ratings is used to map internal 
bank ratings into default probabilities. Contrary to agency ratings, bank 
ratings are usually based on the actual default probability over a 
specific horizon. In the literature, such ratings are labelled current-
condition or point-in-time ratings. The category also comprises ratings 
based on quantitative forecasts of bankruptcy. 
Löffler (2002) suggests that the empirical evidence on ratings has 
to be interpreted with care. Apparent violations of informational 
efficiency could well result from the agencies' rating method. It is 
important to evaluate ratings against an appropriate benchmark and to 
take their particularities into account when using them as inputs to 
other models. Depending on the purpose, agency ratings and current-
condition ratings may not be interchangeable.  
Among the related literature are Carey and Hrycay (2001), whose 
paper contains an empirical investigation into rating dynamics. They 
find that agency ratings exhibit less cyclical variation and are more 
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stable than current-condition ratings, which is consistent with agencies 
following the through-the-cycle approach. Löffler (2002) examines the 
consequences of the agencies' tendency to reduce rating volatility by 
taking a rating action only when it is unlikely to be reversed shortly 
afterwards. Such a policy affects rating dynamics in a similar way as 
following a through-the-cycle approach. It appears that rating through-
the-cycle can have stronger effects on rating stability, whereas 
avoidance of rating reversals can explain predictability of rating changes 
unaccounted-for by the through-the-cycle approach. Even though their 
effects are similar, the two rating policies are conceptually different. 
Avoiding rating reversals by suppressing rating changes works like a 
filter that leads to a loss of information. Through-the-cycle ratings, too, 
neglect information, but only in order to convey other information not 
contained in current-condition ratings.  
Löffler’s (2002) analysis of cyclical components in default risk 
partly builds on the literature on mean reversion in asset prices (Fama 
and French, 1988; Poterba and Summers, 1988). The consequences of 
mean-reverting default risk for the prices of risky debt are studied in 
Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). Dangl and Zechner (2001) 
investigate dynamic capital structure choice and its impact on credit 
spreads and default risk. Recent papers on the fundamental 
determinants of ratings and their informational content are Blume et al. 
(1998) and Ederington and Goh (1998), respectively.  
Agency ratings are often used to infer individual obligor default 
probabilities. Examples are portfolio credit risk models such as 
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CreditMetrics (Gupton et al., 1997) or the recent proposal of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2001). Proponents of alternative 
rating methods point out that the predictive quality of agency ratings 
can be substantially improved (Kealhofer et al., 1998). The fact that 
Moody's has developed a statistical model for predicting short-term 
default risk, which complements the traditional through-the-cycle 
rating, indicates that even the rating agencies share this view (Sobehart 
et al., 2000).  
Kealhofer et al. (1998) and Carey and Hrycay (2001) find that 
agency ratings exhibit a much larger stability than current-condition 
ratings. Kealhofer et al (1998) derive current-condition ratings from an 
application of the Merton (1974) model and compare their stability with 
that of S&P ratings. Carey and Hrycay (2001) use a logic model to 
categorise issuers rated by Moody's. Typically, 40–50% of current-
condition ratings remain stable over a one-year horizon, compared to 
80–90% in the case of agency ratings. Carey and Hrycay (2001) 
attribute this discrepancy to the agencies' rating methodology, but they 
do not examine whether the potential effects of rating through the cycle 
are large enough to account for the evidence. An alternative explanation 
could be that agencies consistently under-react to new information.  
Empirical studies of rating changes have documented a 
significant positive autocorrelation (Altman and Kao, 1992; Lando and 
Skødeberg, 2002). A partial explanation for this phenomenon could be 
that rating agencies "dole out the bad news in small doses rather than 
savaging the bond issuer – who is, after all, their customer – all in one 
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go" (Economist, December 13, 1997, p. 70). Serial correlation might also 
be due to horizon effects. Consider a firm which gradually expands into 
a new, risky business segment, repeatedly issuing new debt to finance 
necessary investments. Over time, the default probability will rise. Even 
if the rating analyst perfectly predicts this development, she will not 
completely incorporate it in the current rating if the rating horizon is 
shorter than the time span in which the firm's restructuring is 
completed. Rating changes will then exhibit positive autocorrelation.  
Löffler (2002) showed that empirical irregularities of agency 
ratings could be a consequence of the through-the-cycle method. Rating 
stability is significantly higher than with a current-condition approach. 
Ratings are not perfectly correlated with actual default risk, and they 
are correlated with past rating changes provided contemporaneous 
information is controlled for. Predictability in the usual sense can stem 
from errors in assessing the degree of cyclicality. The empirical evidence 
on ratings should therefore be interpreted with care. Apparent 
shortcomings of agency ratings might well be inherent to the rating 
method. Rating through-the-cycle does not per se lead to predictability 
of the type tested by Altman and Kao (1992), Lando and Skødeberg 
(2002), and Delianedis and Geske (1999).  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) has 
proposed to tie bank capital requirements closer to default risk. Löffler 
(2002) poses the question of whether banks should measure individual 
credit risk with a through-the-cycle or a current-condition approach. 
Even though through-the-cycle ratings are incomplete measures of 
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short-term default term risk, they need not be inferior for the purpose of 
bank regulation. Among others, Estrella (2001) and Catarineu-Rabell et 
al. (2002) argue that regulators should avoid procyclicality in capital 
requirements. Löffler (2002) suggests that relying on through-the-cycle 
ratings would be one way of achieving this objective. 
2.2.7. Rating requirements: What should a good rating system 
be like? 
 
Inspired by changing regulation, especially from the BIS, banks 
have in the last 5-10 years developed their own international credit 
rating systems. Krahnen and Weber (2001) came up with 14 
requirements, some of which are formally derived, some of which are 
empirically founded, some of which are inspired by the recent 
publication of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and some 
of which they derived at by talking to high level practitioners.  
Rating systems are what is mathematically called a function: 
  R: {companies}      {Rating-values}, 
meaning that the rating system R is a function which assigns 
each element of the set of companies to a rating value. These rating 
values, or short ratings, can be categories, i.e. {A,B+,B,B-,...}, or values 
of an interval [rmin,rmax]. R(company X)=0.67 means that the rating 
system R assigns the rating value of 0.67 to company X. We will assume 
that rating categories and values can be ranked, i.e., A B means, that 
rating category A is better, in the sense of a lower default probability, 
than rating category B. The symbol "~" means that both ratings are 
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identical. This simple mathematical definition of rating systems as 
functions allows to define the first requirements without specifying at 
this point, what rating really means. 
Requirement 1 (Comprehensiveness). A bank's rating system should 
be able to rate all past, current and future clients. This requirement 
defines the potential set of companies to be rated. A bank's rating 
system should be able to cope with all clients possible. Of course, this 
requirement is quite general, and hard to meet. There may be future 
clients, and risk criteria, a given bank may not even imagine. There may 
be past clients who do not exist any more. However, a bank should 
make any effort possible to ensure that its rating system is flexible 
enough to cope with all foreseeable types of risk. It should not happen, 
e.g., that foreign companies cannot be rated or that the rating system is 
not able to handle certain industries. 
Requirement 2 (Completeness). A bank should rate all current 
clients and keep on rating its past clients. The requirement states that a 
bank should rate all its current clients. This is rather trivial and will in 
most cases be current management practice. In addition, Krahnen and 
Weber (2001) suggest that a bank should keep on rating its past clients. 
This might not be easy and in certain cases it might not even be 
possible. Accounting data as well as qualitative data from talking to the 
companies' management might not be available for past clients. 
Nevertheless, we think that a bank should put effort in maintaining its 
rating database. It is of central importance for any type of back-testing 
and further development of the bank's rating that the bank has an 
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ongoing set of rating data. If the bank stops rating clients who, e.g., 
defaulted, the set of companies which are in the rating database can be 
biased. Such a bank would know nothing about the probabilities of 
events that happen after default: how likely is the success of 
restructuring, etc. The survivorship bias (to consider "surviving 
companies" only) is well known from empirical work in capital markets. 
Requirement 3 (Complexity). A bank should have as many different 
rating systems as necessary and as few as possible. The reasons for 
choosing the number of rating systems should be made transparent. 
Requirement 4 (POD-definition). Probabilities of default have to be 
well defined. 
This requirement states that a bank has to have a proper 
definition of what its PODs mean. The bank has to define what it 
considers to be a default event. Krahnen and Weber (2001) found that 
financial institutions rely on a variety of definitions of a default event, 
e.g. loan loss provision, or failure to pay interest, or principal, over a 
specified time span. Note that without a harmonisation of default 
definitions, it will prove difficult to pool POD-data across banks5 
2.2.8. Basel II and banks: 
In June 2004 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
reached agreement on a New Basel Capital Accord that will replace the 
current 1988 Capital Accord. The accord is based on three mutually 
reinforcing pillars that allow banks and supervisors to evaluate properly 
the various risks that banks face.  
                                                 
5 For remaining requirements (5 to 14) kindly refer to Krahnen and Weber (2001)  
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The New Basel Capital Accord focuses on:  
· minimum capital requirements, which seek to refine the 
measurement framework set out in the 1988 Accord  
· supervisory review of an institution's capital adequacy and 
internal assessment process  
· market discipline through effective disclosure to encourage 
safe and sound banking practices  
The Basel Committee received more than 250 comments on its 
January 2001 proposals. In April 2001 the Committee initiated a 
Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) of banks to gather the data necessary 
to allow the Committee to gauge the impact of the proposals for capital 
requirements. A further study was undertaken in November 2001 to 
gain industry feedback about potential modifications to the Committee's 
proposals. In December 2001 the Basel Committee announced a revised 
approach to finalising the New Basel Capital Accord and the 
establishment of an Accord Implementation Group. Previously, in June 
2001 the Committee released an update on its progress and highlighted 
several important ways in which it had agreed to modify some of its 
earlier proposals based, in part, on industry comments.  
During its 10 July 2002 meeting, members of the Basel 
Committee reached agreement on a number of important issues related 
to the New Basel Capital Accord that the Committee had been exploring 
since releasing its January 2001 consultative paper. In April 2003 the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a third consultative 
paper on the New Basel Capital Accord. The goal of the Committee 
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continues for the accord to take effect in member countries by year-end 
2006. To that end, work already has begun in a number of countries on 
draft rules that would integrate Basel capital standards with national 
capital regimes.  
The internal ratings-based approach recently proposed by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision seeks to make bank 
regulatory capital requirements for credit risk approximate economic 
capital requirements (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001). 
That is, under certain assumptions (Gordy, 2000), IRB capital 
requirements would vary across banks according to the riskiness of 
their portfolios in a manner that would make the estimated likelihood of 
insolvency due to credit losses approximately the same for all banks 
that are at the regulatory minimum. Required capital would be larger 
for banks with portfolios posing greater risks of large losses and vice 
versa.  
The IRB capital formula for credit risk takes as inputs loan and 
portfolio characteristics and produces capital requirements. Designing 
such a formula involves decisions about (1) the dimensions of credit 
risk to be included, that is, which loan and portfolio characteristics 
should appear as variables in the formula; (2) the relative variations in 
capital requirements as loan and portfolio characteristics vary from 
those of a reference or numeraire loan or portfolio; and (3) the absolute 
level of capital required for the numeraire portfolio. What is being 
achieved is that with the new BIS is to come from a much generalised 
capital adequacy ratio of 8% on all assets of the bank, to come to a 
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more refined system of solvency requirements, depending on the quality 
of the underlying assets.  
 
2.2.9 Key factors motivating improved regulation: 
 
According to The Banker's (2003) database, Tier 1 capital ratio, 
the measure of a bank's strength, for countries in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), excluding Japan, is a 
healthy 13.48% and aggregate Tier 1 capital is $1360bn. However, in a 
possible vicious circle, banks' capital could come under serious 
pressure if the bear market were to continue for 10 years, which in turn 
would lead to further downward pressure on share prices. Raising 
capital in a bear market is both difficult and unappealing, yet a number 
of banks would need to do so. The Japanese banks are a known worry. 
What is a newer and potentially bigger concern is the state of the 
German banks: in a private meeting, Deutsche Bank chief executive 
Josef Ackerman floated the idea of the state taking over some banks. 
The average Tier 1 capital ratio for German banks is 6.8%, which is less 
than half the 13.4% of OECD banks excluding Japan, according to The 
Banker (2003). Their average non-performing loans are double that of 
OECD banks excluding Japan. Even more worrying, only six banks out 
of a total of 287 declare their non-performing loans.   
The cost of equity is generally perceived to be much greater than 
the cost of debt, owing to tax considerations, asymmetric information, 
agency costs, and the bank safety net (e.g., direct access to government 
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deposit insurance, the discount window, and the payments system). For 
this reason, when regulatory capital standards require banks to 
maintain equity cushions exceeding what they would otherwise choose 
based on market discipline alone, banks may view these standards as a 
form of regulatory taxation (Donahoo and Shaffer, 1991). As with other 
forms of taxation, regulatory taxes encourage banks to develop methods 
for serving customers that avoid or minimise these taxes. Several 
studies, using mainly pre-Accord data, report findings broadly 
consistent with the view that bank behaviour is influenced by 
regulatory taxation, defined to encompass minimum capital 
requirements, reserve requirements and any deposit insurance 
premiums (Cumming, 1987; Baer and Pavel, 1988; Pavel, 1987; 
Koppenhaver, 1989; Berger and Udell, 1993 and Jagtiani et al., 1995).  
Many banks perceive that through regulatory capital arbitrage 
they can enhance shareholder value by replacing equity with debt in 
their capital structures. The "freed up" equity is then either returned to 
shareholders as increased dividends or share repurchases, or 
redeployed within the firm. The institutionalisation of equity holdings in 
the hands of mutual funds and other professional portfolio managers 
appears to have increased pressures on banks to maximise equity 
values and to rationalise their equity retention policies. Heightened 
domestic and international competition in the financial services 
industry probably has reinforced incentives for banks to keep their 
production costs, including the overall cost-of-capital (debt + equity), as 
low as possible.  
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Regulatory capital arbitrage – like traditional tax arbitrage – 
represents a bank's willingness to incur various "structuring costs" in 
order to reduce the regulatory tax consequences of formal capital 
requirements. A bank's decision about whether to engage in regulatory 
capital arbitrage, and on what scale, reflects a cost-benefit analysis in 
which the expected structuring costs are weighed against both the 
expected reduction in the bank's overall funding costs and any other 
benefits (Pennacchi, 1988; Cumming, 1987; James, 1988; Passmore, 
1992 and Chhikara and Hanson, 1993). For a given perceived 
differential between the cost of equity and the cost of debt financing, 
incentives to undertake regulatory capital arbitrage, therefore, are 
related negatively to the associated structuring costs, and positively to 
the extent to which RCA permits debt to be substituted for equity (i.e ., 
the amount of "freed up" regulatory capital).  
As suggested in Merton (1995), the basic insight behind 
regulatory capital arbitrage follows from the observation that, when 
capital standards are not based on any consistent economic soundness 
standard (e.g., probability of default), through securitization and other 
techniques, it is often possible to restructure portfolios to have basically 
similar risks, but much lower regulatory capital requirements. 
Importantly, as emphasised by Cumming (1987), the process of 
unbundling and repackaging risks incurs costs, which are a key 
determinant of a bank's willingness to engage in regulatory capital 
arbitrage. The lower these structuring costs the greater the incentives to 
undertake regulatory capital arbitrage.  
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In the broad sense, structuring costs may be external or internal. 
The former include all out-of-pocket expenses to third-parties (e.g., fees 
to underwriters, lawyers, credit rating agencies, etc.) as well as any 
increase in the bank's net interest costs associated with the use of off-
balance sheet funding sources, in lieu of on-balance sheet funding, 
such as deposits. Examples of internal structuring costs include any 
required modifications to loan administration and management 
information systems to support securitization.  
There appear to be no published studies tabulating structuring 
costs for different types of regulatory capital arbitrage. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that such costs display substantial economies of 
scale, and depend on many factors including the nature and riskiness 
of the underlying assets, legal complexities and uncertainties, and 
investors' familiarity with transactions of that type. Ongoing financial 
innovations, technological advances, and increased competition in the 
financial services sector have been working to reduce structuring costs 
over time. The upcoming new BIS regulations intend to deal with these 
issues more appropriately.  
2.2.10. BIS, Ratings and non-OECD countries: 
 
The geographical coverage of rated firms has greatly increased in 
the last two decades together with the progressive globalisation of goods 
and financial markets. This development is the consequence of both the 
greater scope of coverage of the larger international rating agencies 
(S&P, Moody's, Fitch-IBCA) and of a more active presence of nationally 
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based rating agencies (Ferri et al 2001). An example of the development 
in the scope of coverage by large international rating agencies is 
provided by the increase in the number of foreign currency sovereign 
ratings provided by Standard and Poor's, which has gone from only 11 
countries 20 years ago to 25 in 1989 and to 80 in 1999. The expansion 
of the number of rated firms has followed that of the sovereign ratings. 
By the end of 1999, only six countries, among those who had an S&P 
sovereign rating, did not have any individual firm ratings.  
The world-wide distribution of firms rated by the two largest US-
based rating agencies (Moody's and S&P) is shown below.  The country 
density of rated banks and of non-bank corporations is also illustrated. 
The number of rated firms per country has been computed as the 
average number of firms that held a foreign or domestic currency rating 
from S&P and Moody's in the second half of 1999. From the maps, it 
appears that the scope of coverage for banks is substantially similar to 
that of the total of rated firms. In both cases, Africa, Central America, 
Central Asia and the Middle East show the lowest density of coverage. 
Most developing countries show the lowest degree of concentration of 
rated firms, exception made for fast growing economies as Korea and 
Indonesia and for large countries as China, Brazil, Argentina and Chile.  
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Figure 6 Geographical distribution of non bank ratings 
Note: Geographical distribution of Moody's and S&P's non-
banking firm ratings. (Ferri et al, 2001) 
 
Figure 7 Geographical distribution of bank ratings 
 
 
 
Note: Geographical distribution of Moody's and S&P's bank 
ratings (Ferri et al, 2001) 
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Ferri et al (2001) show that US-based rating agencies, in spite of 
the very rapid growth of their international activities in the last decade, 
have devoted most of their efforts to relatively more developed 
economies, where marginal and fixed costs associated to the coverage of 
additional firms are lower and/or where the demand for ratings is 
higher. Second, the attainment of a world-wide scope of coverage is a 
very recent phenomenon, providing rating agencies with too limited a 
sample for comprehensive assessments of their accuracy in non-G10 
countries. Third, rating agencies tend to concentrate initially on the 
banking sector and only subsequently move to the non-bank sector of 
the economy. Finally, firms' ratings follow more closely sovereign ratings 
as the income level decreases. While these outcomes may be fully 
consistent with rational assessments of credit risk in economies with 
large information costs and unstable institutional structures, they also 
point to potential shortcomings in the use of ratings for regulatory 
purposes. 
A temporary worsening in their access to bank credit could have a 
negative impact on corporate sectors in emerging economies – e.g. 
amplifying corporate bankruptcies and holding corporate production 
constrained below potential. This would provoke a depletion of 
organisational capacity in emerging economies' corporate sectors with 
potential long-lasting detrimental consequences for these economies' 
recovery, as stressed by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993).  
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Ferri et al (2001) suggested that the Basel proposal would 
increase the volatility of capital needs of banks in non-high-income 
countries vs. high-income countries' banks. In fact, bank and corporate 
ratings in non-high-income countries appear to be strongly related – 
and in an asymmetric way – to changes in sovereign ratings. A 
sovereign downgrading would, for instance, imply larger changes in 
capital allocations than an upgrading and would call for larger capital 
requirements at the very time in which access to capital markets is 
more difficult. In addition, the lack of a widespread use of ratings for 
banks and corporations in non-high-income countries would not 
provide an effective incentive to adopt more sound risk assessments on 
the part of banks. In fact, while good banks in non-high-income 
countries would see their capital requirements reduced as a 
consequence of a prudent lending behaviour, their peers in non-high-
income countries would not draw an equivalent benefit from an 
analogous attitude. In fact since publication of the findings of Ferri et al 
(2001) we have already witnessed some of these consequences, as 
markets in anticipation of Basel II, are already in the process of getting 
ready. In consequence, we have seen financial sectors in emerging 
markets being severely affected, despite above Basel II capital adequacy, 
where – for example – the German financial sector, continues operating 
without there seeming to be a sense of urgency, with an average Tier 1 
capital ratio of 6.8%, which is less than half the 13.4% of OECD banks 
excluding Japan, according to The Banker (2003). What this would 
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indicate is that Basel II may further enhance the gap between OECD 
and non-OECD countries.   
Yet the following discourse seems to be illustrative for the 
dominant paradigm, outlining in which direction improvement and 
solutions are to be found.  Since 1997 (IMF and World Bank, 2002), 
financial sector crises in a number of countries, for instance Argentina, 
Ecuador, Indonesia, Korea, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey, have 
highlighted linkages between financial sector crises and weak 
macroeconomic policies, while also showing the adverse effects of poor 
lending practices, weak corporate governance, inadequate loan 
provisioning, accounting and auditing practices, and insufficient 
supervisory independence. In many cases, the preconditions for 
effective banking supervision, which include sound and sustainable 
macroeconomic policies, a well-developed public infrastructure, effective 
market discipline, procedures for effective bank resolution, and 
systemic protection or a safety net, had not been met sufficiently.  
2.2.11. The mathematical language of academic finance: A 
paradigmatic look 
Any adequate analysis of the nature and role of the mathematical 
language in finance necessarily requires fundamental understanding of 
the worldviews underlying the views expressed with respect to the 
nature and role of language (Ardalan, 2002). A worldview can be 
positioned on a continuum formed by four basic paradigms: 
functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. 
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Ardalan (2002) looked at the current state of mainstream academic 
finance and noted that it is founded on the functionalist paradigm. 
It is generally accepted that neo-classical economists develop and 
refine their theory using the language of mathematics. The defence of 
the use of mathematics as a neutral language means that the debates 
within literary criticism about the non-neutrality of language have an 
important contribution to make in reconsidering the use of 
mathematics. Any adequate analysis of the role of paradigms, in social 
theory, must recognise the assumptions that underwrite that paradigm 
or worldview. Social theory can usefully be conceived in terms of four 
key paradigms: functionalist, interpretative, radical humanist and 
radical structuralist, according to Burrell and Morgan (1979). The four 
paradigms are founded upon different views of the social world. Each 
generates theories, concepts and analytical tools, which are different 
from those of other paradigms. 
The four paradigms are based on different assumptions about the 
nature of social science (i.e. the subjective-objective dimension) and the 
nature of society (i.e. the dimension of regulation-radical change)  
Burrell and Morgan (1979).  
Figure 8 Paradigms in social science   
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Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979). This can be used as both a 
classificatory device or, more importantly, as an analytical tool. 
 
The functionalist paradigm occupies the south-east quadrant. 
Schools of thought within this paradigm can be located on the objective-
subjective continuum. From right to left they are: objectivism, social 
system theory, integrative theory, interactionism and social action 
theory. 
The functionalist paradigm assumes that society has a concrete 
existence and follows a certain order. These assumptions lead to the 
existence of an objective and value-free social science which can 
produce true explanatory and predictive knowledge of the reality out 
there. It assumes that scientific theories can be assessed objectively by 
reference to empirical evidence. Scientists do not see any roles for 
themselves within the phenomenon, which they analyse through the 
rigor and technique of the scientific method. It attributes independence 
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to the observer from the observed. That is, an ability to observe what is 
without affecting it. It assumes there are universal standards of science, 
which determine what constitutes an adequate explanation of what is 
observed. It assumes there are external rules and regulations governing 
the external world. The goal of scientists is to find the orders that 
prevail within that phenomenon. 
The functionalist paradigm seeks to provide rational explanations 
of social affairs and generate regulative sociology. It emphasises the 
importance of understanding order, equilibrium and stability in society 
and the way in which these can be maintained. Science provides the 
basis for structuring and ordering the social world, similar to the 
structure and order in the natural world. The methods of natural 
science are used to generate explanations of the social world. Their 
approach to social science is rooted in the tradition of positivism. 
Functionalists are individualists. That is, the properties of the aggregate 
are determined by the properties of its units. The functionalist paradigm 
has become dominant in academic sociology and mainstream academic 
finance. The world of finance is treated as a place of concrete reality and 
the individual is regarded as taking on a passive role; the economic 
environment determines his or her behaviour. 
Based on Smith (1990), Brennan (1995) and Weston (1994), 
theories and policies in current mainstream academic finance may be 
listed as follows: 
· efficient market theory;  
· portfolio theory;  
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· capital asset pricing theory;  
· option pricing theory;  
· agency theory;  
· arbitrage pricing theory;  
· capital budgeting policy;  
· capital structure policy;  
· dividend policy.  
 
Bettner et al. (1994) notes that the common threads among 
theories in mainstream academic finance are: 
· there is a cause- and effect- mechanism underlying all 
nature and human activity (ontology);  
· it is known through the set of homological connections 
between initial conditions and final outcomes 
(epistemology);  
· human beings interact with each other and their society in 
accordance with this mechanism (human nature); and  
· information regarding all natural and human activity can 
be acquired through observations and measurements 
unaffected by individual perceptual differences 
(methodology) (Bettner et al., 1994, p. 3).  
This leads to the conclusion that the current theories in finance 
are clearly based on the functionalist paradigm. Bettner et al. (1994) 
and McGoun (1992) provide more complete treatments of this point. A 
sign does not stand in a projective relation with the meaning that it 
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represents. The various phenomena of language must not necessarily 
have a unity. The uniform appearance of a word or sentence (e.g. in 
speaking, spelling, etc.) assures us of no uniformity or generality 
pervading many and various ways of using it, which are dependent 
upon spatial and temporal factors or what might be called context. 
Language consists ultimately of nothing more than the multiplicity of 
"family resemblances" among linguistic phenomena (concepts), each 
bearing the same signifier. There are similarities among phenomena 
bearing the same signifier, but it is in the differences among uses that 
meaning can be grasped. 
Ardalan (2002) recommends a serious conscious thinking about 
the social philosophy upon which finance is based and of the alternative 
avenues for development. The knowledge of the four paradigms is of 
paramount importance to any scientist, because the process of learning 
about a favoured paradigm is also the process of learning what that 
paradigm is not. The knowledge of paradigms makes scientists aware of 
the boundaries within which they approach their subject. Each of the 
four paradigms implies a different way of social theorising in general, 
and finance in particular. 
Academic finance can gain much by exploiting the new 
perspectives coming from other paradigms. An understanding of 
different paradigms leads to a better understanding of the multi-faceted 
nature of finance. Although a researcher may decide to conduct 
research from the point of view of a certain paradigm, an understanding 
of the nature of other paradigms leads to a better understanding of 
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what one is doing. Knowledge of finance is ultimately a product of the 
researcher's paradigmatic approach to this multifaceted phenomenon. 
Viewed from this angle, the pursuit of financial knowledge is seen as 
being as much an ethical, moral, ideological and political activity as it is 
a technical one. 
2.2.12. The following hypothesis and sub-hypotheses were 
formulated: 
The role of rating agencies such as Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s 
and Fitch-IBCA has increased during the last decades. Both country 
credit ratings as well as company credit ratings have become 
indispensable tools in today’ s finance. The new Basel II regulations will, 
through the requirement of internal ratings systems to be development 
by bank, cause for more emphasis on credit rating.  
H.2.1. The role of credit rating agencies generally can be 
described as constructive and a valuable complementary tool.    
H.2.2. Credit rating agencies, despite their long history and 
expertise, do not really possess competencies which may prevent 
default risk.              
H.2.3. The role of credit rating agencies should be more critically 
assessed and their influence (oligopoly) in finance should be reduced.  
  
H.2.4. The credit analysis process of a credit rating agency and 
those of a housebank are comparable in terms of depth and quality. 
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H.2.5. The new Basel II regulations, to be implemented in 2006, 
will further contribute to a better risk management and control of 
financial institutions and markets.  
H.2.6. The new Basel II regulations carry the risk of a further 
widening of the gap between high income and low income countries. 
2.2.13. Concluding remarks: 
Credit risk, or the risk of default, has always been a major topic of 
concern for banks and other financial intermediaries, and any agent 
committed to a financial contract for that matter. While concern for the 
possible default of counterparty on an agreed-upon financial contract is 
centuries old, modern techniques and models have arisen in the last 
decades that help master the problem. An outline of the differences 
between external and internal rating systems and the influence of Basel 
II accords (Bank of International Settlements) has been provided in this 
section 2.2, in order to stress the relevance and the connections 
between both.  
While the rating agencies use similar methods and approaches to 
rate debt, they sometimes come up with different ratings of the same 
debt investment. In their studies of the credit rating industry Cantor 
and Packer (1994) have illustrated this. This issue of ratings differences 
is an important one. It raises two questions. First, to what extent is the 
rating quantitatively based and what is the role of judgement? The 
second question concerns the independence of the rating agencies.  
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The dominant paradigm seems to suggest that by increasing 
application of technology and modelling, whilst measuring credit risk, 
and, last but not least, that by applying stricter controls, through 
Central Bank and Basel II regulation, credit risk and secondary 
systemic risks may be better managed. 
Within this approach over emphasize is being given to the rating 
of predominantly hard factors and due consideration of the context in 
which credit risks need to be assessed is neglected. This holds 
particularly true for the valuation of cultural differences, which 
according to the key argument of this thesis, hinders bankers to 
adequately understand and evaluate the various risks involved with 
cross border lending. This is why in the next section of chapter 2 cross 
cultural studies and its relevance to the field of cross border lending will 
be discussed and reviewed.  
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 Section 2.3 - Culture’s Consequences 
 
2.3.1. Introduction: 
 
 
This section 2.3. reviews some of the more prominent publications 
in cross cultural studies and deals with the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the different methodologies in its research. Hall (1976) 
describes his views on low- and high context and suggests that if one 
could get behind the scenes one would find context dependant results 
in the majority of research projects. Western science, according to Hall 
(1976) is striving for replicability and rigor in methods and is conducted 
with a view to eliminating context. This is to some extent what Basel II 
does as well with its aim of striving for rigor in the methods of 
measuring and quantifying credit risks, whereas particularly with cross 
border lending, context and therefore cultural differences are supposed 
to be relevant, in order to appropriately understand the associated risks 
of a particular credit in a particular country.  
Culture has been defined in many ways. In the English language, 
“culture” is derived from its original Latin meaning; the cultivation of 
soil (the same applies in French and German). The other meaning which 
leads to most confusion, especially in communication with the French 
is: the training and refinement of the mind, manners, taste, etc. or the 
result of this. “He/she has no culture” is almost as bad as “he/she has 
no personality”. The world “culture” is usually reserved for societies or 
for ethnic or regional groups, but it can be applied equally to other 
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human collectivities or categories: an organization, a profession, or a 
family. Very often practitioners mix what is understood to be the culture 
of the specific organization, with the way in which culture is being 
referred to in cross-cultural literature. In this thesis the word ‘culture’ 
is used to refer to societies, within nations or, as the case may be, 
within regions.  
Kluckhohn (1961) quoted a consensus of anthropological 
definitions on culture: 
Culture consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and 
reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the 
distinctive achievements of human groups, including their 
embodiments in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of 
traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially 
their attached values.  
Hofstede (1980) treats culture as “the collective programming of 
the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from 
another. Culture in this sense includes systems of values; and values 
are among the building blocks of culture.” 
2.3.2. Cross-cultural and intercultural research: 
 
As a precursor to the discussion, we need to understand what is 
meant by “intercultural” as distinct from “cross-cultural” research. 
People who are identified as “intercultural” researchers (e.g., Triandis, 
Brislin, Gudykunst, Landis, Ting-Toomey, etc.) publish not only in 
journals dedicated to the “intercultural” (e.g., The International Journal 
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of Intercultural Relations, IJIR) but also in “cross-cultural” venues (e.g., 
Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology). Sometimes it is quite difficult to 
see the substantive differences between papers published in the two 
types of outlets (Landis and Wasilewski, 1999). There are, nonetheless, 
distinctions that can be made. Cross-cultural research deals primarily 
with the similarities and differences between cultures. The best 
research of this kind is multicultural (e.g., more than three cultures), in 
focus, and more than likely deals with fairly basic psychological 
processes. Intercultural research tends to focus on the penetration by a 
member of one culture into another culture. It is therefore more 
dynamic than cross-cultural research. So, while cross-cultural research 
has a fairly long history in psychology (Klineberg, 1980), intercultural 
studies are fairly recent. This paper deals mainly with cross-cultural 
research.  
In most Western languages “culture” commonly means 
“civilisation” or “refinement of the mind” and in particular the results of 
such refinement, like education, art, and literature. Hofstede (1991) 
describes this as culture in the narrow sense, sometimes referred to as 
"culture one". Cultural as mental software, however correspondents to a 
much broader use of the world which is common among social 
anthropologists: this Hofstede (1991) describes as "culture two" and is 
the concept being used in this thesis. Culture two is the catchword for 
all the patterns of thinking, feeling and acting. It includes not only 
those activities supposed to refine the mind, but also the ordinary and 
menial things in life: greetings, eating, showing or not showing feelings, 
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keeping a certain physical distance from others, making love, or 
maintaining body hygiene. Culture understood in this way deals with 
much more fundamental human processes than culture one: it deals 
with the things that hurt.  
Hofstede (1991) warns of the risk of stereotyping, which occurs 
when assumptions about collective properties of a group are applied to 
a particular individual from that group and quotes the grand old man of 
French anthropology, Claude Lévi-Strauss (1988), by giving his 
definition of cultural relativism affirming that one culture has no 
absolute criteria for judging the activities of another culture as “low” or 
“noble”. However, every culture can and should apply such judgment to 
its own activities, because its members are actors as well as observers.  
Everybody looks at the world from behind the windows of a 
cultural home and everybody prefers to act as if people from other 
countries (cultures) have something special about them, but that home 
is normal. Unfortunately, there is no “normal” position in cultural 
matters. This is an uncomfortable message, as uncomfortable as Galileo 
Galilee’s claim in the seventeenth century that the earth was not the 
centre of the Universe. “Possibly one of the many reasons why the 
culture concept has been resisted”, Hall (1960), writes, “is that it throws 
doubt on many established beliefs. Fundamental beliefs….. are shown 
to vary widely from one culture to the next. It is easier to avoid the idea 
of the culture concept than to face up to it”. In addition, “the concepts 
of culture … touch upon such intimate matters that they are often 
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brushed aside at the very point where people begin to comprehend their 
implications” (Hall, 1960).  
Sex was the great taboo of the Victorian age. At least in the 
organisation literature, power was the great taboo until the 1960s. Both 
taboos have been more or less lifted since that time, although in the 
literature on finance one seldom comes across the term power. Culture 
in the organisation literature may be the great taboo of today. In all 
three cases, the taboo is on something we are all involved in but not 
supposed to speak about. (Hofstede, 1980).      
2.3.3. Culture’s consequences: 
 
In 1980 Geert Hofstede published Culture’s Consequences 
(Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications).  This influential study soon 
became a major source of reference about value differences around the 
world and has been translated in numerous languages.  The four (later 
five) fundamental dimensions of culture with a high-level cross-cultural 
impact on human behaviour that Hofstede discovered (argued by 
Trompenaars et al 1997) and reported in this study still serve today as 
basic criteria in most interdisciplinary, cross-culturally comparative 
research.  Based on this work Hofstede is one of the most cited social 
scientists world-wide.  The survey on which Culture’s Consequences 
builds was held twice, around 1968 and around 1972, generating data 
drawn from 40 countries, 116.000 questionnaires, and about 50,000 
respondents who all work for the multinational computer corporation 
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IBM (called HERMES, after the Greek God of commerce, in Hofstede’s 
book). 
Attitudes, orientations, emotions, and expressions differ strongly 
among people from one nation or the other.  These differences are 
fundamentally cultural.  There are countless examples of difficulties 
and conflicts between people, whether they are policy decision-makers, 
managers of multinational corporations, aeroplane pilots, or common 
tourists, trying to communicate or co-operate with people from other 
cultures.  Understanding and overcoming these difficulties require a 
cultural analysis, an analysis with a high receptiveness for the cultural 
factor: the factor summarising the influence of deeply rooted values or 
shared normative, moral, or aesthetic principles that guide action and 
serve as standards to evaluate (one’s own and other people’s) behaviour.  
Cultural distinctions are based in these deeply rooted values which, in 
turn, according to Hofstede’s theory (1980), can be delineated along five 
fundamental dimensions, some of which will be elaborated on later in 
more detail:   
· Power Distance 
· Individualism versus Collectivism 
· Femininity versus Masculinity 
· Uncertainty Avoidance and  
· Long-Term Orientation.     
 
National cultures, Hofstede (1980) points out, represent a nation’s 
unique score on how to deal with social inequality (Power Distance), the 
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degree of integration of individuals within groups (Individualism-
Collectivism), the division of social roles between women and men 
(Femininity – Masculinity), the tolerance for the unknown (Uncertainty 
Avoidance), and the trade-off between long-term and short-term 
gratification of needs (Long-Term Orientation). 
2.3.4. The concept of power distance: 
 
As it is felt that this dimension highly relates to the research 
subject, this concept is further outlined below. Hofstede (1980) 
introduces the term power distance as a measure of the interpersonal 
power of influence between bosses and subordinates as perceived by the 
less powerful of the two, being the subordinate. The term power 
distance is taken from the work of Mulder (1976, 1977); Mulder’s theory 
is based on a long series of laboratory and field experiments with simple 
social structures.  Mulder defines power as the potential to determinate 
or direct (to a certain extent) the behaviour of another person/other 
persons more so than the other way around; and power distance as the 
degree of inequality in power between a less powerful individual (I) and 
a more powerful one (O), in which I and O belong to the same (loosely or 
tightly knit) social system (Mulder, 1977:90). He proved about 20 
hypotheses, of which the most relevant to Hofstede’s (1980) study are 
the following: 
· The mere exercise of power will give satisfaction 
· The more powerful individual will strive to maintain or to 
increase the power distance to the less powerful person 
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· The greater this distance from the less powerful person, the 
stronger the striving to increase it 
· Individuals will strive to reduce the power distance between 
themselves and more powerful person 
· The smaller this distance from the more powerful person, 
the stronger the tendency to reduce it 
· The downward tendencies of the powerful to maintain the 
power distance, and the upward power distance reduction 
of the less powerful reinforce each other.  
Power has typically been seen as the ability to get others to do 
what you want them to do, if necessary against their will (Weber, 1978), 
or to get them to do something they otherwise would not (Dahl, 1957). 
In world history some philosophers have dealt very explicitly with 
questions of power and inequality. In China, around 500 BC, Kong Ze, 
whom the Jesuit missionaries 2000 years later Latinised as Confucius 
(from the older name Kong Fu Ze), maintained that that the stability of 
society is based on unequal relationships between people. He 
distinguished the wu lun, the five basic relationships: ruler-subject, 
father-son, older brother-younger brother, husband-wife, and senior 
friend-junior friend. These relationships contain mutual and 
complementary obligations: the junior partner owes the senior respect 
and obedience: the senior owes the junior partner protection and 
consideration. Confucius ideas have survived, according to Hofstede 
(1980) as guidelines for proper behaviour for Chinese people to this day. 
Hofstede (1980) argues that people in countries which have undergone 
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Chinese cultural influences, accept and appreciate inequality, but feel 
that the use of power should be moderated by a sense of obligation.   
Culture is learned, not inherited. It derives from one’s social 
environment, not from one’s genes. Culture should be distinguished 
from the human nature on one side and from an individual’s 
personality on the other side (Hofstede, 1991), although exactly where 
the border lies between human nature and culture, and between 
culture and personality, is a matter of discussion among social 
scientists. Please find below a reflection on how Hofstede understands 
mental programming to be formed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Human mental programming. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: Three levels of uniqueness in human mental programming 
(Hofstede, 1991) 
 
2.3.5. The role of symbols, heroes, rituals and values: 
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Cultural differences manifest themselves in several ways. From 
the many terms used to describe manifestations of culture these four 
together cover the total concept rather neatly: symbols, heroes, rituals 
and values. Symbols are words, gestures, pictures or objects that carry 
a particular meaning, which is only recognised by those who share the 
culture. The words in a language or jargon belong to this category, how 
to dress, hairstyle, Coca-Cola, flags, and status symbols. New symbols 
are easily developed and old ones disappear: symbols from one cultural 
group are regularly copied by others. This is why Hofstede (1991) has 
put symbols into the outer, most superficial layer of the next figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Manifestations of culture 
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Figure: The union diagram: manifestations of culture at different levels of depth (Hofstede 1991) 
 
Symbols 
Heroes 
Rituals 
Values 
--Practices-- 
 Heroes are persons, alive or dead, real or imaginary, who posse 
characteristics which are highly prized in a culture and who thus serve 
as models for behaviour. Rituals are collective activities, technically 
superfluous in reaching desired ends, but which within a culture, are 
considered as socially essential: they are therefore carried out for their 
own sake. Ways of greeting and paying respect to others, social and 
religious ceremonies are examples. These three together are then 
submitted under the term’s practices, as they are visible to an outside 
observer: their cultural meaning however is invisible and lies precisely 
and only in the way the insiders interpret these practices. In cross 
border lending one could consider the differences between one culture 
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and the other when filling for bankruptcy. In the USA, for example, this 
means something completely different than from Japan. It is 
unthinkable to have a Donald Trump in Japan, who after several 
bankruptcies (and counting with substantial personal wealth) continues 
to be celebrated as a hero, whereas in Japan one looses face and we 
have seen several CEO’s bursting out in tears before TV cameras 
begging stakeholders and apologizing for their failures.  This is 
confirmed by Trompenaars and Hampden Turner (2000)  who argue 
that the ways Americans resolve dilemmas are often the mirror image of 
the ways East Asians resolve theirs, leading to considerable 
misunderstandings and culture shocks. Whilst lending across borders 
into other cultures, one could perhaps consider the consequences of 
these different attitudes. 
The core of culture is formed by values. Values are broad 
tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others. Values are 
feelings with an arrow between them: they have a plus and a minus 
side. They typically deal with: 
Evil vs. Good 
Dirty vs. Clean 
Ugly vs. Beautiful 
Unnatural vs. Natural 
Abnormal vs. Normal 
Paradoxical vs. Logical 
Irrational vs. Rational 
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Values are among the first things children learn – not 
consciously, but implicitly. Development psychologists believe that by 
the age of 10, most children have their basic value system firmly in 
place, and after that age, changes are difficult to make. Because they 
are acquired so early in our lives, many values remain unconscious to 
those who hold them. Therefore they cannot be discussed, nor can they 
be directly observed by outsiders. They can only be inferred from the 
way people act under various circumstances.  
In interpreting people’s statements about their values it is 
important to distinguish between the desirable and the desired: how 
people think the world ought to be versus what people want for 
themselves. Questions about the “desirable” refer to people in general 
and are worded in terms of right/wrong, agree/disagree or something 
similar. In the abstract, everybody is in favour of virtue and opposed to 
sin, and answers about the “desirable” express people’s views about 
what represents virtue and what correspondents to sin. The “desired”, 
on the contrary, is worded in terms of “you” or “me” and what we 
consider important, what we want for ourselves, including our less 
virtuous desires. The 'desirable' bears only a faint resemblance to actual 
behaviours but even statements about the “desired”, although closer to 
the actual behaviours should not necessarily correspond to the way 
people really behave when they have to choose. (Hofstede, 1991) 
Trompenaars (1998) approaches the differences in layers 
somehow differently, describing them as explicit and implicit products. 
Explicit products coincide with what Hofstede (1991) refers to as “the 
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observed”.  It is according to Trompenaars (1998) that explicit cultures 
are symbols of a deeper level of culture. Prejudice starts on this 
symbolic and observable level. In the literature, one rarely finds an 
author that combines the understanding of values with norms. 
Trompenaars (1998) however is one of the few who does so when he 
explains that explicit culture reflects deeper layers of culture, the norms 
and the values of an individual group. Norms are the mutual sense a 
group has of what is “right” and “wrong”. Norms can develop on a 
formal level as written laws, and on an informal level as social control. 
Values, on the other hand, determine the definition of “good and bad” 
and are therefore closely related to the ideals shared by a group. A 
culture is relatively stable when the norms reflect the values of the 
group. When this is not the case, there will most likely be a 
destabilising tension. While the norms consciously or subconsciously 
give us a feeling of “how I normally should behave”, values, on the other 
hand, give us a feeling of – “how I aspire or desire to behave” 
(Trompenaars 1998). A value serves as a criterion to determine a choice 
from existing alternatives: it is the concept an individual or group has 
regarding the desirable (Trompenaars 1998). Here, too, we find 
resemblance between Hofstede and Trompenaars, where the former 
refers to the desired and the desirable.     
Hofstede’s concepts have been helpful in the analysis of national 
variations in income distribution, defence spending, legal systems, 
social security policies, outbursts of violence and conflict, military and 
police co-operation, administrative cultures, safety of national aircraft 
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companies, religious values and behaviours, state and corporate 
economic governance, etc.  Many researchers have provided examples of 
correlation of (one or two of) Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture and 
different sets of geographic, economic, demographic, and political 
indicators. 
Despite proof of its relevance, the study has met with criticisms, 
which in part fix on problems related to the distant past in which the 
data were collected. Hofstede, through his research institute IRIC, 
argues that this argument alone calls for the replication of the main 
elements of his IBM Study as it would generate powerful opportunities 
to address the claim that the assessment of the five fundamental 
dimensions is outdated.  Surely, the world has changed since the early 
1970s.  Notions on globalisation suggest cultures may converge, 
undermine the very concept of “national” cultures and redefine cultures 
on a global, and perhaps simultaneously, on a mere regional scale.  
Repeating Hofstede’s IBM Study, almost 30 years later, would provide 
the chance to empirically verify these notions and Hofstede’s 
fundamental argument that the five dimensions are stable over time. 
More radical perceptions suggest that cultures have no clear 
dimensions anymore, populated as these cultures are by hyper-
individualists shopping for seemingly contradictory values at their own 
convenience.  
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2.3.6. Another classic: Riding the waves of culture 
According to Keaney (1999) a common and justified complaint of 
many in academia and elsewhere concerns the poverty of substance of 
much of what passes for management “literature”.  The style adopted by 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) is one which will equally 
enthuse and infuriate.  Most non-business school academics will not be 
impressed with the rather diluted nature of the subject matter.   
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) have eschewed the 
universalism of neoclassical economics, arguing instead for a more 
appreciative treatment of culture (contested claims).  As such, their 
work is unlikely to garner the appreciation of mainstream economists 
and the like, who will most likely decry the lack of “rigour” as evidence 
of their fundamentally flawed reasoning. This was illustrated in 
Hofstede’s critique (1996), where he questions the scientific method and 
argues that no evidence for the theory of the book is provided by the 
data.  Institutional economists, on the other hand, are encouraged by 
the attention to details most often ignored by their mainstream 
colleagues. Much of the empirical material used in the book originates 
from the “Trompenaars database”, “one of the largest and richest 
sources of social constructs”.  Their reluctance to make definite 
pronouncements, according to Keaney (1999) is understandable given 
the undoubted controversy which would attend their statistical 
methodology.  This again is affirmed by Hofstede (1996) in his vigorous 
critique arguing that the shortcoming of Trompenaars’ database is its 
evident lack of content validity.  In the same critique, Hofstede confirms 
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his own views regarding the sole purpose of research being to replace 
preconceived notions with empirical findings.  The result of 
Trompenaars’ works being a fast food approach to intercultural 
diversity, according to Hofstede. Trompenaars and Hampden Turner 
(2000) are taking a rather different view to measure cultural diversity 
and describe six different dimensions:   
Table 3 Dimensions of culture according to Trompenaars et al 
 
1. Universalism     Particularism 
(rules, codes, laws,     (exceptions, special circumstances, 
and generalisations)     unique relations) 
 
2. Individualism     Communitarianism  
(personal freedom, human    (social responsibility, harmonious 
rights, competitiveness)    relations, co-operation) 
 
3. Specificity      Diffusion 
(atomistic, reductive     (holistic, elaborative 
analytic, objective)     synthetic, relational) 
 
4. Achieved status     Ascribed status 
(what you have done,     (who you are, your potential 
your track record)     and connections) 
 
5. Inner direction     Outer direction 
(conscience and      (examples and influences 
convictions are located inside)   are located outside) 
 
6. Sequential time     Synchronous time 
(time is a race along     (time is a dance of fine 
a set course)      co-ordinations) 
   Trompenaars and Hampden Turner (2000) take the view that all 
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values take the form of dilemmas and argue that they would not even 
know what a universal rule was unless they could contrast it with an 
exception, a “not-rule”. Evaluative terms are different on a (usually) 
tacit continuum. You can either search for two objects /or people who 
are the same or you can search for the many respects in which these 
are different. For example, one can insist that men and woman are both 
human and should be treated the same, thereby upholding the 
universal rights of both genders. Alternatively, one can insist that men 
and women are different and should be treated differently. Each 
approach has advantages, but also serious disadvantages.  
Regarding comparison between the dimensions used by Hofstede 
(1991) and the ones used by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2000), 
it seems that there are more comparisons than both would accept. Both 
have a strong reference and based their work on findings of Kluckhohn 
and Strodtbeck (1961).   
In every culture a limited number of general, universal shared 
human problems need to be solved. One culture can be distinguished 
from another by the specific solution it chooses for those problems. The 
anthropologists F. Kluckhohn and F.L. Strodtbeck (1961) identify five 
categories of problems, arguing that all societies are aware of all 
possible kinds of solution but prefer them in different order. Hence in 
any culture there is a set of dominant, or preferred, value orientations. 
The five basic problems mankind faces, according to this scheme, are as 
follows: 
1) What is the relationship of the individual to others? 
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 (relational orientation) 
2) What is the temporal focus of human life?   
(time orientation) 
3) What is the modality of human activity?   
(activity orientation) 
4) What is a human being’s relation to nature?   
(man-nature orientation) 
5) What is the character of innate human nature?  
(human nature orientation)  
 
In short Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) argue that mankind is 
confronted with universally shared problems emerging from 
relationships with fellow beings, time, activities and nature. 
Perhaps Hall (1976) is helpful understanding what separates 
men. The widely divergent but interrelated experiences, which he has 
drawn from the field of psychoanalysis and his work as anthropologist, 
have led Hall (1976) to believe that in his strivings for order, Western 
man has created chaos by denying that part of his self that integrates 
while enshrining the parts that fragment experience. These 
examinations of man’s psyche have also convinced Hall (1976) that: the 
natural act of thinking is greatly modified by culture; Western man uses 
only a small fraction of his mental capabilities; there are many different 
and legitimate ways of thinking; we in the West value one of these ways 
above all others – the one we call “logic”, a linear system that has been 
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with us since Socrates. Western man sees his system of logic as 
synonymous with the truth. For him it is the only road to reality.  
Hall (1976) takes a firm position towards Western science when 
he argues that, men have fought and died in the name of different 
models of nature. All theoretical models are incomplete. By definition 
they are abstractions and therefore they leave things out. What they 
leave out is as important as, if not more important than, what they do 
not, because it is what is left out that gives structure and form to the 
system. Models have a half-life – some are ephemeral, others last for 
centuries. There are highly explicit models, while others are so much 
part of life as to be unavailable for analysis except under very special 
circumstances. In constructing their models of culture, most 
anthropologists take into account that there are different levels of 
behaviour: overt and covert, implicit and explicit, things you talk about 
and things you do not. Also there is such a thing as the unconscious, 
although few are in agreement as to the degree to which the 
unconscious is influenced by culture. Paradoxically, studying the 
models that men create to explain nature tells us more about the men 
than about the part of nature being studied (Hall, 1976). 
This could bring us back to Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 
which provide for the basis upon which they built their theory, avoiding 
the use of specific models. In their approach, taking the view that all 
values take the form of dilemmas, it may be helpful to demonstrate 
their theory. Although the training in cross culture is fairly limited still, 
this approach is relevant to practitioners and very receptive given the 
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practical way it is being communicated and explained. During the 
conference,6 references to these kinds of training have been made (see 
Annex 1: Kleiterp on FMO (Netherlands)-DEG (Germany) and Hanegraaf 
touched on the subject of the merger of Fortis (Netherlands) with 
Generale Bank (Belgium)). Dilemmas are a very appropriate form of 
testing values, as it is confirmed by the works of Hofstede as well as 
Trompenaars et al.  
2.3.7.  Dilemma theory (Trompenaars et al, 2000): 
Please find below the basis upon which Trompenaars and 
Hampden-Turner (2000) built their theory. In their approach, all values 
take the form of dilemmas, and this is helpful to demonstrate their 
theory. 
Values deemed virtuous, god-like, and personified by heroes 
inevitably conflict and must achieve harmony if protagonists are not to 
clash tragically (derived from classic Greek tragedy). 
Among conflicting values, one is often consciously and culturally 
preferred to the other which is buried and repressed (derived from 
Freud, Jung, Adler, Reich, Rank and Fromm). 
The personality constantly struggles for consistency and may 
successfully integrate opposing values or repress and deny one side 
(derived from cognitive consistency theorist, especially George Kelly, 
Prescott Lecky and Leon Festinger). 
                                                 
6 Conference sponsored by FMO, DEG and DBA March 21st -24, 2004 to be discussed in Chapters, 3,4 
and 5  
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These values, properly conceived, are differences on an often tacit 
continuum and thereby structure the patterns of a culture and the 
minds of its members (derived from structural anthropologists, such as 
Frances Densmore, Clyde Kluckhohn, Ruth Benedict, Gregory Bateson, 
Claude Levi-Strauss and Edmund Leach). 
These combinations of values may grow synergistically and 
humanistically, or regress with catastrophic consequences  (from 
humanistic psychologists, especially Abraham Maslow, Rollo May and 
Carl Rogers). 
Much of this inherent opposition and unity has been found in 
contrasting brain functions (from brain researchers, such as Roger 
Sperry, Michael Gazzaniga and John E. Bogen). 
Values form open systems which spontaneously self-organise and 
steer by getting feedback from their environment (from systems 
theorists, such as Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Geofrey Vickers, West 
Churchman and others). 
Many of the tensions within living systems have been found in 
organisational behaviour. Industries and workplaces confront dilemmas 
which they must resolve to generate wealth (from the field of 
organizational behaviour, Fritz Roethlisberger, Douglas Mc.Gregor, 
Robert Blake and Angyris and Schon, Michael Porter, Henry Mintzberg 
and others). 
Similar dilemmas pattern the politics and sociology of American 
and other societies and must be resolved if those societies are to 
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continue developing (from political science, sociology and cultural 
studies, Talcott Parsons, Daniel Bell, Chrispher Jencks and others).  
The ways Americans resolve dilemmas are often the mirror image 
of the ways East Asians resolve theirs, leading to considerable 
misunderstandings and culture shock (from East Asian studies, Ezra 
Volgel, James Abegglen and Jorge Stalk). 
Searching into and resolving dilemmas is a form of human and 
organisational learning (from epistemology and the philosophy of 
science, Floyd Matton, T.S. Kuhn a.o.). 
It requires creativity and innovation (from studies in creativity, 
Arthur Koestler, Frank Barron and Liam Hudson a.o.). 
It may involve moral development (from moral development 
studies, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Richard Crutchfield and 
Stanley Milgram). 
It is reflected in architecture and design (from architecture and 
design, Buckminster Fuller and Kisho Kurokawa). 
And it enables us to bring order in chaotic events and manage the 
fractal patterns which arise (from Chaos theory and patterns of fractals, 
James Gleick, and John Briggs and many others).  
Whereas the publications of findings by Trompenaars and 
Hampden Turner (1998, 2000) provide very rich sources of information, 
research data and opinions, it remains somehow vague as to how their 
theory (approach) can be applied by others. There is no generalization of 
their theory, neither do they provide for a specific model. The main 
findings are that foreign cultures are not arbitrarily or randomly 
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different from one another. They are instead mirror images of ones 
another’s values, reversals of order and sequence of looking and 
learning (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2000). They argue that 
what the foreign culture sees so clearly, most of us miss and vice versa. 
The ideal, they argue, is to perceive and think in both directions, in 
order words that we must learn to think in circles.   
Above argument is illustrated by Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner (2000), starting with the ubiquity of dilemma.  
“We all know the old dilemma of the chicken and the egg. Which 
came first? And they argue that all their six value dimensions can be 
investigated, representing similar dilemmas. Which came first the 
universal rule or the exceptional event? There is no final answer to 
these dilemmas. This is where cultures come in. The resourceful 
individual comes first, says the American culture. The rice-growing 
village comes first, says the Chinese culture. Consider the famous 
dictum of Adam Smith, that self-interest leads as of by an “invisible 
hand” to social and public benefit. Is there truth to this proposition? 
Certainly! Do individuals competing with one another in serving 
customers thereby improve service to those customers? Yes. Is this a 
truth upon which the science of economics can be squarely based? 
Perhaps not.” 
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2.3.8. Different schools of thought: Positivist versus realist 
It is rather subjective to qualify a researcher as part of a specific 
school of thought.  Different this is, if and when a researcher 
acknowledges him or herself as part of a specific school. 
Trompenaars et al (1997), contrasting Hofstede with 
Trompenaars, provides for the following differences: 
Table 4 Contrasting Hofstede and Trompenaars et al. 
 
Hofstede assumes Trompenaars assumes 
Cultures are static points on dual axis maps Cultures dance from one preferred end to 
its opposite and back. 
One cultural category excludes its opposite One cultural category seeks to "manage" its 
opposite. 
"Independent" factors account for 
"dependent" variables. 
Value dimensions self-organize in systems 
to generate new meanings. 
Established statistical procedures are 
culture neutral and value free. 
Established statistical procedures are 
culturally biased and value full. 
Cultures are linear with "more" or "less" of a 
fixed quality 
Cultures are circles with preferred arcs 
joined together 
Data derived from IBM is superior to ideas 
drawn from academic research and reflects 
managements' convictions. 
Data derived from IBM are but pale 
imitations of academic research and reflect 
managements' compliance. 
Hofstede by thinking inductively derived his 
categories from IBM data and originated his 
own scales. 
Hofstede by thinking inductively reinvented 
the scales from which IBM had plagiarised 
their questions. 
NO better place to be on a quadrant pas 
and no answer to the questions "so what?" 
and "where should  we move?" 
No better place to start on the seven 
dimensions but moves to integrate and 
reconcile values lend to superior 
performance. 
A priori concepts like "dilemma" are 
metaphysical constructs with no basis in 
empirical research and with no testable 
Dilemma has been part of culture from 
Classic Greek Tragedy, from the Primordial 
Opposites of the Tao, through Shakespeare 
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validity or means of verification. to the binary codes of anthropologists 
today. 
All cultures are different although those 
differences can be expressed as positions 
of relative salience on four variables. 
All cultures are similar in the dilemmas they 
confront, yet different in the solutions they 
find, which transcend the oppositions 
creatively. 
 
2.3.9.  Hofstede and positivism: 
Clearly Hofstede qualifies as an empiricist, as Trompenaars et al 
(1997) suggests.  He has difficulties with Hofstede's approach whereby it 
seems that culture can be best measured and expressed in 
mathematical language. Hofstede does meet the definition by Smith 
(1998) that the positivist approach to the social sciences claim the label 
scientific, for he assumes that things can be studied as hard facts and 
the relationships between these facts established as scientific laws.  For 
positivists, such laws have the status of truth and social objects can be 
studied in much the same way as natural objects.  These views of 
Hofstede are confirmed throughout his work and also in his critique on 
Trompenaars.  His considers his findings to be laws which do not 
change over time (even after 30 years), and he argues his fundamental 
belief that his dimensions would still be the same and could be proven 
empirically.  He continuously advocates a rather standard positivist 
account (Smith -p.77, 1998), which emphasises the importance of value 
freedom, hard fights and prediction as a basis for offering policy 
proposals for governments, businesses and other private institutions.  
Yet there is hardly any evidence that Hofstede's claims are still accepted 
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in this respect.  Hofstede also unreservedly accepts the assumptions of 
phenomenalism, demonstrating his commitment to the use of empirical 
data as evidence; unwillingness to accept un-provable data, sentiment, 
imaginings, or illusions as proof.  As an "-ism" phenomenalism is often 
contrasted with realism, because the former requires specific evidence 
of each "thing", whereas realism accepts that some "things" exist only as 
wholes or through processes, so that evidence (the empirical) is different 
from the real existence of the thing.  Realism and thus Trompenaars et 
al (1998, 2000) separates evidence from existence, whereas 
phenomenalism usually conflates the two (Olsen 2001).  Below a 
reflection will be given on the link between realism and Trompenaars. 
2.3.10. Trompenaars and realism: 
According to Smith (1998), realists argue that science only makes 
sense in open systems.  Whereas the realist approach is deeply critical 
of positivism, it still attempts to use methods and assumptions of 
natural science to study the social world and where the empiricist 
identifies causal laws by identifying empirical regularities, a realist view 
of causality focuses on the structure of objects.  For a realist, according 
to Smith (1998), reality has three levels (empirical, actual, and real or 
deep), which have to be distinguished if we are to understand how 
things work.  These differences become clear analysing the critiques on 
Hofstede, as Trompenaars et al argues (1997) that Hofstede's work uses 
Aristotelian categories of A and non-A.  If you are individualist you 
cannot be collectivist.  You are at one end of a linear measure or 
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another, occasionally in between.  Trompenaars et al (1998, 2000) 
however uses dilemmas as a way of understanding differences in 
culture.  It seems that this is one appropriate methodology to grasp the 
deeper meaning and understanding of this complex problem.  Indeed, 
as Trompenaars et al (1997) states:  (1) social science methodology is 
not culture free and (2) there is no neutral point "above" culture from 
which to view the universe and (3) it follows that many different ways of 
viewing culture are legitimate. 
The realist school of thought does not insist that realism is both 
tangible and observable but rather believes that theories of explanation 
can be understood through careful abstractions of interrelationships 
and interactions.  One can conclude that the realist approaches to the 
real world are attempts to identify and explain the structures and 
mechanisms through which social events are understood (handout 
Olsen 2001).  This can be observed on both the work of Trompenaars et 
al (1998, 2000) as well as their critique on Hofstede (1997). 
2.3.11. Quantitative research – Hofstede: 
Quantitative research designs are characterised by the 
assumption that human behaviour can be explained by what may be 
termed as “social facts”, which can be investigated by methodologies 
that utilise “the deductive logic of the natural sciences” (Homa, 1994, p. 
121).  Quantitative investigations look for “distinguishing 
characteristics, elemental properties and empirical boundaries” and 
tend to measure “how much”, or “how often” (Nau, 1995).  A 
 176 
quantitative research design allows flexibility in the treatment of data, 
in terms of comparative analysis, statistical analysis, and repeatability 
of data collection in order to verify reliability.  Many of the scales used 
within these studies are also tested for validity and reliability, thus 
claiming further “scientific” credibility.  The weaknesses of such 
quantitative research designs lie mainly in their failure to ascertain 
deeper underlying meanings and explanations, even when significant, 
reliable and valid. 
  
2.3.12. Qualitative research – Trompenaars: 
The classic qualitative study is one in which the findings are 
“grounded” in the data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  A qualitative study 
seeks to identify underlying concepts and the relationship between 
them (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996).  The data for a 
qualitative study might include transcripts of in-depth interviews, 
observations or documents (Patton, 1991).  Qualitative enquiry often 
takes the form of a case study.  According to Yin (1994), case study is 
the preferred research approach when “how” or “why” questions are 
being posed – in other words, questions of process. Most researchers 
have been guided to believe that the role of qualitative enquiry is that of 
an advisable first step to be taken before the “real” enquiry – a 
quantitative enquiry – is undertaken.  This view denigrates the role of 
qualitative enquiry.   
Some social scientists would now subscribe to the view that 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies can both lead to valid 
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research findings in and of their own right.  According to Easterby-
Smith et al (1991), there are many researchers who adopt a pragmatic 
view of deliberately combining quantitative and qualitative methods.  It 
is not a matter of inflexibility adhering to one methodological approach 
simply because it is traditionally associated with a chosen paradigm of 
science. 
Qualitative methodologies are strong in those areas that have 
been identified as potential weaknesses within the quantitative 
approach, e.g. the use of interviews, observations, case studies to 
provide a deep, rather than broad set of knowledge about a particular 
phenomenon.  This depth allows the researcher to achieve “Verstehen”, 
or empathetic “understanding” (Smith 1998).  The concept of Verstehen 
is the basis for a critique of quantitative research designs, and their 
empiricist emphasis.  The argument used is that quantitative methods 
measure human behaviour “from outside”, without accessing the 
meanings that individuals give to their measurable behaviour.  This 
perfectly illustrates the apparent differences between Hofstede (1996) 
and Trompenaars et al (1997). 
 
2.3.13. Confronting realism and positivism: 
The positivist paradigm provided the springboard for other 
paradigms like realism.   Yet, realists seek interpretations and 
meanings of interactions, whereas the positivist looks for empirical 
evidence and regularities.  The realist argues that science makes sense 
only in an open system (Smith 1998).  In other words it is essential that 
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methods must be appropriate to the nature of the object and the 
purpose and expectations of our enquiry (Sayer 1992).  Positivists 
generalise from the observation of specific events, they claim that these 
generalisations are the principal source of explanations.  Realists think 
otherwise, they tend to seek and observe regularities, and from these 
they propose models of structures to explain them.  One will then have 
to undertake research to either establish or refuse the explanation put 
forward  (Smith 1998). Interestingly, Hall (1976) explains this difference 
in approach quoting Nobel Price laureate Szent-Györgyi (1972), who 
classified two types according to an old Greek system: Apollonian, 
“which tends to develop established lines to perfection” (LC – low 
context), and Dionysian, which is more apt to open new lines of 
research (HC –high context). He says: 
These are not merely academic problems. They have most 
important corollaries and consequences. The future of mankind 
depends upon the progress of the science, and the progress of science 
depends on the support it can find. Support mostly takes the form of 
grants, and the present methods of distributing grants unduly favours 
Apollonian. Applying for a grant begins with writing a project. The 
Apollonian clearly sees the future lines of his research and has no 
difficulty in writing a clear project. Not so the Dionysian, who knows 
only the direction in which he wants to go out into the unknown; he has 
no idea what he’s going to find there and how he’s going to find it. 
Defining the unknown or writing down the subconscious of self-
conscious thinking must precede a Dionysian’s observation. 
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Hall (1976) continues explaining that a Dionysian scientist must 
be deeply contexted in his work before he even writes a proposal. Szent-
Györgyi (1972) goes on to state that in order to get research grants he 
had to lie about what he intended to do, make up proposals he knew 
would be acceptable.  He states: 
“…. Sitting in an easy chair I can cook up anytime a project, 
which must seem quite attractive, clear and logical. But if I go out into 
nature, into the unknown, to the fringes of knowledge, everything seems 
mixed up and contradictory, illogical and incoherent. This is what 
research does: it smoothes out contradiction, makes things simple, 
logical, and coherent. So when I bring reality into my projects they seem 
hazy and are rejected. The reviewer, feeling responsible for the 
“taxpayer’s money”, justly hesitates to give money for research, the lines 
of which are not clear to the applicant himself. A discovery must be, by 
definition, at variance with existing knowledge. During my life, I have 
made two. Both were rejected offhand by the popes of the field.” 
Hall (1976) thus takes a whole different approach to positivism 
and other schools of thought. Remembering the process of the DBA it 
now seems that the author of this thesis is very much a Dionysian 
without having realized the same, and that at the same time most of the 
supervising and teaching of the program (not the supervisor) has come 
from “Apollonians”.     
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2.3.14. Objectivity – subjectivity: 
Some philosophers according to Fay (1998) have claimed that an 
objective conclusion is one which "warrants acceptance by all who 
seriously investigate".  But this he argues is a mistake.  Investigators 
can proceed with their analysis in an objective manner and yet they 
arrive at different conclusions, indeed they may never agree.  (Hofstede 
versus Trompenaars 1996- 1997). 
Sayer (1992) says that objectivity in social science is a false, 
unattainable aim.  He calls scientists "naive objectivists" if they 
advocate that objectivity is possible.  The subject-object problem 
according to Smith (1998) focuses on the relationship between the 
researcher and the "things" he studied and highlights the way in which 
there are crucial differences between natural science and social science.   
Through Hofstede's absolute claims to validity and truth he seems not 
to recognize this difference.  Yet starting with Hofstede, Trompenaars et 
al (1997) illustrates in various ways the subjectivity of Hofstede's work, 
arguing for example that as an employee to IBM, he got an 
undergraduate psychology degree and sold his project and ideas to IBM.  
Indeed, whereas Hofstede for more than 30 years has taken pride in his 
research, advocating the impressive data obtained, he has been unable 
to find funding to repeat research on similar scale since.  His survey on 
which Culture's Consequences builds was held twice, around 1968 and 
around 1972, generating data drawn from 40 countries, 116.000 
questionnaires, and about 50.000 respondents who all work for the 
multinational computer corporation IBM.  Trompenaars et al (1997) 
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correctly refers to the effects of IBM being headquartered in the USA 
and thus that data came from the interstices of the company itself.  
Furthermore, the questions made up by unknown members of IBM's 
personal department, had according to Trompenaars, their origins in 
American academic research of those days, and subsequently puts in 
doubt Hofstede's claim that he "discovered" the four (later five) 
fundamental dimensions of culture with a high-level cross-cultural 
impact on human behaviour.  This also touches upon the issue of value 
free or situated knowledge. 
Trompenaars’ et al (1998, 2000) books, on the other hand, use a 
wide variety of data and include raw data comprising of 50.000 cases 
from over 100 countries.  Restricting those to managers from 
multinational and international corporations, some 30.000 comparative 
(valid) cases can be selected drawn from 55 countries.  Both 
Trompenaars as well as his author Hampden-Turner received both 
undergraduate as well as doctorates in the USA.  (PhD Wharton - 
Trompenaars, DBA Harvard – Hampden-Turner). 
 
2.3.15. Situated knowledge: 
According to Kuhn (1970), all social research is socially embedded 
and Smith (1998) acknowledges that research is socially positioned and 
that yet all researchers try to base their findings on evidence.  Olsen 
(2001) additionally viewed that subjectivity is an inherent part of all 
social research.  This is not necessarily true for natural science. 
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In line with Kuhn's concept, Hofstede's (1980, 1991) as well as 
Trompenaars et al (1998, 2000) scientific knowledge is both situated in 
the context of the historical and social practices which define (natural) 
science in a particular time and place.  Consequently, the truth of a 
scientific statement is only relevant to those who share the belief system 
(value system) upon which such "truths" are based.  Hofstede and 
Trompenaars et al do not seem to share the same belief systems. 
Hofstede claims that if his research were to be repeated today (30 
years later), it would provide the chance to empirically verify these 
notions and his "fundamental" argument that the five dimensions are 
stable over time.  Hofstede denies that his research is socially embedded 
in time and assumes, implicitly, that his cultural consequences and 
findings are static.  Trompenaars et al (1997) refer to Hofstede's 
paradigm of still being in the thrall of Newtonian science and celestial 
mechanics.  It is merely a point of view. 
2.3.16. Current issues in cross-cultural research: 
 
Landis and Wasilewski (1999) identified several areas relevant to 
future productive research in the field of intercultural and cross-
cultural studies. Some of the key areas relevant to this thesis are 
discussed below. A theory that has the distinction of being one of the 
most researched derives from the work of Hofstede (Hofstede, 1980; Kim 
et al., 1994). They question whether the seven Trompenaars dimensions 
(universalism, individualism, emotionalism specific vs. diffuse, 
achievement vs. ascription, time orientation, and attitudes toward the 
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environment) are really derivations of the individualistic factors of 
Hofstede. Even more bothersome is the possibility that both approaches 
are faulty because they base their generalisations on the use of etic 
approaches to study emic phenomena as well as commit the ecological 
fallacy (the assumption that people who happen to reside within a 
defined geographical region share the same set of attitudes to the same 
extent). More to the point of this section, however, is Trompenaar's 
belief that the dimensions organise themselves in different ways in 
different cultures, thus calling into question the linear combinations 
implied by the Hofstede approach. Perhaps the reductionism to four 
dimensions in the Hofstede structure fails to capture the real 
differences in the way people in different cultures view their social world 
and it seems that Trompenaars is correct in suggesting that the 
dimensions are organised and prioritised differently in different 
cultures. Not only that, but we do not even know what all the possible 
dimensions might be. Most of the categories currently used according to 
Landis and Wasilewski (1999), just like Hofstede’s, derive from some US 
normed construct (see also Trompenaars et al, 1997). 
Somewhat strong arguments to be cautious with the methodology 
applied by Hofstede (1980, 1991) have been found by Segalla et al 
(2000).  They argue in their research, which is restricted to European 
corporate integration, that traditional cross-cultural research is no 
longer useful for the problems facing Europe’s cross border companies. 
In their paper, they report results of a study of European managerial 
values designed to uncover European values and conducted a six-
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country study of over 800 managers working in 60 companies in the 
European financial sector. The results of their study suggest that 
although European managers have widely-differing solutions to 
common managerial problems, there is an underlying logic – referred to 
as group logic or market logic- that guides their choices. 
In their study, Segalla et al (2000) plea for the need of better 
cross-cultural knowledge, built on understanding how cultural values 
are tied to real organisational problems. They quote Roberts (1970) and 
Weinshall (1979) saying that most of the studies in the field are based 
on surveys, which are not well thought out… It is not well guided by 
theoretical underpinnings, data are often weak, and conclusions are 
difficult to comprehend. Organisations are rarely viewed as parts of 
their environment, yet understanding organisational environmental 
interactions seems a major practical reason for engaging in cross-
cultural research.  They refer to major studies by Hofstede (1980) and 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) as illustrations of cross-
cultural research having matured during the 1980s. Yet, they provide 
for a whole range of clear demonstrations of what were the weaknesses 
with research of Hofstede and others, and argue that the context of the 
questions are clearly as important as the answer. This approach seems 
to confirm the findings of Hall (1976) where he stresses the overriding 
importance of context. 
Segalla et al (2000) argue furthermore that the more general 
problem with finding human values is that they are notoriously difficult 
to identify, and quote Schein (1986) that values lie at the lowest level of 
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human consciousness and are difficult to evoke. We seldom have the 
occasion to fully identify and understand our values and therefore they 
may not be fully understood. Simply asking a question is not sufficient 
to elicit a deep search for values according to Segalla et al (2000), and 
by means of this statement, they further critique this type of – 
traditional – research.  However, in their own research, they have 
drifted alongside Trompenaars (1998) arguments to using dilemma 
scenarios; each centred on a specific problem (situation), and arrived at 
a new model, describing basically the suggestion that European 
managers have (only) two basic value systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Model of culture, Segalla et al  
 
 
Rationality “Switching” Model, Segalla et al (2000)   
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Above figure from the study illustrates amongst which 
‘dimensions’ they have measured value systems amongst the sample, 
and across dilemmas in recruitment, promotion, compensation and 
reductions. It shows that different nationalities may switch from one 
dimension to another depending on the setting of a specific problem or 
dilemma. According to Segalla et al (2000), these findings mean that 
previous cross-cultural research, which generated mean “country 
scores” measuring various, hypothesized values, will need to be re-
evaluated. In fact, managerial actions are as much influenced by the 
context of the problems as whatever the manager underlying value 
system is, then the 'one size fits all' approach. Also traditional close-
ended questionnaires so routinely used are considered inappropriate 
without some way of ensuring that they record the various situations in 
which the measured values are applied.   
Hall (1976) goes even further than only arguing that context is 
relevant, and describes his views on low- and high context cultures 
(very much in line with Trompenaars’s dimension of universalism and 
particularism) and suggests that if one could get behind the scenes one 
would find context dependant results in the majority of research 
projects. Western science, according to Hall (1976) is striving for 
replicability and rigor (!) in methods and is conducted with a view to 
eliminating context.  
Another issue of relevance according to Landis and Wasilewski 
(1999) is the development of Psychometrically Adequate Scales for 
Measuring Cross-cultural Adaptation and Other Dimensions. Many 
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studies fail to find significant results (or they present weak findings) 
because the measures are psychometrically flawed. These measures will 
have low reliability and, consequently, low validity. Landis and 
Wasilewski (1999) refer to four papers, which have included rigorously 
developed measuring instruments (Dawson, Crano, & Burgoon 1996; 
Dunbar, 1997; Landis, Dansby, & Tallarigo, 1996; Pruegger & Rogers, 
1994). Two of these researches present new quantitative measures and 
the third refines an already existing scale. Pruegger and Rogers 
developed a new measure, the Cross-cultural Sensitivity Scale (CCSS) 
(Pruegger & Rogers, 1994). All these efforts, however, seem not to accept 
that perhaps all theoretical models are incomplete. By definition they 
are abstractions and therefore leave things out. What they leave out is 
as important as, if not more important than, what is included, because 
it is what is left out that gives structure and form to the system (Hall, 
1976).  
According to Landis and Wasilewski (1999), there is a need for 
Reality-based Assessments of Cross-cultural Training Effectiveness. 
Kealey and Protheroe reviewed the state of assessing cross-cultural 
training and came to the conclusion that it is ` . . . seriously deficient' 
(Kealey & Protheroe, 1996, p. 159). They suggested that a `reliable' 
study of the impacts of expatriate training would need to include, at a 
minimum, the following four criteria:  
1) a comparison between trained and untrained groups which 
have been matched on most important criteria as well as randomly 
selected; 
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2) pre and post knowledge measures of change in both cognitive 
and behavioural competencies [and affective competence]; 
3) longitudinal measures of subsequent performance on the job 
lasting fairly long periods of time; and; 
4) impact measures, which are more objective than the self-
reports of the trainees, including peer, supervisor, and host national 
assessments. 
After reviewing much of the literature on cross-cultural training 
effectiveness, Kealey and Protheroe concluded that few, if any, studies 
meet all of the criteria (Kealey & Protheroe, 1996). The two studies 
(Landis & Bhagat, 1996a,b; Sorcher & Spence, 1982) that came closest 
to meeting the criteria were focused on domestic intergroup relations 
and may, therefore, be of doubtful application to the expatriate setting.  
In training we often avoid discussions of “sensitive” topics that 
may make some members of the group uncomfortable, and there are 
certainly ethical reasons to be cautious here (Paige & Martin, 1996). 
Nevertheless, when the discussion may prevent embarrassing and 
possibly dangerous (e.g., STD and HIV infection, botched abortions, 
etc.) situations in-country, it may be worthwhile to take the risk. 
Sexuality is also a topic which involves many issues of power.  
According to Landis and Wasilewski (1999) it has become rather 
traditional to start a paper, or workshop, on expatriate manager 
success (or lack thereof) to assert that most such assignments are 
failures. While this without doubt gets the attention of editors and 
potential sponsors, it is apparently a figure built on a rather nebulous 
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base (Hofstede, 1997). Harzing (1995) has traced almost all such 
assertions back to a single article by Rosalie Tung  (1981) which has 
been wildly misquoted as giving failure rates of around 40% for 
American firms (actually, her report suggests that only 7% of American 
firms had recall rates between 20-40%). It is apparent that most writers 
have been content to cite either Tung (1981) or one of the many other 
writers who cite her. In any case, some really serious research needs to 
be done to deal empirically with this interesting issue.  
Landis and Wasilewski (1999) believe that we have spent too 
much time researching and training sojourners as opposed to 
expatriates or other international travellers. Convenience samples are 
the staple of much intercultural research, a design resulting from that 
most prized aspect of the academic: the sabbatical year. If the sample is 
not made up of students in a foreign university (or foreign students at 
one's home university), it may be Americans located in the country in 
which the sabbatical is located. In either case, the sample is dictated by 
the locale rather than some interesting characteristic of the sample. 
There are other groups that engage in intercultural interactions that 
may be able to offer interesting insights into the process. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, we need to spend time researching, not 
just expatriate training, but research into how to build lasting 
relationships, true connections (Hall, 1998), entangling alliances, the 
maintenance of relationships through thick and thin, good times and 
bad.  
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2.3.17. Link to this research: 
 
According to Hall (1976), the part of man’s nervous system that 
deals with social behaviour is designed according to the principle of 
negative feedback. One is completely unaware of the fact that there is a 
system of controls as long as the program is followed (see also Hofstede, 
1991 – software of the mind). Ironically – according to Hall (1976), this 
means that the majority of mankind is denied knowledge of important 
parts of the self by virtue of the way the control system works. The only 
time one is aware of the control system is when things do not follow the 
hidden program. Most cultural exploration however begins with the 
annoyance of being lost. The control system of the mind signals that 
something unexpected has arisen, that we are in uncharted water and 
are going to have to switch off the automatic pilot and man the helm 
ourselves (Hall, 1976). These observations when applied to this field of 
research raise other interesting issues. How for example do banks cope 
with these processes? Do they actually seek to work in cultures which 
are different from their own, or – alternatively - does their lending policy 
implicitly lead to a selection of cultures which seem similar?  
Perhaps relevant in this aspect is the work of Thomas Kuhn 
(1970) who, reflecting on the emergence of the idea of oxygen during the 
late eighteenth century, wrote the following: 
“Lavoisier…. saw oxygen where Priestly had seen ….. 
dephlogistinated air and where others had seen nothing at all…. At the 
very least, as a result of discovering oxygen, Lavoisier saw nature 
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differently. And in the absence of that hypothetical fixed nature that he 
“saw differently,” the principal of economy will urge us to say that after 
discovering oxygen Lavoisier worked in a different world” (Kuhn, 1970). 
Relativism is the doctrine that either experience (in the case of 
epistemological relativism) or reality (in the case of ontological 
relativism) is a function of a particular conceptual scheme. Both imply 
that so deep are the differences which separate those within different 
frameworks that their experiences and beliefs would be fundamentally 
incommensurable (Fay, 1996). By incommensurable Fay (1996) means 
that no common measure can serve as a bridge among different 
conceptual schemes. Those inside one conceptual scheme would be 
living in their own reality, one different from those living in other 
conceptual schemes: and the experiences of the respective member 
would be so different that no basis could exist on which to understand 
each other.  Bankers all over the world seem to agree on the fact that 
credit risks in large part are related to the competencies of management 
of companies and organisations. The argument can however be made 
that the assessment of management capabilities may be hindered in 
those cases where the culture is little understood. In other words, how 
do bankers evaluate management of another culture, if they understand 
little of it? 
What can often be observed is that management of international 
and transnational companies and organisations has often been trained 
and educated in different cultures (usually Western). The question here 
that can be asked is whether, despite the fact that people from different 
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cultures live in different worlds (according to ontological relativism), 
they change after such training and education. According to many 
authors, such as Hofstede (1980) their culture does not.  So, when 
trained and educated in the West – for example – one can run the risk 
of falling into the “they are just like the folks at home syndrome,” which 
according to Hall (1976) is one of the most persistent and widely held 
misconceptions of the Western world, if not the whole world. Also, in 
this context, one may wonder how universal rules and regulation 
coming from BIS (Basel II) will work in so many different cultures.   
It also seems that some aspects of culture are more relevant to 
the subject than others. Particularly aspects of power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, universalism versus 
particularism, as well as high versus low context are expected to play a 
more prominent role than some of the other culture dimensions. This 
research also refers to other specific aspects of culture – differences – 
for example as to how different cultures handle asymmetry of 
information, adverse selection and moral hazard; three issues which are 
perhaps more relevant to the type of cross-cultural relationships in 
banking and credit.   
2.3.18. Research questions: 
 
Following the above chapter on the topic of cross cultural 
research, the following hypotheses were formulated: 
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H.3.1. Cultural differences have played a role in there having been 
so many accidents (defaults) throughout history in international 
finance.   
H.3.2. If the bank does not understand the cultural context of a 
particular country or region, it becomes highly doubtful it will 
understand the risks  
H.3.3. Capabilities to make friends, combined with common sense 
ensure healthy bank-client relations  
And sub-hypotheses; 
H.3.3.1 Clients of banks would be benefited if banks were rated in 
terms of client’s satisfaction  
H.3.3.2 the commitment of most relationship banks depends 
largely on the weather (Umbrella whilst the sun is out, requesting it 
back when clouds appear)  
H.3.3.3 the quality of a bank should also be rated in accordance 
with client satisfaction.  
2.3.19. Concluding remarks: 
In this final section of chapter 2, the relevance of cultural 
differences has been discussed. It was made clear that there are many 
different methodological approaches to study the phenomena of culture. 
The works of Hofstede (1980) have been thoroughly reviewed, as for 
many decades his work has been considered to be one of the leading 
references in the field. In later publications both Trompenaars (1998) as 
well as Segalla et al (2000) demonstrated that quantifying cultural 
differences along the five dimensions defined by Hofstede (1980) needed 
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to be revised. In line with the writings of Hall (1976), context was 
considered of overriding importance as different culture dimensions 
may vary depending on the context of the particular problem or 
dilemma. One of the main problems with culture as defined in this 
thesis is that most of it remains covert, as the core of ones culture is 
driven by ones value system. 
It is argued that despite the fact that culture is such a difficult 
concept to deal with, the solution will not be for it to be ignored. Rather 
it should be understood and acknowledged, as without further 
understanding and study of this concept much of the cross cultural 
challenges will not be addressed appropriately. This seems to hold 
particularly true for cross border lending.      
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CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1. Introduction: 
 
Methodology is understood to be the general principles behind the 
research, whereas methods are the principal techniques used to 
undertake the research. The methodology of any research underpins the 
values and assumptions that form the rationale for the research. It also 
directs the criteria that the researcher chooses to use for collecting and 
interpreting data. Methodology therefore “provides the link between 
technique and theory” (University Handout 2001).   
It is never possible to understand completely any other human 
being: and no individual will ever really understand himself – the 
complexity is too great and there is not the time to constantly take 
things apart and examine them. This is the beginning of wisdom in 
human relations. However, understanding oneself and understanding 
others are closely related processes. To do one, you must start with the 
other, and vice versa (Hall, 1976 page 69). This observation by Hall 
serves as one of the perspectives on which this thesis has been built.  
Fay (1996) suggests that there is no self-understanding without 
other-understanding, and the extent of our self-consciousness is limited 
to the extent of our knowledge of others. To identify other as different 
requires that we also identify the ways we are similar. Much social 
thought consists of oppositional categories, such as the case in cross 
cultural research (self versus other, particular vs. universal, insider vs. 
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outsider etc). The same dualistic thinking mark meta-theories in the 
philosophy of social science: atomism vs. holism, cause vs. meaning etc. 
Fay (1996) warns against those pernicious dualism and argues that 
such thinking promotes an “either – or” mentality in which one category 
precludes it’s supposed opposite. Often one side of a dichotomy depends 
on and invokes the other – in which case the dichotomy is subverted. 
Frequently an entity can be in both categories, as it has also been 
demonstrated in findings of Segalla et al (2000) and publications by 
Trompenaars et al (1997), the latter in his reply to Geert Hofstede 
(1996).  
Within the context of this argument and this thesis it is perhaps 
illustrative to quote van Deventer and Imai (2005) in their book: Credit 
risk Models and the Basel Accords, (page 135), where, after referring to 
different researchers having found the different levels of statistical 
significance, they quote; 
“What we do believe is that quantitative credit models provide 
cheaper, faster and more accurate indices of credit quality than the 
traditional credit analysis practiced by most financial institutions”.  
It can be argued here that depending on the context they may be 
right. Such being the case in a large domestic market as the USA, 
where financial institutions using large databases in consumer lending 
(credit card business, mortgage lending), as well as the credit market to 
the small and medium sized companies, can be efficient users of 
(sophisticated) credit models. This may perhaps not be the case with the 
larger issuers of debt instruments, such as has been the case with 
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Parmalat, Enron, Worldcom and the like. A similar argument can be 
made for cross border lending.  
The other pillar perhaps is the philosophical perspective referred 
to as relativism, which is the doctrine that either experience (in the case 
of epistemological relativism) or reality (in the case of ontological 
relativism) is a function of a particular conceptual scheme. 
Epistemological relativism claims not only that our perceptions are 
organized differently according to the linguistic or conceptual system to 
which we belong, but also that our ways of thinking are determined by 
our conceptual scheme. In the work  of Thomas Kuhn (1970),  the 
thinker most responsible for the idea that scientific thinking necessarily 
occurs within a conceptual scheme, it can be seen that epistemological 
relativism leads to ontological relativism.   
Epistemological and ontological relativism taken together imply 
that the differences which separate those within different frameworks 
are so deep, that their experiences and beliefs would be fundamentally 
incommensurable (Fay, 1996).  In this branch of thinking and research, 
to which the author of this thesis subscribes, claims that things are 
different from different points of view and the idea that different 
viewpoints are equally valid. Moreover, contrary viewpoints may well be 
equally valid across particular and peculiar societal settings. Fay (1996) 
furthermore argues that no common measure can serve as a bridge 
among different conceptual schemes. Those inside one conceptual 
scheme would be living in their own reality, one different from those 
living in other conceptual schemes: and the experiences of the 
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respective members would be so different that no basis could exist on 
which to understand each other.   
For the last 20 years the researcher has been constantly travelling 
between and within Europe and Latin America, more specifically, 
between the Netherlands and the Rio de la Plata (Uruguay and 
Argentina). A former colleague whilst travelling together for the first 
time suggested that; “one, who travels far, can tell great stories and yet 
those who travel further, should keep their stories for themselves”. In 
later experiences this advice has helped a great deal: it is rather difficult 
and sometimes quite impossible for people from different realities to 
understand each other. This seems to be obvious always when we deal 
with great contrasts in our world (USA – Iraq, North –South, East - 
West, Rich – Poor, Catholic – Muslim).    
3.2. Truth, knowledge and reality: 
Fay (1996) in the chapter:  "Can we understand each other 
objectively", explains that the central point in construing truth is the 
distinction between what is in our minds and what actually obtains 
outside of them.  It is quite natural to think that in those cases, in 
which the content of our minds is at variance with external realities, 
these contents are false; and that when the content of our minds mirror 
what is outside of them these contents are true.   
Some philosophers according to Fay (1998) have claimed that an 
objective conclusion is one which "warrants acceptance by all who 
seriously investigate".  But this he argues is a mistake.  Investigators 
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can proceed with their analysis in an objective manner and yet they 
arrive at different conclusions, indeed they may never agree.  Sayer 
(1992) says that objectivity in social science is a false, unattainable aim.  
He calls scientists "naive objectivists" if they advocate that objectivity is 
possible.  The subject-object problem according to Smith (1998) focuses 
on the relationship between the researcher and the "things" he studied 
and highlights the way in which there are crucial differences between 
natural science and social science. 
3.3. Situated knowledge: 
“Science is nothing but trained and organized common sense” 
(T.H. Huxley) 
 
According to Kuhn (1970), all social research is socially embedded 
and Smith (1998) acknowledges that research is socially positioned and 
that yet all researchers try to base their findings on evidence. In line 
with Kuhn's concept most - and also financial scientific knowledge - is 
both situated in the context of the historical and social practices which 
define (natural) science in a particular time and place.  Consequently, 
the truth of a scientific statement is only relevant to those who share 
the belief system (value system) upon which such "truths" are based.  
Clearly finance theories are only relevant to those who share the belief 
system, which to some extent may be explained by the fact that it is a 
rather specialized matter, which rarely appeals to other fields of science. 
Academic finance continuously advocates a rather standard positivist 
account (Smith, 1998) which emphasises the importance of value 
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freedom, hard facts and prediction as a basis for offering policy 
proposals for governments, businesses and other private institutions. 
Most practitioners and scholars in the field of finance – seem to adhere 
to a positivist approach, especially those representing the dominant 
paradigm i.e. IMF, World Bank, Central Banks, BIS and other 
regulating bodies and institutions.  
Smith (1998) argues that positivist approach to the social 
sciences claim the label scientific, for he assumes that things can be 
studied as hard facts and the relationships between these facts 
established as scientific laws.  For positivists, such laws have the status 
of truth and social objects can be studied in much the same way as 
natural objects. Often their research is quantitatively based.  
The traditional view is that quantitative enquiry examines data 
which are numbers, while qualitative enquiry examines data which are 
narrative (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991).  Inherent in this dichotomy is 
the view that quantitative enquiry generally adopts a deductive process, 
while qualitative enquiry generally adopts an inductive process.  The 
traditional view is that quantitative researchers subscribe to a 
“positivist” paradigm of science, while qualitative researchers subscribe 
to a realist paradigm.  Guba and Lincoln (1994) argue that the choice of 
research paradigm, rather than the choice of research method is the 
overriding concern. 
Quantitative research designs are characterized by the 
assumption that human behaviour can be explained by what may be 
termed “social facts”, which can be investigated by methodologies that 
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utilize “the deductive logic of the natural sciences” (Homa, 1994, p. 
121).  Quantitative investigations look for “distinguishing 
characteristics, elemental properties and empirical boundaries” and 
tend to measure “how much”, or “how often” (Nau, 1995).  A 
quantitative research design allows flexibility in the treatment of data, 
in terms of comparative analysis, statistical analysis, and repeatability 
of data collection in order to verify reliability. The weaknesses of such 
quantitative research designs lie mainly in their failure to ascertain 
deeper underlying meanings and explanations, even when significant, 
reliable and valid. 
The classic qualitative study is one in which the findings are 
“grounded” in the data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  A qualitative study 
seeks to identify underlying concepts and the relationship between 
them (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996).  The data for a 
qualitative study might include transcripts of in-depth interviews, 
observations or documents (Patton, 1991).  Qualitative enquiry often 
takes the form of a case study.  According to Yin (1994), case study is 
the preferred research approach when “how” or “why” questions are 
being posed – in other words, questions of process. Most researchers 
have been guided to believe that the role of qualitative enquiry is that of 
an advisable first step to be taken before the “real” enquiry – a 
quantitative enquiry – is undertaken.  This view denigrates the role of 
qualitative enquiry.   
Some social scientists would now subscribe to the view that 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies can both lead to valid 
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research findings in and of their own right.  According to Easterby-
Smith et al (1991), there are many researchers who adopt a pragmatic 
view of deliberately combining quantitative and qualitative methods.  It 
is not a matter of inflexibility adhering to one methodological approach 
simply because it is traditionally associated with a chosen paradigm of 
science. Qualitative methodologies are strong in those areas that have 
been identified as potential weaknesses within the quantitative 
approach, e.g. the use of interviews, observations, case studies to 
provide a deep, rather that broad set of knowledge about a particular 
phenomenon.   
This depth allows the researcher to achieve “Verstehen”, or 
empathetic “understanding” (Smith 1999).  The concept of Verstehen is 
the basis for a critique of quantitative research designs, and their 
empiricist emphasis.  The argument used is that quantitative methods 
measure human behaviour “from outside”, without accessing the 
meanings that individuals give to their measurable behaviour.  
Another criticism which may hold true for the particular field of 
finance is that – consistent with the positivist paradigm – or especially 
the functionalist approach – the field seems to run the risk of producing 
more and more facts confirming a status quo of the science and the 
belief systems. It seems to lead to the conviction that an even more 
refined technical approach to credit, to credit risk, to credit 
measurement, and to markets in general will lead to a more appropriate 
management and control of the same. Publications in recent years on 
credit defaults, instability of financial markets and participants, clear 
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demonstrations of problems of asymmetry of information, including 
adverse selection and moral hazard, as well as agency costs, all seem to 
indicate  the contrary.    
There may be room for a more balanced approach to these issues, 
which then should include an analysis of the problems from different 
perspectives. Professor Francis (2001) suggested in his presentation; 
some issues in management research, that key issues in management 
require an understanding of underlying social and economic processes, 
including agency theory, transaction costs theory, institutional theory 
and evolutionary approaches to economics, sociology and psychology, 
which can all play their part in developing our understanding of this 
issues.  
This point of view is also expressed by Stiglitz (2000) in his article; 
“the contributions of the economics of information to twentieth century 
economics”, where he outlines the following: “Some of the advances…. 
will entail an integration of economics with other social sciences- with 
psychology, on, for instance, how individuals process information, form 
expectations, and select among possible signals; and with sociology, on, 
for instance, the creation of social knowledge and signaling 
conventions”.  
The mere fact that no references can be found on the relationship 
between (cross border) lending and culture, and the arguments 
previously stated on the dominant paradigm in finance, all seem to 
indicate that in this particular field the multi-disciplinary approach 
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advocated above, has not yet started. Perhaps this thesis may be 
considered a small step towards this end.  
3.4. Approach and methods: 
 
This research has been guided by the belief that the role of this 
research is exploratory, a more qualitative enquiry and that of an 
advisable first step to be taken before a real enquiry – a quantitative 
enquiry – can be undertaken. The hypotheses formulated and the 
applied methodology, which will be explained further, both combined, 
intend to establish a reasonable and plausible argument whether 
practitioners share the view that cultural impacts influence the 
effectiveness of cross border lending and whether further credit rating 
(of hard factors), as a result of Basel II, will sufficiently, according to 
Grunert et al (2005); “alleviate asymmetric information problems 
between borrowers and lenders”.  
3.5. Methods: 
 
Given the rather intensive and exploratory character of this 
research, whereby the research questions focused on what and how the 
patterns work, the choice has been made to use to different methods, 
which were both felt adequate to achieve the objectives. 
 
3.5.1. The questionnaire: 
 
One of the main instruments used in this study has been the use 
of a questionnaire. Literature is rather inconsistent using both 
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questionnaires as well as surveys. Hofstede (1994) for example refers to 
his research in “Culture Consequences” both to the Hermes 
questionnaire as well as the Hermes survey.  Using surveys is one way 
of collecting data. Survey research involves the administration of 
questionnaires or interviews to relatively large groups of people 
(Singleton and Straits 1999). Survey research, while a relatively new 
field, has become one of the most popular methodologies, not just in 
sociology, but in other disciplines also. They are being used for 
measuring demographic characteristics, behaviour frequencies, 
personal beliefs and individual attitudes on issues and towards 
products. Usually their structure is rather rigid, as most researchers 
believe that objectivity and accuracy is best achieved by treating each 
and every respondent in the same fashion. It can furthermore be argued 
that whilst using closed questions, it allows getting information for 
many individuals with relative little effort and in a short time. 
Furthermore standard use of questionnaires allow for it to be 
anonymous, which can enhance the response rate.  
In this research, however, it has been decided to invite 
participants to use their names for identification. Reasons being that 
during the conference the questionnaires were filled out in front of the 
research assistant, who assisted them going through the questionnaire. 
In this way it could be ensured which of the conference participants had 
participated, and which one not. In total 44 participants took part in 
this part of the research. Secondly, the development of an online 
identical survey instrument allowed for identifying who had 
 206 
participated, as the invitation to participate had been sent individually 
to members of a selected group of bankers and company executives. 
Another often sited weakness of survey instruments is the lack of 
interaction. In this research this has been improved by using the 
conference through which participants were exposed to refinement of 
concepts and subsequent questions. Also through the publication of the 
key findings of the conference, the conference papers and the abstracts, 
those participating in the on-line survey, were to some extent more 
adequately informed.  
3.5.2. The conference: 
 
Although the use of a single methodology has been advocated by a 
number of authors, many of the supporting arguments are decidedly 
pragmatic, such as time constraints, the need to limit the scope of a 
study, and the difficulty of publishing the findings (Creswell, 1994). 
The crucial aspect in justifying a mixed methodology research 
design is that both single methodology approaches (qualitative only and 
quantitative only) have strengths and weaknesses. The combination of 
methodologies, or triangulation, on the other hand, can focus on their 
relevant strengths. The researcher should aim to achieve the situation 
where "blending qualitative and quantitative methods of research can 
produce a final product which can highlight the significant 
contributions of both" (Nau, 1995,), where "qualitative data can support 
and explain the meaning of quantitative research. As in all research, 
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consideration must be given to construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity, and reliability (Yin, 1994) 
Denzin (1984) identified four types of triangulation: Data source 
triangulation, when the researcher looks for the data to remain the 
same in different contexts; Investigator triangulation, when several 
investigators examine the same phenomenon; Theory triangulation, 
when investigators with different view points interpret the same results; 
and Methodological triangulation, when one approach is followed by 
another, to increase confidence in the interpretation. In this research 
methodological triangulation has been used in order to increase the 
confidence and reliability of the findings.  
 
3.5.3. Limitations of the methods: 
 
For the purpose if this exploratory research the use of the 
questionnaire, with its strengths and weaknesses as has been described 
before, was considered an adequate instrument for the exploratory 
objectives of this research. They are certainly limitations to both the 
sample as well as the sample size regarding the validity of the findings, 
the sample consisting of both bankers and senior company executives 
operating in cross border finance, but limited between a small part of 
Western Europe and an even smaller part of Latin America.  
Especially the organization of a conference to test hypothesis 
brings with it several limitations, as just a few of the hypotheses can be 
discussed and or tested and several key concepts, even in a conference 
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which lasted three days, could not be sufficiently explored. The 
conclusions, validity and reliability of findings in a conference setting 
are open for debate. These limitations are accepted for this particular 
research and the results the conference has been able to produce are 
considered to be of substantial qualitative value.  
3.5.4. Validity and reliability: 
  
Validity of the research instrument can be measured in different 
ways, one of which being the response rate to the invitations to 
participate in a survey. The following results for the on-line survey can 
be reported. Given that the mailing was sent those who participated 
previously in the seminar, and were asked to invite 5 to 10 immediate 
colleagues to participate in the on-line questionnaire, some 
assumptions have been made as to how response rate in this case could 
be calculated, Given that this indirect approach does not tell us how 
many effectively have been approached. The results can be illustrated 
below, whereby 4 different calculations were made, depending what is 
reasonable.   
Table 5 Response rate on-line questionnaire 
 
 
Resume of mailings questionnaire     
   factor 1 factor 2 factor 3 factor 4 
Mailing sent to participant of the 
seminar  40 80 120 160 
Mailing to members of DBA news 95 95 95 95 
Total   135 175 215 255 
Online respondents received 61 61 61 61 
Response rate in percentage 45,19% 34,86% 28,37% 23,92% 
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The mailing with the invitation to participate in the on-line part of 
the survey was sent to two different subgroups;  
(1) The participants of the conference, who were invited to ask 5 
to 10 direct colleagues to participate in the survey. Different 
calculations have been made assuming which kind of factor would be 
considered as reasonable, given the fact that this type of indirect 
approach to invite for participation in a survey is considerably less 
effective than a direct approach.  
(2) A direct and personal approach was made to members of the 
DBA News (weekly newsletter), which consisted of 95 individuals.    
The result of these findings is, depending on the assumption of 
factors that the response rate can assumed to be between 24 and 45 %.  
During the conference we were able to interview 45 senior 
executives who were eligible to participate in the survey. Assuming the 
total of all eligible participants, the response rate has been over 80%, 
which is great part was due to logistic and organizational difficulties (in 
finding the time and moment to take a conference participant apart).  
3.5.5. Ethical implications of the research: 
 
There are various ethical aspects concerned with any type of 
research, the disclosure of information, on data and findings and 
revealing sources. According to Fay (1996) objectivism objectivity 
consists of looking at the world from a god’s-eye point of view in which 
all of the viewer’s interest and pre-suppositions are eliminated and the 
world is seen directly as it is. Another way of expressing this according 
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to Fay (1996), is that the objectivist ideal envisions the disappearance of 
the author who in effect becomes a recording device upon which reality 
is written. The problem with this picture is the epistemological 
incoherence. All inquiry according to Fay (1996) is inevitably 
perspectival and its results inherently partial and interested. All 
knowledge claims are necessarily embedded within a specific way of 
engaging the world. It follows that objectivity cannot be the elimination 
of all cognitive and moral pre-suppositions; far from opening the eyes of 
potential cognizers such an elimination would in fact render them blind, 
unable to see anything at all.  
Conference quote, Mr. Nanno Kleiterp (page 130); I think that, for 
me, it was a quite unique meeting because there are not many meetings 
where development bankers and clients come together. Normally what 
we see in meetings is that it's all bankers, or it's all soy crushers, etc.; all 
is organized by sector. And I think that the idea of Gert Jan to bring 
people together in this way made it a very special meeting. Of course, 
there was one motive behind, which I didn’t see in writing anywhere, that 
was that he has to finish his thesis, isn’t it? 
The above quote from Mr. Nanno Kleiterp at the end of the 
conference contained some critical elements which rather appropriately 
called for explanation and perhaps defence in this particular chapter. 
Without going into too much detail, the following observations should 
be made: 
The prepositions, the presentations of previous findings from 
literature, the design and content of both the conference itself as well as 
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the questionnaire are all a product of previous research findings. The 
researcher does not claim objectivity, as has been explained throughout 
this thesis, yet a critical approach (as some may have felt this to be) to 
banks, or to credit ratings agencies, or to supervisory institutions (BIS), 
have no bearing in any other interest than this particular piece of 
research. The particular questions for example, such as (1) Why Banks 
Exist and (2) Credit rating agencies, despite their long history and 
expertise do not really possess competencies, which may prevent 
default risk and (3) The role of credit rating agencies should be more 
critically assessed and their influence (oligopoly) in finance should be 
reduced; all these issues have been raised by many other scholars in 
various academic journals.  The research questions have likewise also 
been critical towards companies, such as in (1) most companies tend to 
act opportunistically in their bank relations.  The purpose of any 
inquiry is, furthermore, to seek variance and one of the ways to achieve 
this is by opting for a critical-realist approach.  
Secondly, it is not correct that in the approach to the conference 
there has not been explicit mentioning and reference to the fact that the 
conference, both in its design as well as in its purpose, also served for 
the researcher to use the material for the finalisation of the DBA thesis, 
as can be seen in the following statement on the invitation; (quote; We 
also feel that it will be an appropriate opportunity for DEG and FMO, to 
present themselves as professional long-term financial partners to key 
companies in the region. We certainly anticipate content contribution 
from both DEG and FMO. If agreed we will leave the chair for the formal 
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part to Mr. Mulder. He will also be using part of his doctorate findings 
and research to enhance content to the central theme (his thesis, 
banks, credit and culture – differences). Secondly, the invitation to 
participate in the questionnaire clearly refers to the purpose of the 
inquiry, as well as due explanation has been given throughout the 
conference.  
The four-page invitation to speakers at the conference, not only 
raised 30 possible topics for speakers to choose from, but also 
structured the content of the program using and making reference 
(through hyperlinks) to the three management papers.  
And yes, had the invitation to participate in the conference been 
extended, just because it served to finalize a doctorate thesis, then 
DEG, FMO and DBA would not have agreed to sponsor the event, and 
we would not have had a program with a content which was felt 
appropriate before, during and after the conference had taken place, by 
a large majority of the attendees.  
Perhaps, on another note, it would be good to observe that in 
terms of ethics, one could be more careful with managing concepts 
which one has been studying at great detail and then to suppose that 
those concepts, even to some extent, are known and familiar to the 
particular audience, such as that present at the conference. One thing 
would be to present certain findings before a group of specialists on that 
particular subject, or to be dealing with those in front of a business 
setting. The preparation for the presentations of the research could 
have been improved upon, in order to make it somewhat more 
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productive. The discussion on credit rating as well as culture issues 
have been evaluated positively, yet a subject as why banks exist, and 
explaining it by making reference to rather abstract terminologies such 
as agency theory, transactions cost theory and the like, was experienced 
as rather confrontational, being this obviously unintentional. 
 
3.6. The research process: 
 
 Please find below a diagram on the research approach and 
process: 
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Figure 12 Research 
design
 
 
  
The research process and approach as outlined above can be 
furthermore explained and commented as follows: 
 
Step 1:  
Management paper 1. 
Why banks exist  
Management paper 3. 
Cross cultural studies, and 
their practical implications 
Management paper 2. 
Credit & Credit rating 
Identification of Research 
problem and formulation of 
hypotheses. 
Development of 
survey instrument with 
20 questions 
Organisation of 3 days 
conference in Uruguay 
on the Topic of 
research problem 
Survey of 
participants 
during 
conference 
On-line 
survey to 
others from 
the sample 
Conference 3 days in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay: 75 participants, 10 
contributions: transcript of conference 
Collection and analysis of the data. 
Invitation to 
speakers for 
their 
contributions 
 
DBA THESIS,  
BANKS, CREDIT AND CULTURE 
Research findings 
Triangulation of data 
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Management papers were written on the different subjects, such 
in accordance with the requirements for the DBA program of the 
University of Bradford.  
Step 2:  
Identification of the research problem and formulation of 
hypotheses. All of the hypotheses were directly drawn from the findings 
in one of the management papers. Perhaps this process can be best 
illustrated by providing the following figure:  
  
Figure 13 Generic research process 
 
Models:  An overall framework for looking at reality 
 
Concepts:  An idea deriving from a given model 
 
Theory: A set of concepts used to define and/or explain 
some phenomenon 
 
Hypothesis:  A testable proposition 
 
 
Methodology: A general approach to studying research topics 
 
Method:  A specific research technique 
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Findings: 
(Figure adopted from Silverman, 2000) 
 
Step 3:  
Organization of a three-day conference in Punta del Este 
Uruguay, in order to gather bankers from Europe and their clients and 
prospects from the Mercosur countries (Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina). Co-
sponsors of the conference were found and were addressed (FMO & 
DEG, both development banks from respectively the Netherlands and 
Germany). The company of which the author is a director was the third 
sponsor, each being responsible for 1/3 of the total costs. In the 
invitation to the co-sponsors the following paragraph was included: 
“We also feel that it will be an appropriate opportunity for DEG 
and FMO, to present themselves as professional long-term financial 
partners to key companies in the region. We certainly anticipate content 
contribution from both DEG and FMO. If agreed we will leave the chair 
for the formal part to Mr. Mulder. He will also be using part of his 
doctoral findings and research to enhance content to the central theme 
(his thesis, banks, credit and culture – differences)”: 
Step 4:  
The objective of the conference was to provide a balanced mix of 
views from both the banking side as well as the corporate side on the 
various themes and issues. It was the intent to achieve also a rather 
balanced representation through different countries, both for the banks 
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(Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, UK) as well as the companies 
(Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay).  
The following persons and institutions were identified and 
approached as possible contributors to the conference: 
Table 6 List of invited speakers 
 
Banks 
 
1. Hendrik Lühl DEG 
2. Karl Weinfurtner   DEG   
3. Nanno Kleiterp FMO 
4. Paul van Heerde - ING 
5. Fred Arnold – KBC  
6. Hans Hanegraaf - Fortis 
7. Martin Schmitz - West LB 
8. Rafael Bonasso -  Rabobank –  
Argentina 
 
 
Companies 
 
1. Ricardo Zerbino – Fanapel –  Uruguay 
2. Osvaldo Bertone – ACA - Argentina 
3. Bengt Hallqvist – Consultant (FMO) - 
Brazil 
4. Alejandro Benvenuto – Nidera – 
Argentina 
5. Roberto Gazze – Vicentin - Argentina 
6. Tomas Hinrichsen, JJH - Argentina 
7. Horacio Aranguren, Molinos Rio de la 
Plata – Argentina 
8. Juan Diego Ferrés – Granol Brazil  
 
Results: 
 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Not accepted 
Accepted 
 
 
 
 
 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
 
Not accepted 
 
Accepted 
Accepted (had to excuse later) 
Not accepted/ only as member 
of panel 
Accepted 
 
 
 
The potential speakers were approached with a detailed outline of 
the proposed conference. Of the invitees of companies 6 out of 8 
accepted the invitation (75%), whereas with regard to the banks 7 out of 
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8 accepted (87.5%).  The proposal to speakers carried several objectives 
amongst which the most important were: 
· To approach them with suggestions for themes and title of 
presentations, all of which were drawn from the literature 
and referred to in one of the management reports. The 
different contributors to the conference were given a choice 
of subjects to choose from. 
· To make explicit the requirements for content of their 
presentation, as well other aspects related to time 
constraints. 
· To inform about the background of the conference and the 
issues which were drawn from the existing literature in the 
different fields.      
 
Structure of the conference: 
The three days were divided into 5 different parts, most consisting 
of a block of roughly 4 hours. One of these blocks was to be reserved for 
leisure activities. Each block could have 4 to 5 presentations and each 
presentation to be limited to 20-25 minutes, preferably using only 
slides.  
 
Block 1:  General introduction, opening and welcome 
Wednesday morning, arrival and “inscription” of the guests 
11.00 Opening with the presence of special invitees, the 
Ambassadors of the Netherlands and Germany, followed by lunch. 
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Outline of the program for attendees, introduction of speakers, 
formulation of structure etceteras.  
Block 2: Why do banks exist?  
Introduction and presentation of the main findings of the 
management paper with the above title.  
Presentations to be given by FMO and DEG, amongst others. 
Possible questions/issues: 
· Why do (FMO/DEG) exist, origin – mission- strategy 
· Major trends in the financial sector, consequences for 
banks, for clients, implications both in terms of 
opportunities as well as treats. 
· What do banks expect from clients (corporate governance, 
moral hazards, adverse selection, the role of accountants) 
· What may clients expect from (FMO/DEG) (commitment, 
added value, pricing conditions aligned to risks) 
· Risk measurement, role of external credit rating 
· Country risk – so what? Theory and practice. 
· Banks – a necessary evil, or what? 
· The future of the European banking system. 
· The role of local banks (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay) – asset 
or liability? 
Note suggested speakers: DEG, FMO, ACA (Argentina), and 
Brazilian company, Rabobank/Vereins 
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Block 3:  Credit and credit rating, consequences to banks and 
companies 
Introduction and presentation of the main findings of the 
management paper with the above title.  
· Basel II outline – consequences for credit markets 
· Rating Agencies – asset or liability? 
· Company experience with rating process: positive aspects, 
negative aspects 
· Comparison professionalism and approach – housebank 
and rating agency 
· Credit risk measurement: how does it work? Does it?  
· Credit risk measurement, moral hazard and adverse 
selection, how to design and apply appropriate tools. 
· Default probability: theory and practice. 
· Basel II and internal rating systems – will it work and if so, 
how? 
· Country rating and consequences for our company? 
Consequences to average cost of capital. 
· BIS, Credit rating and us (non OECD countries) 
· Tier one capital (Germany 6,8%, Average OECD 13,4 and 
what’s next) 
Note suggested speakers: AGD (Acevedo/Urquia), (Brazilian 
company), ING Bank, Dresdner/WestLB, FANAPEL (Zerbino) 
 
Block 4: Relationship banking – cultural differences 
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Introduction and presentation of the main finding of the 
management paper with the above title.  
· Relationship banking and good weather 
· What may be expected from a relationship bank? 
· Why do companies consider relationship with housebanks 
important? 
· Does culture matter? Uncertainty avoidance, long and short 
term orientation.  
· Being a banker and a friend: an impossible combination? 
(link to quote of Edward T. Hall) 
· Relationship banking, how does it work for us? (case study) 
· Long term investments in bank relations: will it pay? 
Note suggested speakers: Vicentin (Roberto Gazze), Tomas 
Hinrichsen (Hinrichsen S.A., Karel Valken (Nidera), Fortis Bank, KBC. 
 
Step 5:   
Two months before the conference, a pre-advice was sent out to 
approximately 130 individuals, equally distributed between companies 
and financial institutions. Without exception they all qualified as 
practitioners in the field of cross border lending, either as borrower or 
as lender. It was made clear in the pre-advice that about 60-80 persons 
were expected to attend and that, furthermore, invitations would be 
sent on a personal basis. Although practically all addressees 
represented a company and/or financial institution with activities and 
presence in the region (Mercosur), it was not the idea to have invitations 
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issued in any other way than on a personal basis, this to ensure a 
proper representation both in terms of level as well as focus. It was 
specially agreed that the aim was for quality of the people present in the 
conference and not the quantity. It was also deemed, in discussions 
with the co-sponsors, that a meeting of this kind could only produce 
good dialogue if and when the group would not be larger than 60-80 
persons.   
 
Step 6:  
Development of the survey to be used during the conference, as 
well as thereafter for on-line. Testing the survey instrument, with fellow 
students and receiving input from supervisor. 
 
Step 7:  
Data collection, during the seminar with a personal approach. 
Each of the participants was requested to participate individually in the 
survey, whereby questions of the survey were put forward (by a trained 
psychologist). Following the conference, during which 45 respondents 
participated, it was decided to add an on-line survey to other members 
of the sample, this to increase the number of participants in the survey. 
The final number of participants thus obtained reached 106. 
 
Step 8:  
Data analysis, transcript and analysis of the entire conference, 
using triangulation.  
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Step 9:  
Reporting of findings in a DBA thesis.   
 
3.7. Sample: 
 
The unit of analysis was defined for this research as being both 
bankers as well as their clients, each of whom is or has been actively 
involved in cross border lending. In the particular data set of this 
research, these involve, on one side, European bankers involved in 
lending to Mercosur clients, irrespective of whether they are physically 
based in Europe or in the region. The relevant aspect here is that the 
credit decision by the bank is being taken by credit committees based in 
Europe. On the client side these involve executives mainly from the 
financial area of the companies or at the level of the executive board, 
actively engaged in dealing with the European banks. On either sides 
the participants in the data set, involve executives being responsible for 
rather large sizes of credit (between US$ 5 – and US$ 50 million per 
credit facility). These individuals are the ones who on a regular basis 
are dealing directly, very often face-to-face, with the relationship and 
the credit facilities between them. Most have travelling experiences, i.e. 
the bankers know the clients in their own setting, and most clients 
regularly visit the banks in Europe. In this way it can be argued that 
both sides have been exposed to credit, credit rating and new BIS 
regulation, as well as experiencing different ways and forms of cultural 
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differences. Defined in this way, this unit of analysis is believed to be 
representative for this piece of research. The argument that the sample 
demonstrates strong experiences (between 15 and 21 years) in their 
field is being shown in the following two tables, one distributed to 
region, and the second over banks, companies and others.   
Table 7 (i) and (ii) Years of activity (regionally) and per sector 
 
 
 
 
Generalizability is a standard aim in quantitative research and is 
normally achieved by statistical sampling procedures. Such sampling 
has two functions: First, it allows the researcher to feel confident about 
the representativeness of the sample; “if the population characteristics 
are known, the degree of representativeness of a sample can be 
checked” (Arber, 1993). Second, such representativeness allows making 
broader inferences; “The purpose of sampling is usually to study a 
representative subsection of a precisely defined population in order to 
make inferences about the whole population” (Arber, 1993).  
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In stratified sampling, the population is divided into groups 
(strata) and a random sample is obtained from every stratum. In cluster 
sampling, the population is divided into groups called clusters, not all of 
the clusters are sampled. If a cluster is included in the sample, all of 
the cases in the cluster are included in the sample.  
Stratified sampling works best if the strata are homogeneous so 
that relatively few points can represent each stratum well. Sampling 
error will arise primarily from variability within the strata.  
Cluster sampling works best if the clusters are as heterogeneous 
as possible. Sampling error will occur because of variability between 
clusters. There should be no sampling error within the clusters if each 
member is included.  
Normally, cluster sampling produces greater sampling error than 
random or stratified sampling. However, the loss of precision may be 
outweighed by the efficiency of data collection. 
In this research stratified sampling or purposive sampling had 
been applied. Purposive sampling allows choosing cases because they 
illustrate some feature or process in which we are interested (Silverman, 
2000).  In this research, the requirements of the sample implied those 
who had experience in cross border lending, were experienced working 
with different cultures and those who were, to some extent, familiar 
with existing and forthcoming BIS regulation on banks. Companies who 
only work with local banks, as well as bankers who only work in local 
markets, did not qualify for this research.  
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The selection of the sample was drawn from a database of the 
sponsoring company (DBA corporate Finance), and are all those 
executives from both banks and companies who had been receiving the 
weekly DBA newsletter for several years already. The newsletter informs 
recipients on news and developments in Agribusiness, economics and 
finance as well as banking. It has a strong focus on Mercosur 
developments. The data base for the DBA news consists of 95 
individuals, who all have been approached for the research.  
Those invited to participate in the conference, however, were only 
those more senior executives from banks and companies who very 
actively and intensively work in cross border finance, mainly between 
Europe and Mercosur. As can be seen from the data, 4 respondents 
were classified as “other”, i.e. not European and not Latin American. 
These were identified to be 2 bankers from the USA and 2 bankers from 
Asia. Given the marginal effect on the outcome of the research it was 
decided to include them in the sample.  
3.7.1. The practice of data collection: 
 
The collection of the data can be divided into two steps: first, the 
collection of the questionnaires during the conferences, which given the 
setting of the conference and the level of the representatives (senior 
executives), was found to be more effective to perform with the help of a 
research assistant, who ensured that most participants were personally 
invited to participate in the research. They were also guided through the 
questionnaire.  
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Secondly, after the first set of questionnaires was gathered during 
the conference, it was decided to increase the number of participants 
from 44 during the conference, to include those who had not been 
participating in the conference, but who did match the requirements of 
the sample, i.e. other bankers and representatives from companies out 
of the DBA news data base. The following results can be reported, 
between online and survey, the latter meaning the ones collected during 
the conference. 
 
Table 8 Distribution questionnaires 
(1) online (2) survey
62 58,5 58,5 58,5
44 41,5 41,5 100,0
106 100,0 100,0
online
survey
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
In addition, participants of the conference were invited to 
approach direct colleagues in order for them to also participate in the 
research. In total the research produced 108 responses, out of which 
two had to be disregarded, because they were only partially completed.  
Out of the total of 106 valid respondents, only 2 returned the 
questionnaire not having disclosed their names. They are included 
though in the total of 106 respondents. As it can be seen in the table 
below, almost 80% of respondents have the level of account manager 
and above. 
Table 9 Distribution of sample  in position  
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President (1), MD/board (2), div head (3), account mger (4), staff (5), other (6) (s1.4)
11 10,4 10,4 10,4
19 17,9 17,9 28,3
32 30,2 30,2 58,5
22 20,8 20,8 79,2
6 5,7 5,7 84,9
16 15,1 15,1 100,0
106 100,0 100,0
President
Managing director/ board
Division or departm. head
Accountmanager
Staff
Others
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
We did not score particularly well in terms of representation 
between males and females as the following chart will show. This is 
however consistent with the dominant paradigm in international 
finance:  
 
Table 10 Distribution of sample  to sex 
male (1) female (2) (S1.2)
104 98,1 98,1 98,1
2 1,9 1,9 100,0
106 100,0 100,0
male
female
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
On the distribution between respondents from bank, companies 
and other, it can also be said that a fairly representative distribution 
has been obtained, as can be seen in the following table: 
Table 11 Distribution of sample per sector 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5)
58 54,7 54,7 54,7
40 37,7 37,7 92,5
8 7,5 7,5 100,0
106 100,0 100,0
bank
company
other
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Furthermore, in terms of seniority of the respondents, it was 
found that more than 85% were of the age of 35 years or older at the 
time of participating in the research.  
The survey also made a distinction in respondents in terms of 
origin, referred to as country/region of residence.  The following 
distribution in terms of origin can be reported: 
Table 12 Distribution of sample by region and sector 
Europe (1),  Latin Am (2), others (3) * bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) Crosstabulation
39 10 5 54
72,2% 18,5% 9,3% 100,0%
67,2% 25,0% 62,5% 50,9%
36,8% 9,4% 4,7% 50,9%
16 29 3 48
33,3% 60,4% 6,3% 100,0%
27,6% 72,5% 37,5% 45,3%
15,1% 27,4% 2,8% 45,3%
3 1 4
75,0% 25,0% 100,0%
5,2% 2,5% 3,8%
2,8% ,9% 3,8%
58 40 8 106
54,7% 37,7% 7,5% 100,0%
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
54,7% 37,7% 7,5% 100,0%
Count
% within Europe (1), 
Latin Am (2), others (3)
% within bank (1),
company (2) or others
(3) (S1.5)
% of Total
Count
% within Europe (1), 
Latin Am (2), others (3)
% within bank (1),
company (2) or others
(3) (S1.5)
% of Total
Count
% within Europe (1), 
Latin Am (2), others (3)
% within bank (1),
company (2) or others
(3) (S1.5)
% of Total
Count
% within Europe (1), 
Latin Am (2), others (3)
% within bank (1),
company (2) or others
(3) (S1.5)
% of Total
Europe
Latin America
Others
Europe (1), 
Latin Am (2),
others (3)
Total
bank company other
bank (1), company (2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
 
It can therefore be explained that of the total number of 
respondents, there have been 4 reported as “others” i.e. not being from 
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neither Europe nor Latin American. These 4 were a mix from both Asia 
and the USA.  
3.7.2. The development of the questionnaire: 
 
A questionnaire is a document for generating primary data by 
means of answers given by a respondent to a series of prepared 
questions (Butler, 2001). Whilst designing a questionnaire it is essential 
to have clarity about the research objectives, the unit of analysis, and 
variables.  According to Butler (2001), good questions are: 
· Clear and unambiguous and short 
· Discriminate between respondents (because of variance) 
· Can be answered quickly (hence forth it was decided to 
using closed end questions, with ordinal variables on a 
Likert scale from 1 to 5 
· Is in harmony with the respondents way of thinking and 
interest (affirmative in respect of interest, perhaps not so 
much in the way of thinking, as variance is what we seek 
and therefore some questions may be challenging and or 
provocative) 
· Questions are short, to the point and in simple language.  
· Avoids a double negative.  
 
3.7.3. Questionnaire design: 
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The questionnaire was divided into 4 different sections: (1) general 
data, (2) bank-client relationship, (3) bank credit and credit rating and 
(4) relationship banking – cultural differences.  It was supposed that 
section titles could help establish context, and that related questions 
would help the respondent think efficiently. It was understood that 
presentation of questions with straightforward answers first could help 
to warm up the respondent for harder questions. 
Regarding the layout, the consistency was considered elementary 
and use of the same format for the same type of questions was applied. 
There was enough space for circling numbers as well as enough space 
between questions in order to avoid confusion.  The questions were 
numbered in a sequence as such would be easier to follow. The total 
number of questions was limited to 20, similar to the number of the 
value survey model used by Hofstede (1980). 
Before the questionnaire was used, a pilot was launched amongst 
five fellow students and the supervisor in order to check the 
questionnaire, using a checklist drawn from Janes (1999), including the 
works of Babbie (1990) and intended to test the practicability, 
transparency, clearness, usage, and logic of the questionnaire, and 
especially to test whether the questions were considered to be: 
· Related to the problem at hand.  
· The correct type to get the best information.  
· Clear, unambiguous, precise . Giving definitions where 
appropriate; avoiding jargon or slang unless needed or 
appropriate. 
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· Not leading.  
· Able to be answered by the subjects.  
· Not double-barreled.  
· Short.  
· Not negative.  
· Unbiased.  
All 6 invitees (5 fellow students and the supervisor) responded to 
the invitation to report back and subsequent modifications were made. 
Furthermore the questionnaire was translated into Spanish by a 
qualified translator and subsequently the Spanish version was 
translated by a second certified translator back into English, to be 
compared for any mistakes and confusions (University handout Butler, 
2001). 
3.7.4. Practical issues of gaining access: 
 
Access to data is considered to be one of the main obstacles for 
research. A DBA can provide an empirical setting allowing for easier 
assess to opinion leader and data. This has been the case in this 
particular research where, thanks to co-sponsors and the host 
company, a 3-day conference could be organized bringing together 80 
senior executives and have most of them participating in the survey. 
Publicity and permanent marketing of the event, the company and the 
issues have helped to pave the way for others to participate in the 
online survey. Whereas in terms of quantity of data generated for this 
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research hopes could always be higher, it is the quality of the data, 
which allows for this research to be highly representative. 
3.7.5. Problems experiences during data collection: 
 
During the conference we were able to produce “only” 44 
questionnaires. Obviously during such a setting it was found 
problematic to be separating the participant in order to have them 
participate in the survey. As these were done with the help and by 
invitation from the research assistant, the time necessary to complete 
the survey was on average 20 minutes. During the 3 days – and the 
time available during the official part of the conference - this meant 44 
x 20 minutes, i.e. almost 15 hours. 
The conference counted with simultaneous translation and the 
entire conference could subsequently be audio taped and transcribed 
not only for the benefit of this research, but likewise for the benefit of all 
of those who participated.  
The on-line survey which was performed shortly after the 
conference took place caused the usual amount of effort and reminders 
to have invitees respond to the invitation. Following a personalized 
invitation, two reminders were sent in some cases, asking people to 
participate. Thanks to a personalized approach and identification and 
registration of the names of participants, a response rate between 25% 
and 45% could be obtained7.      
                                                 
7 See analysis on chapter 3.5.4. 
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CHAPTER 4 - RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
4.1. Introduction: 
 
The approach taken in this chapter is to report on the findings of 
both the questionnaire and the conference findings at the same time, 
using mainly descriptive statistics, and for each hypothesis, conference 
quotes have been used for illustration, mostly in support of the context 
of the hypothesis, or as the case may be, for the hypothesis itself. The 
quotes are provided in italic, in order to avoid confusion.  The whole 
transcript of the conference is provided in the Annex 1. At the end of 
this chapter a summary of hypotheses and conclusions will be given, in 
order to be able to see in a bird’s eye view what have been the results of 
this study. Several key concepts, hypothesis and sub- hypothesis could 
be confirmed.  
Hofstede suggested (1980) six areas for continued research, one of 
them he considered most important and was about the consequences 
for organizations. Hofstede counted on the critical support of 
enlightened and creative practitioners to, for example, learn about how 
the new insights of his study could contribute to turning cultural 
conflict in multicultural organizations into cultural synergy. Now, 25 
years have passed by and although Hofstede is one the most referenced 
social scientist of the last decades, his ambition – unfortunately – seems 
to have been a bit too high.  
This research in the area of banks, credit and culture started off 
in a more ambitious form 4 years ago. Then, Hofstede’s type of research 
 235 
was not found in the area of finance and the specific relationship 
between credit (risks) and culture (differences) had not been studied 
thus far.  The focus of the study needed to be gradually amended into 
an exploratory research in order to be able to answer the key hypothesis 
of this study: whether culture should be a concept to be taken into 
consideration, according to practitioners in the field of cross border 
finance.   
The findings of the questionnaire clearly confirm this hypothesis, 
whereby 90.6% agreeing and strongly agreeing and the remaining 10 
(9.4%) to be undecided. No disagreements were registered, as it is 
illustrated in the following frequency distribution: 
Table 13 Frequency distribution Key hypothesis  
if the bank does not understand the cultural context of a particular country or
region, it becomes highly doubtful it will understand the risks
52 49,1 49,1 49,1
44 41,5 41,5 90,6
10 9,4 9,4 100,0
106 100,0 100,0
strongly agree
agree
undecided
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
4.2. Review of the hypotheses and their results: 
 
The first information obtained from the questionnaire consists 
typically of frequency distributions for the different answer categories of 
one question. All twenty questions of the questionnaire consistently 
used the same five points Likert answer scales, from strongly agree – 
agree – undecided - disagree - to strongly disagree. All the questions 
used therefore are a so-called ordinal scale, which means that the 
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answer categories show a natural and unambiguous rank order. Most of 
the frequencies distributions are skewed.  
For further processing of the information contained in the 
frequency distributions, it is often necessary to reduce the information 
to a single number per frequency distribution. This can be done by 
using a measure of central tendency. As measures of central tendency, 
the mean and the median are available. The mean loses the least 
information, is easier to compute, and plays a role in all parametric 
statistical calculations. However, it formally presupposes interval scales 
which we do not have. The median is the theoretically more correct 
measure, but for short scales with many cases per answer category it 
approaches the mean closely. In the analysis of these data, the choice 
has been to consider the scales as quasi-interval scales and to use the 
mean as a measure of central tendency for such scales. SPSS 
calculations of the means and standard deviations have been made, the 
latter which however are rarely used for the interpretation and analysis; 
large standard deviations can be a warning that we are dealing with 
heterogeneous groups of respondents and that we should look for 
criteria to further break down our groups.  The data have been analyzed 
between groups, “groups” being any sets of respondents that were 
assumed to be homogeneous as to certain external criteria (such as 
bank/companies and Latin American/ European). The major analysis 
tool has been cross tabulations, as these provided the most insight. 
In using the calculation of the mean, the standard deviation, and 
the cross-tabulations, a fairly close approximation of the results of the 
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questionnaire can be demonstrated. It can furthermore be argued that 
given the ordinal scale and corresponding values being used, a 
hypotheses may be considered accepted if and when the value scores; 
µ = 2.5 and 
In-conclusive if and when a value scores; 
2.5 < µ < 3.5 
Rejected if and when a value scores; 
µ = 3.5 
and assuming a calculated standard deviation not exceeding 1. 
given that large standard deviations can be a warning that we are 
dealing with heterogeneous groups of respondents and that we should 
look for criteria to further break down our groups. 
 
4.3. Findings of hypothesis H1: Why banks exist 
 
Please find below a summary of all of the key hypotheses and 
sub-hypotheses which were dealt with in the questionnaire; 
 
H.1.1. In general banks seem to be very competent with regard to 
understanding risks. (Mean 3.00 standard deviation of 1.124 - 
undecided). 
Table 14 Cross tabulation hypothesis H.1.1. 
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bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * in general banks seem to be competent with regards to understanding risks
Crosstabulation
2 27 10 19 58
3,4% 46,6% 17,2% 32,8% 100,0%
2 9 7 20 2 40
5,0% 22,5% 17,5% 50,0% 5,0% 100,0%
2 3 3 8
25,0% 37,5% 37,5% 100,0%
4 38 20 42 2 106
3,8% 35,8% 18,9% 39,6% 1,9% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
in general banks seem to be competent with regards to
understanding risks
Total
 
Whereas total frequency distribution as shown above, only 
provides a mixed response with nearly 40% agreeing, 20% undecided 
and 40% disagreeing, using cross tabs in SPSS, discriminating the 
respondents in their respective categories of banks, companies and 
others, reveal a more interesting finding which is that 50% of the banks 
believe that banks are competent, whereas 55% of the respondents from 
companies believe that bank do not possess the competencies to 
understand risks.  In addition the 32.8% (and 17.2% undecided) of the 
banks disagreeing to the statement, indicates that even within banks a 
majority seems to be in doubt whether banks do well in this crucial 
aspect of their business. These arguments are supported by the 
following calculations: 
Table 15 Mean, Frequency distribution per sector and Std. Deviation H.1.1. 
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in general banks seem to be competent with regards to
understanding risks  * bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5)
in general banks seem to be competent with regards to
understanding risks
2,79 58 ,951
3,28 40 1,037
3,13 8 ,835
3,00 106 ,995
bank (1), company (2)
or others (3) (S1.5)bank
company
other
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
 
Conference quote Mr Rafael Bonasso (page 37); I think it is key 
what we need to focus on as banks is who do you want to do business 
with.  As long as profitability is the name of the game I believe that banks 
are going to be losers in the future.  If we are able to select the right 
companies that we believe are going to be the survivors, no matter what 
happens in the long-term, if time is what they need, time is what they are 
going to get ; 
and (2) Karl Weinfurther (page 39);  ….I think this is a difference 
with commercial banks.  In addition to investing in projects which are 
profitable we also want to contribute to sustainable development, and we 
look very much at both environmental and social aspects of our financing.  
And (3) Roberto Gazze (page 49)  However, it is necessary for 
banks to have a clear policy.  It is the only way for results to be observed, 
and certain banks have been able to handle this.  They have been 
cautious, and they have stood beside the companies.  It is not pleasant to 
feel unprotected.   
Reports by Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 2003) indicate that most 
episodes of (bank) insolvency are caused by a mixture of bad luck, bad 
policies – both microeconomic (regulatory) and macroeconomic – and 
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bad banking. The latter in part for when a banking system grows 
rapidly (Caprio and Klingebiel 1996) it is difficult for supervisors (or 
even bankers) to keep abreast of loan quality, since their information 
usually arrives late. The question here may be raised; what is bad 
banking?  
The fact that preventing default risk is a very complex area was 
somehow illustrated by Mr. Paul van Heerde (commodity banker), 
(conference paper page 106); Now, if I look at what ING has lost over the 
past 20 years, it was always (because of) fraud. It was not so much in 
terms of clients being very speculative, clients doing funny things that 
they are not telling you about, other than simply doing something with 
the books. Sometimes, fraud driven by those sort of things, by 
speculation or by other actions that the client could not cope with and 
didn’t want to go to the bank at an early stage and rather let it go – I 
think in Dutch you call that “quit or double”– to try to improve his position. 
H.1.2. Clients of banks would be benefited if banks were rated in 
terms of client’s satisfaction (mean of 2.19 SD .995 - accepted). 
Table 16 Cross tabulation H.1.2. 
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bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * bank clients would be benefited if banks were rated in terms of clients satisfaction
Crosstabulation
10 33 3 10 2 58
17,2% 56,9% 5,2% 17,2% 3,4% 100,0%
9 24 4 1 2 40
22,5% 60,0% 10,0% 2,5% 5,0% 100,0%
3 4 1 8
37,5% 50,0% 12,5% 100,0%
22 61 8 11 4 106
20,8% 57,5% 7,5% 10,4% 3,8% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
bank clients would be benefited if banks were rated in terms of
clients satisfaction
Total
 
In line with the findings under hypothesis H.3.3.1 (Clients of 
banks would be benefited if banks were rated in terms of clients 
satisfaction), this finding is confirming the hypothesis with nearly 80% 
of the total being in agreement. No notable differences can be observed 
on the other frequencies reported.  Neither such relation, nor suggestion 
has been found in previous research. The finding is perhaps something 
to be taken into consideration for banks, preparing their marketing and 
for discussions between banks and their ratings agencies.  Please find 
below the table with the calculations of the means and standard 
deviation. It confirms that with a SD of 1.066 the bank respondents are 
somewhat heterogeneous. 
Table 17 Mean, frequency distribution per sector and Std. Deviation H.1.2. 
Report
bank clients would be benefited if banks were rated in terms of
clients satisfaction
2,33 58 1,066
2,08 40 ,944
1,75 8 ,707
2,19 106 1,006
bank (1), company (2)
or others (3) (S1.5)bank
company
other
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
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Conference quote Mr. Roberto Gazze (page 47); We also had to go 
through a process by which the banks, at least many of them, had to 
redefine their strategies.  We felt that they did not have a clear picture of 
where they were going, whether they were commercial banks or 
investment banks, a series of issues that were not clear when we talked 
to them.  Of course all this affected the relationship with our banks, and 
fortunately a few of them (less than five) have maintained a consistency, 
a commitment that is very strong, and which strengthened the 
relationship, if anything, during these periods of crisis.  We all know that 
in a friendly relationship the other party does not expect to be thanked, 
but they know very well that we are deeply grateful and it is something 
that we wish to continue through time.   
 
H.1.3. The long history in banking and the lack of alternatives 
means that banks will continue to exist for many more years (mean of 
2.10 SD of 1.006 accepted). 
Table 18 Cross tabulation H.1.3. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * the long history in banking and the lack of alternatives means that banks will continue to
exist Crosstabulation
14 31 7 5 1 58
24,1% 53,4% 12,1% 8,6% 1,7% 100,0%
8 20 10 1 1 40
20,0% 50,0% 25,0% 2,5% 2,5% 100,0%
2 6 8
25,0% 75,0% 100,0%
24 57 17 6 2 106
22,6% 53,8% 16,0% 5,7% 1,9% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
the long history in banking and the lack of alternatives means that
banks will continue to exist
Total
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The findings reported above seem to confirm the findings of 
existing literature as described in Chapter 2 section 2.1. in that 
answering the question why banks exist, a rather complex combination 
of existing economic theories, the lack of alternatives and the fact that 
banks exist for over 5.000 years seem to provide convincing evidence of 
the finding with 75% of respondents agreeing to the hypothesis.  
H.1.4. With current supervision and regulation on banks one can 
be confident about low systemic risks (mean of 3.42 SD .994 - 
undecided) 
Table 19 Cross tabulation H.1.4. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * with current supervision and regulation on banks...confident of low systemic risks
Crosstabulation
2 15 13 21 7 58
3,4% 25,9% 22,4% 36,2% 12,1% 100,0%
3 13 19 5 40
7,5% 32,5% 47,5% 12,5% 100,0%
2 3 2 1 8
25,0% 37,5% 25,0% 12,5% 100,0%
2 20 29 42 13 106
1,9% 18,9% 27,4% 39,6% 12,3% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
with current supervision and regulation on banks...confident of low
systemic risks
Total
 
The above cross-tab calculation provides rather inconclusive 
results, other than that 60% of the companies seem to disagree that 
with current supervision and regulation one can be confident about low 
systemic risks. In the recalculation of mean by comparing between 
groups, one learns, however that the hypothesis gets rejected by both 
companies with a mean of 3.65 and standard deviation of .802, as well 
as by the respondents from Latin America with 3.63 and a standard 
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deviation of .866. These findings then seem to confirm the view that 
these segments of the market are not of the opinion that there are low 
systemic risks, with current supervisions and regulation on banks. 
Again, with several Latin American countries recently suffering banking 
crises, these can hardly be called surprising.  
Table 20 (i) and (ii) Mean, frequency distribution per region (i) sectors (ii), and Std. deviation 
H.1.4. 
with current supervision and regulation on banks...confident of
low systemic risks  * bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5)
with current supervision and regulation on banks...confident of low
systemic risks
3,28 58 1,089
3,65 40 ,802
3,25 8 1,035
3,42 106 ,994
bank (1), company (2)
or others (3) (S1.5)bank
company
other
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
 
with current supervision and regulation on banks...confident
of low systemic risks  * Europe (1),  Latin Am (2), others (3)
with current supervision and regulation on banks...confident
of low systemic risks
3,22 54 1,058
3,63 48 ,866
3,50 4 1,291
3,42 106 ,994
Europe (1),  Latin
Am (2), others (3)Europe
Latin America
Others
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
 
These conclusions are furthermore rather consistent with the 
findings of Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), which report on systemic 
banking crises in several high income OECD countries including Japan 
(1991 – present), Finland (1991-1994), Norway (1987-1993), Spain 
(1977-1985), Sweden (1991), and for example on border-line non-
systemic banking crises with the savings and loan institution, for 
example, The United States (1984-1991), where 1,300 banks failed 
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(costs US$ 180 billion or 3% of GDP). Subsequently it seems not to 
dependant on country and/or region, but can affect any country.  
H.1.5. Banks play a crucial, mostly constructive role within the 
world economy (Mean of 2.22 and SD .828 accepted). 
 
Table 21 Cross tabulation H.1.5. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * banks play a crucial, mostly constructive role within the world economy Crosstabulation
12 36 7 3 58
20,7% 62,1% 12,1% 5,2% 100,0%
1 27 5 6 1 40
2,5% 67,5% 12,5% 15,0% 2,5% 100,0%
1 4 2 1 8
12,5% 50,0% 25,0% 12,5% 100,0%
14 67 14 10 1 106
13,2% 63,2% 13,2% 9,4% ,9% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
banks play a crucial, mostly constructive role within the world
economy
Total
 
This finding with more than 75% agreeing and strongly agreeing 
clearly suggests that respondents agree with the hypothesis that banks 
play a crucial and mostly constructive role within the world economy, 
this being in line with current economic theories. An interesting 
difference, although, can be observed between banks and companies, 
where banks seem to be rather more convinced about their positive and 
constructive role in the world economy (and companies tending to 
remain undecided) as shown in the following table: 
Table 22 Mean, frequency distribution per sector and Std. Deviation H.1.5. 
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banks play a crucial, mostly constructive role within the world
economy  * bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5)
banks play a crucial, mostly constructive role within the world
economy
2,02 58 ,737
2,48 40 ,877
2,38 8 ,916
2,22 106 ,828
bank (1), company (2)
or others (3) (S1.5)bank
company
other
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
 
 
H.1.6. With increased knowledge and modern techniques in 
finance, the role of relationship in bank -client relations will diminish 
(Mean of 3.38 SD 1.125 undecided). 
Table 23 Cross tabulation H 1.6. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * with increased knowledge and modern techniques in finance... role of relationship will
diminish Crosstabulation
2 12 6 32 6 58
3,4% 20,7% 10,3% 55,2% 10,3% 100,0%
5 7 5 20 3 40
12,5% 17,5% 12,5% 50,0% 7,5% 100,0%
1 1 1 4 1 8
12,5% 12,5% 12,5% 50,0% 12,5% 100,0%
8 20 12 56 10 106
7,5% 18,9% 11,3% 52,8% 9,4% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
with increased knowledge and modern techniques in finance... role
of relationship will diminish
Total
 
62% of the respondents disagreeing with the question posed to 
them, seems to imply that a majority is still of the opinion that the 
concept of relationship banking is here to stay for a while. No 
improvement in the findings could be obtained between groups 
comparison, and also at these levels, standard deviations remain too 
high for any reasonable observation.  It is here where the sub-
hypotheses provide further insight and clarification.  
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H.1.6.1. Most companies tend to act opportunistically in their 
bank relations (Mean of 2.77 and SD 1.107 undecided). 
Table 24 Cross tabulation H.1.6.1. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * most companies tend to act opportunistically in their bank relations Crosstabulation
5 24 9 18 2 58
8,6% 41,4% 15,5% 31,0% 3,4% 100,0%
4 14 7 13 2 40
10,0% 35,0% 17,5% 32,5% 5,0% 100,0%
2 4 1 1 8
25,0% 50,0% 12,5% 12,5% 100,0%
11 42 17 32 4 106
10,4% 39,6% 16,0% 30,2% 3,8% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
most companies tend to act opportunistically in their bank relations
Total
 
Calculation between different groups did not reveal any additional 
findings. With 50% of respondents acknowledging that most companies 
tend to act opportunistically in their bank relations, it is indicated that 
the concept of relationship banking is not that strong, at least within 
this specific sample.  Calculation on different groups did not reveal any 
additional findings. 
Conference quote Mr. Roberto Gazze (page 47); What Vicentin 
seeks in relationships with banks:  
• Continuity  
• Consistency 
• Commitment (especially personal) 
• Professionalism 
• Competitiveness in costs and service 
• Chemistry and frequent contact 
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All these points are in theory what one has to try to achieve with 
friendly banks. These are concepts that one tries to achieve in 
relationships with banks.  But if you look carefully, these concepts should 
be applied not only to relationships with banks but with friends, wives, 
girlfriends, partners, with people from the football team…  That these 
items converge at the same time is quite difficult in a normal relationship, 
and even more so in relationships with banks.  Many times these 
concepts are affected by matters completely beyond the relationship 
itself.  We Argentines – well, I believe that people from the whole region 
can relate to this –have not only suffered but even caused some crises 
ourselves. 
 
H.1.6.2. Banks are considered by most clients as a necessary evil 
(Mean of 2.95 SD 1.124 undecided) 
Table 25 Cross tabulation H.1.6.2. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * banks are considered by most clients as a necessary evil Crosstabulation
1 23 4 25 5 58
1,7% 39,7% 6,9% 43,1% 8,6% 100,0%
3 20 3 12 2 40
7,5% 50,0% 7,5% 30,0% 5,0% 100,0%
1 4 2 1 8
12,5% 50,0% 25,0% 12,5% 100,0%
5 47 9 38 7 106
4,7% 44,3% 8,5% 35,8% 6,6% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
banks are considered by most clients as a necessary evil
Total
 
Conference quote Mr. Osvaldo Bertone (page 52); My challenge, 
facing an audience like this one, is not an easy one.  I was told that I had 
to discuss the issue of whether banks are a necessary evil or what.  I 
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think that this title is a little bit aggressive.  In ACA we carried out a few 
studies, not for this seminar but because we wanted to know how to deal 
with or position ourselves in our relationships with banks.  We have 
always thought that a bank is a partner, not a partner in the sense of 
owning shares, and more so in our case, as in a cooperative it is 
impossible for a bank to be a partner, as Karl was saying earlier; but 
rather a partner in the sense of being a participant in our business, a 
helper in our business, someone who knows it well.   
With a 57.5% of companies to confirm the hypothesis, and over 
40% of the banks sharing this feeling, produces a result which can be 
supporting different claims and points towards the finding of the 
confidential internal survey8 of a major bank, where 2000 corporate 
clients reported to prefer to work without a bank (if they only could) 
which can be illustrated looking at the substantial difference in the 
mean between groups;  
Table 26 Mean, frequency distribution per sector and Std. Deviation H.1.6.2. 
banks are considered by most clients as a necessary evil  *
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5)
banks are considered by most clients as a necessary evil
3,17 58 1,110
2,75 40 1,127
2,38 8 ,916
2,95 106 1,124
bank (1), company (2)
or others (3) (S1.5)bank
company
other
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
 
The finding reported above can support two different claims: (1) 
That the concept of “relationship” in banking is rather different from 
what is often interpreted as a relationship. There may be some 
                                                 
8 The author has been involved in a major survey amongst client in a large international bank, details of 
which are not available 
 250 
confusion on the questions as to what a relationship bank or 
housebank actually represents, or as Mr. Paul van Heerde commented 
(conference paper page 105); what they consider to be a relationship 
bank, and what we consider to be a relationship bank. That difference is 
not entirely clear to me, maybe that’s something worth a discussion later 
on.  
(2) That the appreciation of banks perhaps is rather different 
depending from which perspective a question is asked, as can be seen 
in the following calculation, where the difference between Latin America 
and Europe is notable, despite the rather large standard deviations; 
Table 27 Mean, frequency distribution per region and Std, deviation H.1.6.2. 
banks are considered by most clients as a necessary evil 
* Europe (1),  Latin Am (2), others (3)
banks are considered by most clients as a necessary evil
3,15 54 1,106
2,69 48 1,114
3,50 4 1,000
2,95 106 1,124
Europe (1),  Latin
Am (2), others (3)Europe
Latin America
Others
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
 
Conference quote Mr. Karl Weinfurtner (page 41); We consider 
regional know-how is very important, but at the same time sectorial 
know-how is regarded as a key issue.  We would like that our project 
managers when they come to you are able to understand your business, 
that they can do a smooth risk-oriented appraisal of the project so they 
should not come to you and stay in agricultural terms and tell you “Oh, 
what a wonderful cow”, and you have to tell them that it is a bull. 
 H.1.6.3. Housebanks play an important and largely positive role 
in the process of corporate control; and borrowers with a strong bank–
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borrower relationship receive more competitive credit on average. (Mean 
of 2.29 and SD .850 - accepted) 
…..and this is really relationship banking, that you are so involved 
with this that you feel it, you can smell it (Bengt Hallqvist, conference 
quote page 74).   
Table 28 Cross tabulation H.1.6.3. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * housebanks play important and positive role in the process of corporate
control; and borrowers with strong bank-borrower relationship receive more competitive credit on average
Crosstabulation
9 35 8 6 58
15,5% 60,3% 13,8% 10,3% 100,0%
4 23 7 6 40
10,0% 57,5% 17,5% 15,0% 100,0%
5 1 2 8
62,5% 12,5% 25,0% 100,0%
13 63 16 14 106
12,3% 59,4% 15,1% 13,2% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
housebanks play important and positive role in the
process of corporate control; and borrowers with
strong bank-borrower relationship receive more
competitive credit on average
Total
 
Conference quote Mr. Rafael Bonasso (pag 35); So in a f ew words, 
what I believe the new model is, a model that we believe is always in 
place, not only in the good times but also in bad times.  It is a real 
partnership between banks and corporates, where we all share the risks 
and rewards.   
Although the concept of housebanks may not be universally 
known (special reference to findings in North Western European 
countries) the confirmation of the hypothesis, with nearly 72%, 
confirms that a housebank (strong relationship bank), is expected to 
produce positive results and effects on either improved corporate 
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control as well as more competitive credit for the client. This seems to 
indicate that depending on the quality and the depth of the relationship 
(housebank), the appreciation for the concept may be very positively 
interpreted, especially seen from the Latin American perspective which 
is illustrated is the following table; 
Table 29 Mean, frequency distribution per region and Std. deviation H.1.6.3. 
housebanks play important and positive role in the process
of corporate control; and borrowers with strong
bank-borrower relationship receive more competitive
credit on average  * Europe (1),  Latin Am (2), others (3)
housebanks play important and positive role in the process of
corporate control; and borrowers with strong bank-borrower
relationship receive more competitive credit on average
2,41 54 ,901
2,21 48 ,798
1,75 4 ,500
2,29 106 ,850
Europe (1),  Latin
Am (2), others (3)Europe
Latin America
Others
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
 
Conference quote Mr. Bengt Hallqvist (page 73); Here we come into 
relationship banking, and that is:  everyone concerned must understand 
the family company, even the family company themselves.  And of course 
the bankers. In relationship banking, and also if you are involved as an 
outside director or even for the families themselves to understand, you 
have to know them all, including in-laws.  Very often problems are 
generated through the in-laws.  They have not the same feeling of family 
connection as those who really are the bloodlines, and it’s very often that 
problems start that way.  You have to understand the family problems, in 
relationship banking you have to have a feeling of what’s going on… and 
Now it’s very, very important, and this is really relationship 
banking, that you are so involved with this that you feel it, you can smell 
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it.  And maybe you can as a banker or as another family member start 
doing things to avoid a catastrophe.   
4.4. Summary of calculation of mean, frequencies and standard 
deviation: 
 
 Table 30 Summary means, frequencies and Std. Deviation H.1 - H 1.6 
Report
2,79 2,33 2,10 3,28 2,02 3,48 2,79 3,17 2,19
58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
,951 1,066 ,931 1,089 ,737 1,047 1,088 1,110 ,826
3,28 2,08 2,18 3,65 2,48 3,23 2,88 2,75 2,38
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
1,037 ,944 ,874 ,802 ,877 1,209 1,137 1,127 ,868
3,13 1,75 1,75 3,25 2,38 3,38 2,13 2,38 2,63
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
,835 ,707 ,463 1,035 ,916 1,302 ,991 ,916 ,916
3,00 2,19 2,10 3,42 2,22 3,38 2,77 2,95 2,29
106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106
,995 1,006 ,883 ,994 ,828 1,125 1,107 1,124 ,850
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
bank (1), company (2)
or others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
Total
in general
banks
seem to be
competent
with
regards to
understandi
ng risks
bank clients
would be
benefited if
banks were
rated in terms
of clients
satisfaction
the long
history in
banking and
the lack of
alternatives
means that
banks will
continue to
exist
with current
supervision
and
regulation on
banks...
confident of
low systemic
risks
banks play a
crucial, mostly
constructive
role within the
world
economy
with
increased
knowledge
and modern
techniques in
finance... role
of relationship
will diminish
most
companies
tend to act
opportunistica
lly in their
bank relations
banks are
considered by
most clients
as a
necessary evil
housebanks
play important
and positive
role in the
process of
corporate
control; and
borrowers
with strong
bank-borrowe
r relationship
receive more
competitive
credit on
average
 
4.5. Findings of hypothesis H2: Credit and credit rating 
 
The role of rating agencies such as Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s 
and Fitch-IBCA has increased during the last decades. Both country 
credit ratings as well as company credit ratings have become 
indispensable tools in today’ s finance. Also as a result of Basel II rating 
will become more important, yet most of the rating is done on the basis 
of hard factors, those which can be objectively measured. Findings in 
both literature and during the conference indicated however that there 
are many aspects which are not that easy to measure as is illustrated in 
the following quote:  
Conference quote Mr. Ricardo Zerbino (page 81); on management 
quality: we believe that this is very important, it has been mentioned here 
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in other presentations, the quality of the people is the most important 
element of the company.  Machines and technology can be bought, but 
what makes performance different in the market is the quality of 
customer service, and profitability has a lot to do with management and 
direction.     
 
H.2.1. The role of credit rating agencies generally can be 
described as constructive and a valuable complementary tool. (Mean of 
2.25 SD .976 - accepted) 
Table 31 Cross tabulation H.2.1. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * the role of credit rating agencies generally can be describes as constructive and a
valuable complementary tool Crosstabulation
3 38 9 7 1 58
5,2% 65,5% 15,5% 12,1% 1,7% 100,0%
5 19 9 6 1 40
12,5% 47,5% 22,5% 15,0% 2,5% 100,0%
1 5 2 8
12,5% 62,5% 25,0% 100,0%
9 62 18 15 2 106
8,5% 58,5% 17,0% 14,2% 1,9% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
the role of credit rating agencies generally can be describes as
constructive and a valuable complementary tool
Total
 
The finding confirms the hypothesis with 67% to agree and 17% 
undecided and is also confirmed by the following quote; 
Conference quote Mr Osvaldo Bertone (page 54); We have also 
rated ACA in order to provide additional information to our banks, if we 
want to be their partners, we want them to know who their partner is. We 
have tried to create trust, beyond the figures we may provide;  
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And, Mr. Ricardo Zerbino (page 80);  we should consider that 
credit rating, with all its imperfections, is a tool which is very useful for 
private investors, for institutional investors who act in the capital market 
and also for financial institutions, particularly banks, because it is a 
reference element which is very important, which complements auditing, 
which only gives us a vision of what has happened up to that moment, 
and can give us a glimpse of the solidity and the financial structure of the 
company, but it does not look beyond in general terms.  Rating considers 
the risk factors of the issuer and the systemic factors.  It considers the 
elements of risk associated with the macro economy of the country, it 
takes into account the possibilities of growth of the country where the 
company is located, the risk of devaluation, how the credit market is in 
general, what risk there is in the banking system.  It also measures the 
tendencies concerning inflation and how they can affect the companies, 
combined with devaluation, in accordance with the structure of the 
liabilities, taking into account local currency, foreign currency, and what 
position the company has in terms of currencies and its liabilities.  It 
analyzes factors of the company, of the industry, of the operational 
aspects, and it also analyzes factors of the economic environment or 
macroeconomic factors.  It also takes into account political, institutional, 
legal, regulatory factors, fiscal risks, it takes into account cultural aspects 
of the country, and this has been mentioned a lot between yesterday and 
today, cultural aspects are very important when a company’s ability to 
develop in certain fields is being judged.  Basically it also provides an 
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outlook of the future from the present financial situation of the issuer, and 
its projection for the future.   
  
H.2.2. Credit rating agencies, despite their long history and 
expertise do not really possess competencies, which may prevent 
default risk (Mean of 2.25 and SD of 1.005 - accepted). 
 
Conference quote Mr. Ricardi Zerbino (page 80); A last comment is 
that (rating is not so useful) in periods of good economic progress.  This 
may sound difficult to understand, but I would say that in the same way 
as one looks at a lighthouse that has a real use at night when it is dark, 
and vision is imperfect, a good rating is also like a lighthouse in the 
middle of the night or in stormy periods.  It makes a company different 
from another in the market, it is a firm sign for doubtful investors, or 
scared investors, it is a basic element for institutional investors, so I 
believe that this value is a lot greater than in periods of progress when 
the markets are growing and investors are willing to take more risks, 
when an investor wishes to widen the scope of his investments and in 
general investors are not scared of risk factors pertaining to the 
environment.  
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Table 32 Cross tabulation H.2.1. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * credit rating agencies, despite long history and expertise don't posses competencies,
which may prevent default risk Crosstabulation
9 31 8 9 1 58
15,5% 53,4% 13,8% 15,5% 1,7% 100,0%
6 21 7 4 2 40
15,0% 52,5% 17,5% 10,0% 5,0% 100,0%
2 4 2 8
25,0% 50,0% 25,0% 100,0%
17 56 15 15 3 106
16,0% 52,8% 14,2% 14,2% 2,8% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
credit rating agencies, despite long history and expertise don't
posses competencies, which may prevent default risk
Total
 
Conference quote Mr. Rafael Bonasso (page 58); We know that a 
rating at the end of the day is a third party that analyzes how the bank 
is today, things might change in the future. 
Despite the fact that under hypothesis (H.2.1.) credit rating was 
positively evaluated as a complementary tool, the finding on this 
hypothesis brings to doubt the general assumption regarding credit 
rating agencies (despite their 100 year of experience) to help preventing 
default risks effectively. This leads to the following hypothesis, whether 
their role should be more critically accessed.    
H.2.3. The role of credit rating agencies should be more critically 
assessed and their influence (oligopoly) in finance should be reduced 
(Mean of 2.25 and SD .976 - accepted). 
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Table 33 Cross tabulation H.2.3. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * the role of credit rating agencies should be more critically assessed and their influence in
finance should be reduced Crosstabulation
12 28 7 10 1 58
20,7% 48,3% 12,1% 17,2% 1,7% 100,0%
8 22 5 4 1 40
20,0% 55,0% 12,5% 10,0% 2,5% 100,0%
7 1 8
87,5% 12,5% 100,0%
20 57 13 14 2 106
18,9% 53,8% 12,3% 13,2% 1,9% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
the role of credit rating agencies should be more critically assessed
and their influence in finance should be reduced
Total
 
With both banks and companies (and others) overwhelmingly 
agreeing with the statement, this seems to confirm the findings of the 
literature (Chapter 2, section 2.2.) in that the role of ratings agencies 
and their influences is under scrutiny. This does not cover, however, 
that improved internal rating by banks following Basel II should be 
regarding the same. This clearly was left aside in the question.   
Conference quote Mr. Ricardo Zerbino (page 81); So to conclude, 
credit rating is a necessary tool, as all tools it is imperfect, and we have 
already seen that it does not necessarily provide security, nor has it 
prevented crises in different markets of the world, but it’s very useful for 
investors, it’s useful for the issuers, because it helps the issuing company 
to revise and focus on its risk factors, and I would say that it is 
indispensable for the development of the capital market.  
H.2.4. The credit analysis process of a credit rating agency and 
those of a housebank are comparable in terms of depth and quality 
(Mean of 3.35 and SD .957 - undecided). 
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Conference quote Mr. Jan Portegies (page 88); Linking it perhaps 
to Mr. Zerbino’s presentation from a little while back, it may improve your 
credit rating, although perhaps today we may not see substantial 
evidence that credit rating agencies are quantifying the aspects of 
corporate governance in their rating of the company, but we are confident 
that it is inevitable as we go along corporate governance will be 
something that these agencies will take a look at more closely, and if you 
are in good shape in respect of that, in the end it may also mean that you 
pay a lower price for your credit.  
Table 34 Cross tabulation H.2.4. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * the credit analysis process of a credit rating agency and those of a house bank are
comparable in terms of depth and quality Crosstabulation
14 14 28 2 58
24,1% 24,1% 48,3% 3,4% 100,0%
4 6 12 16 2 40
10,0% 15,0% 30,0% 40,0% 5,0% 100,0%
1 4 2 1 8
12,5% 50,0% 25,0% 12,5% 100,0%
4 21 30 46 5 106
3,8% 19,8% 28,3% 43,4% 4,7% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
the credit analysis process of a credit rating agency and those of a
house bank are comparable in terms of depth and quality
Total
 
The 28.3% of total respondents undecided seems to indicate that 
the question and the underlying concept were perhaps not too clear to 
all respondents. In order to be able to reply to this question, (practical) 
experiences with both credit rating as well as the credit process of 
banks need to be available. This is not often the case, both with 
bankers as well as with companies. Especially for Latin American 
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companies, external credit rating is a novelty, and only experienced by 
the very large companies which have been having sporadically access to 
capital market instruments. The fact that nearly 50% disagree with the 
hypothesis indicates that a majority (taking the undecided into 
consideration) still supposes that the quality and depth of credit 
analysis between banks and credit rating agencies are not comparable, 
leaving unanswered which one is considered better. 
Conference quote Mr. Karl Weinfurtner (page 85); Most companies 
in Germany have no ratings.  Most are family-owned companies, medium-
size companies, and for them I think there was no necessity in the past 
for a rating, because of the close ties they had to banks, what was called 
housebank, principal bank relationship.  But this will change in the 
future, with Basel II coming. 
 
H.2.5. The new Basel II regulations, to be implemented in 2006, 
will further contribute to a better risk management and control of 
financial institutions and markets (Mean 2.62 and SD .798 undecided) 
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Table 35 Cross tabulation H.2.5. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * the new Basel II regs., implemented 2006, will further contribute to a better risk
management and control of financial instit and markets Crosstabulation
4 27 18 8 1 58
6,9% 46,6% 31,0% 13,8% 1,7% 100,0%
1 9 28 1 1 40
2,5% 22,5% 70,0% 2,5% 2,5% 100,0%
1 5 2 8
12,5% 62,5% 25,0% 100,0%
6 41 48 9 2 106
5,7% 38,7% 45,3% 8,5% 1,9% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
the new Basel II regs., implemented 2006, will further contribute to a
better risk management and control of financial instit and markets
Total
 
Conference quote Mr. Hendrik Lühl (page 59): I think that the 
problem is that the internal approval procedures, at least in the banks, 
and DEG is also governed in Germany by the banking commission, are 
changing.  You have a veto right in these days by a credit department 
and even if the big bosses say “Well, we should do that”, they have a 
veto and these are people who do not travel.  I mean, you can be lucky if 
they have some experience. In DEG luckily they do, these are people who 
come from the operational level.  But this is something that is imposed to 
us by law and it is very difficult to overcome9. 
The most striking observation here is that 70% of the companies 
are still undecided, meaning that they seem to have no opinion yet on 
the meaning and impacts of Basel II. With over 50% of the banks 
supporting the claim that Basel II will contribute to better risk 
                                                 
9 Anecdote: Two members of the board of a large German bank, had agreed to be in favour of a new 
credit ((US$ 25 -50 million), one board member responsible for commercial and the other for risk 
management. The proposal stranded in the newly formed internal credit rating department, who were 
unable to apply an acceptable rating to the credit, given that the standard operating procedures did not 
allow adjusting one of the risk components, given the structure of the transaction. The banks lost the 
business and the client.  
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management of banks and markets, this seems to contradict very recent 
findings of the Centre for Study of Financial Innovation (Banana Skins 
2005). In this report, 440 respondents rank the rise of regulation to be 
the number one risk facing the industry and the costs and distractions 
of regulation, as well as the false sense of security it brings, were the 
main reasons cited for its strong showing (CSFI, 2005).  The industry, 
according to this report, clearly believes that regulators are getting it 
wrong both from a cost perspective, driven by what banks see as an 
excessive focus on consumer protection, and from too much complexity, 
which is seen as killing competition and promoting a herd instinct in 
financial institutions (CSFI, 2005). It has been observed in many 
meetings during the last few years that bankers, in their contacts with 
clients, frequently referred to Basel II changes and the fact that the 
business subsequently would become more difficult, especially to 
unrated and unsecured clients. Susan Rice, chief executive of Lloyds 
TSN Scotland was quoted in the CSFI report (2005) by saying that; “If 
(banks) take a view that regulations are being ‘done’ to them, they are 
also likely ‘to do’ to their customers, rather than responding to their 
needs and those of the market. Yet that is probably just as important 
for running a business based on pillars of integrity and probity as the 
regulation itself, perhaps more so”    
Conference quote Mr. Osvaldo Bertone (page 52);  I believe that 
knowing people is at least as important as the figures on the balance 
sheet, especially concerning their professionalism and their 
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honourableness. I think that when people are honourable, there may be 
problems, but they can be solved easily.   
In order to check whether the comparison of means between 
groups would substantially change the finding, the following calculation 
has been made, which confirms that the average of banks would be 
more inclined and “others” would indeed to accept the hypothesis; 
Table 36 Mean, frequency distribution by sector and Std. Deviation H.2.5. 
Report
the new Basel II regs., implemented 2006, will further contribute to
a better risk management and control of financial instit and
markets
2,57 58 ,881
2,80 40 ,648
2,13 8 ,641
2,62 106 ,798
bank (1), company (2)
or others (3) (S1.5)bank
company
other
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
 
Conference quote Mr. Rafael Bonasso (page 34); So having said 
this, what are the lessons learnt from the crisis?  …..banks:  you should 
always be looking for the right client, right client that can be defined by 
the following characteristics:  what is the character of the shareholders 
and the management, in tough times is where really you see whether 
companies are willing to share all the information with you, moving into 
the right direction…. 
H.2.6. The new Basel II regulations carry the risk of a further 
widening of the gap between high-income and low-income countries. 
(Mean of 2.73 and SD .900 undecided) 
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Table 37 Cross tabulation H.2.6. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * the new Basel II regs carry the risk of further widening of the gap between high income
and low income countries Crosstabulation
7 17 19 13 2 58
12,1% 29,3% 32,8% 22,4% 3,4% 100,0%
2 12 24 2 40
5,0% 30,0% 60,0% 5,0% 100,0%
3 3 2 8
37,5% 37,5% 25,0% 100,0%
9 32 46 17 2 106
8,5% 30,2% 43,4% 16,0% 1,9% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
the new Basel II regs carry the risk of further widening of the gap
between high income and low income countries
Total
 
Rather inconclusive in its findings, with 43.4 % undecided, it 
should be noted that, although this hypothesis has been strongly 
argued by academics such as Ferri et al  (2001) who suggested that the 
Basel II proposal would increase the volatility of capital needs of banks 
in non-high-income countries vs. high-income countries' banks, it is a 
concept which was practically unknown to practitioners, given that the 
implementation of Basel II was still 2 years away at the time of the 
survey and the concept was at the time still a rather futuristic one.  
Separated by groups we find, however, that the hypothesis is accepted 
from the Latin American perspective, as shown in the table below: 
Table 38 Mean, frequency distribution by region and Std. Deviation H.2.6. 
the new Basel II regs carry the risk of further widening of
the gap between high income and low income countries  *
Europe (1),  Latin Am (2), others (3)
the new Basel II regs carry the risk of further widening of the
gap between high income and low income countries
2,91 54 1,033
2,50 48 ,684
3,00 4 ,816
2,73 106 ,900
Europe (1),  Latin
Am (2), others (3)Europe
Latin America
Others
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
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4.5.1. Summary of calculation of means, frequencies and standard 
deviation: 
 
Table 39 Summary Mean, frequency distribution and Std. Deviation H.2.1 - H.2.6. 
Report
2,40 2,34 2,31 3,31 2,57 2,76
58 58 58 58 58 58
,836 ,983 1,046 ,883 ,881 1,048
2,48 2,38 2,20 3,15 2,80 2,65
40 40 40 40 40 40
,987 1,030 ,966 1,075 ,648 ,662
2,38 2,25 2,13 3,38 2,13 2,88
8 8 8 8 8 8
1,061 1,165 ,354 ,916 ,641 ,835
2,42 2,35 2,25 3,25 2,62 2,73
106 106 106 106 106 106
,904 1,005 ,976 ,957 ,798 ,900
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
bank (1), company (2)
or others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
Total
the role of
credit rating
agencies
generally can
be describes
as
constructive
and a
valuable
complementa
ry tool
credit rating
agencies,
despite long
history and
expertise
don't posses
competencie
s, which may
prevent
default risk
the role of
credit rating
agencies
should be
more critically
assessed
and their
influence in
finance
should be
reduced
the credit
analysis
process of a
credit rating
agency and
those of a
house bank
are
comparable in
terms of depth
and quality
the new Basel
II regs.,
implemented
2006, will
further
contribute to a
better risk
management
and control of
financial instit
and markets
the new Basel
II regs carry
the risk of
further
widening of
the gap
between high
income and
low income
countries
 
4.6. Findings of hypotheses H3: Culture differences 
 
Conference quote Mr. Bengt Hallqvist (page 95); I think the 
important thing is to have a clear idea of what is the best practice.  Now 
the way to go from your current situation to best practice - it’s a long way 
and a lot of companies will never get there.  A lot of cultural differences 
make some of these requirements inadequate or impossible.  So I think 
it’s important to have an idea of what is best practice.  Practically every 
code – and there are maybe 100 codes in the world – they are more or 
less in agreement about most of the basic things.  Now the way to apply 
it, you have to adjust to the situation, you have to adjust to the country, 
to cultural differences, to the size of the company, to the values of the 
company and so on and so forth .  
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H.3.1. Cultural differences have played a role in there having been 
so many accidents (defaults) throughout history in international finance 
(Mean of 2.39 and SD 1.001 - accepted). 
 
Conference quote Mr. Hans Hanegraaf (page 123); And cultural 
differences mainly become apparent when things don’t develop as you 
want or expect, because then you really want to have an answer quickly, 
you say "I want to do this and that this way", because you’re under 
stress and people react very differently.  
Table 40 Cross tabulation H.3.1. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * cultural differences have played a role in there having been so many defaults throughout
history in international finance Crosstabulation
8 27 14 7 2 58
13,8% 46,6% 24,1% 12,1% 3,4% 100,0%
8 16 10 5 1 40
20,0% 40,0% 25,0% 12,5% 2,5% 100,0%
2 5 1 8
25,0% 62,5% 12,5% 100,0%
18 48 24 13 3 106
17,0% 45,3% 22,6% 12,3% 2,8% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
cultural differences have played a role in there having been so many
defaults throughout history in international finance
Total
 
Although with almost 25% undecided both among banks as well 
as companies, the hypothesis was accepted with 62.3% agreeing and 
strongly agreeing with the statement. Given the SD of 1.001 and the 
fact that 25% were undecided, a further breakdown in groups was 
performed showing that European respondents seem to agree even more 
than others with a mean of 2.33 and a SD of .971 whereas the 
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companies respondents measured 2.38 yet with a SD of 1.030 (too 
high). 
Table 41 (i) and (ii) Mean, frequency distribution by sector (i) and region (ii) and Std. Deviation 
H.3.1. 
cultural differences have played a role in there having been so
many defaults throughout history in international finance  *
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5)
cultural differences have played a role in there having been so
many defaults throughout history in international finance
2,45 58 ,994
2,38 40 1,030
2,00 8 ,926
2,39 106 1,001
bank (1), company (2)
or others (3) (S1.5)bank
company
other
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
 
cultural differences have played a role in there having been
so many defaults throughout history in international
finance  * Europe (1),  Latin Am (2), others (3)
cultural differences have played a role in there having been
so many defaults throughout history in international finance
2,33 54 ,971
2,35 48 ,978
3,50 4 1,291
2,39 106 1,001
Europe (1),  Latin
Am (2), others (3)Europe
Latin America
Others
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
 
Conference quote Mr. Karl Weinfurtner (page 40); We are 
interested in long-term relationships and in long term cooperation and I 
think that to have long term relation it requires that you build up mutual 
confidence and understanding.  It requires a type of relationship building.  
Confidence is vital to get through difficult times.  And I think we need to 
take into account different aspects.  For example in DEG we are investing 
in Latin America, in Eastern Europe, in Africa, in Asia.  We have to take 
cultural differences into account.  So we need a specific approach to our 
partners, we don’t want to treat our partners in Asia the same as we 
treat our partners in Latin America because it’s a different cultural 
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perspective, it’s a different cultural approach and we have to take this 
into account. 
 Conference quote Robert Louzada (page 22); The point is that I 
would add that it is not only cultural differences that we have.  We might 
be working very well at the working level, shall we say, with people of 
both countries, but suddenly something changes from outside.  There is 
very strong influence in strategy in different countries not being decided 
by the people who work together, but being decided at other levels of the 
company......It is not only the cultural cooperation in the short term, it is 
more of strategies that start to defer, and start to go one or the other way.  
And then, cooperation does not have any sense any more.  
 
H.3.2. If the bank does not understand the cultural context of a 
particular country or region, it becomes highly doubtful it will 
understand the risks (Mean of 1.60 and SD .657 - accepted). 
Table 42 Cross tabulation H.3.2. 
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bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * if the bank does not understand the cultural context of a
particular country or region, it becomes highly doubtful it will understand the risks Crosstabulation
28 23 7 58
48,3% 39,7% 12,1% 100,0%
17 20 3 40
42,5% 50,0% 7,5% 100,0%
7 1 8
87,5% 12,5% 100,0%
52 44 10 106
49,1% 41,5% 9,4% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided
if the bank does not understand the
cultural context of a particular country or
region, it becomes highly doubtful it will
understand the risks
Total
 
By far the clearest of all responses and at the heart of the thesis, 
this result indicates that a large majority of the respondents support 
the key hypothesis of this thesis, confirming that, whereas there seems 
to be an agreement on the fact that credit risks in large part are related 
to the management competencies - effective corporate governance and 
integrity of management and organization - the argument can be made 
that the assessment of management capabilities, governance and 
integrity may be hindered in those cases where the culture is little 
understood. In other words, if the bank does not understand the 
cultural context of a particular country or region, it becomes highly 
doubtful it will understand the risks.   
 
Conference quote Mr. Nanno Kleiterp (page 7); We have learned a 
lot of lessons from that experience because always in a crisis you see a 
test for the choices you make and it is a test for the relationships you 
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have.  And what we can see is that we may say that during the crisis 
that occurred in Argentina at the end of 2001 and of course the related 
crisis in the financial system in Uruguay, with the effort we invested in 
the client selection ……Of course on the other hand we had some clients 
who ran into difficulties, through a variety of issues such as currency 
mismatches, and also .... insufficient corporate governance and in some 
instances that has even led in those difficult situations to frauds in 
institutions which meant that we had a very difficult time with some of 
our investments. 
Our strategies are built on knowing our business and environment, 
recognizing and adequately mitigating, and building on selected local and 
international partnerships with specialized and focused experience.  
And , Mr. Osvaldo Bertone (page 53); With regard to risks, I spoke 
about two types:  company risk and country risk.  Unfortunately I am old 
enough to refer to my experience.  I have been in ACA for 31 years, and 
only recently I became the general manager.  Before that I was always 
strongly involved in the financial area.  So I have gone through crises, as 
many as those of you who are not so young either may recall, crisis like 
Sacetru, the Falkland Island crisis, hyperinflation, the tequila effect, etc.  
We have had relationships with several banks.  Which were the banks 
who overcame those problems without going down themselves?  It were 
the banks who knew Argentina........... The risk was higher, but so was 
the spread.   
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H.3.3. Capabilities to make friends, combined with common sense 
ensure healthy bank-client relations (Mean of 2.17 and SD of 1.046 - 
accepted).  
To my way of thinking, the most important rule of establishing a 
relationship is to show an interest in your subject (Mr. Fred Arnold, 
conference quote page 102). 
Table 43 Cross tabulation H.3.3. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * capabilities to make friends, combined with common sense ensure healthy bank-client
relations Crosstabulation
17 22 7 10 2 58
29,3% 37,9% 12,1% 17,2% 3,4% 100,0%
9 25 3 1 2 40
22,5% 62,5% 7,5% 2,5% 5,0% 100,0%
1 6 1 8
12,5% 75,0% 12,5% 100,0%
27 53 11 11 4 106
25,5% 50,0% 10,4% 10,4% 3,8% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
capabilities to make friends, combined with common sense ensure
healthy bank-client relations
Total
 
Conference quote Mr. Osvaldo Bertone (page 58); Therefore in ACA 
we have always privileged long-term relationships with banks.  In spite 
of the fact that the people have changed, we have relationships of more 
than 30 years with certain banks, very fruitful relationships, with ups 
and downs, and with a few arguments in the middle, as it should be.  I 
do not think that anyone gets on so well with a wife that there are never 
any arguments!   At least in my case, I think that there are more 
arguments than necessary, but I think that with banks, the same criteria 
should apply.  I believe that this is a very important point. In the case of 
ACA, and I am not saying this because in this environment it is easy to 
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say, we prefer to work with European banks.  We decided that we did 
not want to work with US banks.  The reason for this is that we do not 
want opportunity business.  We want long-term commitment.  This is an 
ACA policy which was defined a long time ago.   
The hypothesis was derived from a statement from Edward T. Hall 
(1996) where he argued that after a life-long study of the subject of 
transnational management, he had come to conclude that of all the 
capabilities managers should have in order to operate successfully, the 
far most important one was the capability of making friends in other 
cultures. The findings confirm that respondents tend to agree with the 
statement, with perhaps the additional argument that from a Latin 
American perspective, even more attention is paid to friendship, as is 
shown by the following; 
Table 44 Mean, frequency distribution per region and Std. Deviation H.3.3. 
  
capabilities to make friends, combined with common
sense ensure healthy bank-client relations  * Europe (1), 
Latin Am (2), others (3)
capabilities to make friends, combined with common sense
ensure healthy bank-client relations
2,22 54 1,058
2,02 48 1,000
3,25 4 ,957
2,17 106 1,046
Europe (1),  Latin
Am (2), others (3)Europe
Latin America
Others
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
 
And sub-hypotheses; 
 
H.3.3.1 Clients of banks would be benefited if banks were rated in 
terms of clients’ satisfaction (Mean of 2.02 and SD .946 accepted). 
Table 45 Cross tabulation H.3.3.1. 
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bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * the quality of a bank should also be rated in accordance with client satisfaction
Crosstabulation
11 37 1 9 58
19,0% 63,8% 1,7% 15,5% 100,0%
16 19 1 2 2 40
40,0% 47,5% 2,5% 5,0% 5,0% 100,0%
2 5 1 8
25,0% 62,5% 12,5% 100,0%
29 61 3 11 2 106
27,4% 57,5% 2,8% 10,4% 1,9% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
the quality of a bank should also be rated in accordance with client
satisfaction
Total
 
This table contains a very important finding of this study with 
over 85% of the respondents either agreeing or strong agreeing with the 
hypothesis. This finding correlates with hypothesis H.1.2. [Clients of 
banks would be benefited if banks were rated in terms of client’s 
satisfaction (mean of 2.19 SD .95 accepted)].  It has been the only 
specific question which verifies whether respondents have been 
consistent in their approach to the questionnaire. Although the framing 
of the question has another dimension, the essence of the question 
remains fairly the same. The finding confirms that the role and place of 
banks in the market is special (Corrigan 1982, 2000) since the 
marketing of banking products is rarely a product of client research and 
needs. 
 
H.3.3.2. The commitment of most relationship banks depends 
largely on the weather (Umbrella whilst the sun is out, requesting it 
back when clouds appear) (Mean of 2.58 and SD 1,162 - undecided). 
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Conference quote Mr.  Roberto Gazze; It is not pleasant to feel 
unprotected. 
Table 46 Cross tabulation H.3.3.2. 
bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5) * the commitment of most relationship banks depends largely on the weather
Crosstabulation
6 26 6 15 5 58
10,3% 44,8% 10,3% 25,9% 8,6% 100,0%
9 17 4 9 1 40
22,5% 42,5% 10,0% 22,5% 2,5% 100,0%
1 5 2 8
12,5% 62,5% 25,0% 100,0%
16 48 12 24 6 106
15,1% 45,3% 11,3% 22,6% 5,7% 100,0%
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
Count
% within bank (1),
company (2) or
others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
bank (1), company
(2) or others (3)
(S1.5)
Total
strongly agree agree undecided disagree
strongly
disagree
the commitment of most relationship banks depends largely on the
weather
Total
 
Given a standard deviation of 1.162 and a mean above 2.5 the 
hypothesis remains undecided. A further breakdown into groups has 
been made, leading to an interesting observation: separated between 
groups, both companies with a mean 2.40 (SD 1.150) but particularly 
subjects from Latin America  with a mean of 2.29 and a standard 
deviation of 1.031, show more acceptance with the hypothesis, albeit a 
too high standard deviation. This could be expected and is consistent 
with the experiences that Latin American companies have had with the 
commitment of their banks during the several banking (and other) 
crises that have taken place, which have lead them to believe that 
banks walk away every now and than when the weather gets tough.  
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Table 47 (i) and (ii) Mean, frequency distribution per sector (i) and region (ii) and Std. Deviation 
H.3.3.2. 
the commitment of most relationship banks depends largely on
the weather  * bank (1), company (2) or others (3) (S1.5)
the commitment of most relationship banks depends largely on
the weather
2,78 58 1,200
2,40 40 1,150
2,13 8 ,641
2,58 106 1,162
bank (1), company (2)
or others (3) (S1.5)bank
company
other
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
 
the commitment of most relationship banks depends largely
on the weather  * Europe (1),  Latin Am (2), others (3)
the commitment of most relationship banks depends largely
on the weather
2,76 54 1,196
2,29 48 1,031
3,75 4 1,258
2,58 106 1,162
Europe (1),  Latin
Am (2), others (3)Europe
Latin America
Others
Total
Mean N Std. Deviation
 
Conference quote Mr. Hendrik Lühl (page 12) To summarize, DEG 
is a long-term partner.  We come when the weather is bad and we do not 
run away when the weather is bad.  
Conference quote Mr. Rafael Bonasso (page 33); …..in Argentina, 
no matter that in the macro context there was a sovereign  default, there 
were scarce financial resources, there was a strong devaluation, unstable 
political environment, and economic recession, we were able to do 
business………..but it is clear that during tough times many friends 
disappear.   
And, not in relation to the former speaker, but rather aiming at 
those banks who had decided to leave – or step out the business at the 
midst of the crises; 
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Mr. Henk van der Heiden (page 56); Again you are saying the right 
thing, but where were the banks in the meantime?......but in the past two 
or three years there were very serious problems, and when there are two 
or three years without liquidity, because of the lack of cooperation of the 
institutions, one doesn’t exist any more as a company.   
 
4.6.1. Summary of calculation of means and standard deviation: 
 
Table 48 Summary Mean, frequencies and Std. Deviation H-3.1.- H 3.3. 
Report
2,45 1,64 2,28 2,14 2,78 2,33
58 58 58 58 58 58
,994 ,693 1,167 ,907 1,200 1,066
2,38 1,65 2,05 1,88 2,40 2,08
40 40 40 40 40 40
1,030 ,622 ,932 1,042 1,150 ,944
2,00 1,13 2,00 1,88 2,13 1,75
8 8 8 8 8 8
,926 ,354 ,535 ,641 ,641 ,707
2,39 1,60 2,17 2,02 2,58 2,19
106 106 106 106 106 106
1,001 ,657 1,046 ,946 1,162 1,006
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
bank (1), company (2)
or others (3) (S1.5)
bank
company
other
Total
cultural
differences
have played a
role in there
having been
so many
defaults
throughout
history in
international
finance
if the bank
does not
understand
the cultural
context of a
particular
country or
region, it
becomes
highly doubtful
it will
understand
the risks
capabilities to
make friends,
combined
with common
sense ensure
healthy
bank-client
relations
the quality of a
bank should
also be rated
in accordance
with client
satisfaction
the
commitment
of most
relationship
banks
depends
largely on the
weather
bank clients
would be
benefited if
banks were
rated in terms
of clients
satisfaction
 
 
4.7. Summary of findings of the research hypotheses: 
 
A table is provided below in order to provide a clear overview of 
the key findings of the research.   The terminology used to assign a 
result on the findings varies from (1) “not tested” (which as it has been 
explained, is the case for several hypotheses not discussed at the 
conference), which were 10 out of the total of 20; (2) “undecided” for the 
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hypothesis where the mean value shows 2,5 < µ  < 3,5 or where in-
conclusive results were obtained during the conference and; (3) 
“rejected” where  µ  = 3,5 or where the conference findings indicated 
disagreement with the hypothesis (this confirmed by specific quotes); 
and (4) “accepted” where  µ = 2,5  or where conference findings confirm 
the same.   
Table 49 Summary of finding on the hypotheses 
 
 
  SUMMARY FINDINGS   
      
questionnaire 
findings 
questionnaire 
findings 
questionnaire 
findings 
Hypothesis  
literature 
findings 
conference 
findings total  banks companies 
H.1.1. In general banks seem to be very 
competent with regard to understanding 
risks.  
accepted not tested undecided accepted undecided 
H.1.2. Clients of banks would be 
benefited if banks were rated in terms of 
client’s satisfaction 
undecided not tested accepted accepted accepted 
H.1.2.1. The quality of a bank should also 
be rated  in accordance with client 
satisfaction 
undecided not tested accepted accepted accepted 
H.1.3. The long history in banking and 
the lack of alternatives means that banks 
will continue to exist for many more 
years 
accepted not tested accepted accepted accepted 
H.1.4. With current supervision and 
regulation on banks one can be confident 
about low systemic risks 
accepted not tested 
undecided 
(*)/accepted undecided undecided 
H.1.5. Banks play a crucial mostly 
constructive role within the world 
economy 
accepted not tested accepted accepted accepted 
H.1.6. With increased knowledge and 
modern techniques in finance the role of 
relationship in bank -client relations will 
diminish  
accepted not tested undecided undecided undecided 
H.1.6.1. Most companies tend to act 
opportunistically in their bank-relations   
accepted not tested undecided undecided undecided 
H.1.6.2. Banks are considered by most 
clients as a necessary evil 
undecided rejected undecided undecided undecided 
H.1.6.3. Housebanks play an important 
and largely positive role in the process of 
corporate control; and borrowers with a 
strong bank–borrower relationship 
receive more competitive credit on 
average. 
accepted accepted accepted accepted accepted 
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H.2.1. The role of credit rating agencies 
generally can be described as constructive 
and a valuable complementary tool. 
accepted accepted accepted accepted accepted 
H.2.2. Credit rating agencies, despite 
their long history and expertise do not 
really possess competencies, which may 
prevent default risk.  
undecided accepted accepted accepted accepted 
H.2.3. The role of credit rating agencies 
should be more crit ically assessed and 
their influence (oligopoly) in finance 
should be reduced.  
undecided undecided accepted accepted accepted 
H.2.4. The credit analysis process of a 
credit rating agency and those of a 
housebank are comparable in terms of 
depth and quality. 
undecided undecided undecided undecided undecided 
H.2.5. The new Basel II regulations, to be 
implemented in 2006, will further 
contribute to a better risk management 
and control of financial institutions and 
markets.  
undecided undecided undecided undecided undecided 
H.2.6. The new Basel II regulations carry 
the risk of a further widening of the gap 
between high income and low income 
countries. 
accepted not tested 
undecided 
(*)/accepted undecided undecided 
H.3.1. Cultural differences have played a 
role in there having been so many 
accidents (defaults) throughout history in 
international finance.  
undecided not tested accepted accepted accepted 
H.3.2. If the bank does not understand the 
cultural context of a particular country or 
region, it becomes highly doubtful it will 
understand the risks 
undecided accepted accepted accepted accepted 
H.3.3. Capabilities to make friends, 
combined with common sense ensure 
healthy bank-client relations 
undecided accepted accepted accepted accepted 
H.3.3.2. The commitment of most 
relationship banks depends largely on the 
weather (Umbrella whilst the sun is out, 
requesting it back when clouds appear). 
accepted undecided accepted accepted accepted 
 
(*) Between group analysis lead for Latin American respondents to 
accepted 
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CHAPTER 5 - DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO FURTHER RESEARCH AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1. Introduction: 
 
The final chapter of the thesis will provide a discussion as concise 
as possible, limitations of the results, a review of possible 
recommendations for further research and the conclusions of this 
research. It has not been an easy journey, yet a very satisfying one, 
which hopefully will be appreciated by as many of the colleagues in the 
field of cross border finance, especially all of those who have willingly 
participated in the conference and the questionnaire.  Certainly the 
findings will be communicated to them in an appropriate form, as it can 
not be expected for people to read through the entire doctorate thesis.  
It will depend to a large extent on the feedback in the coming period 
whether some of the findings qualify for further publication.  
A second objective of this thesis is to comply with the regulations 
of the University of Bradford in partial fulfilment of the requirement for 
the degree of Doctor in Business Administration.  Although there are no 
universal standards for a thesis, it usually requires students to make a 
substantial contribution to the knowledge in a specific field of research. 
It should therefore also reflect the standards of originality required for a 
doctorate (Butler, University of Bradford 2000). The term thesis refers to 
an orderly and scholarly presentation of an argument. A thesis 
furthermore should take the reader through an argument and needs to 
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be in conversation with existing literature in the chosen fields of 
research.  
The relationship between banks, credit rating and culture is not 
an area which had been thoroughly explored by scholars and 
practitioners.  Cross border lending however can not be undertaken 
without crossing cultures. This research explored this particular 
relationship (lending to other cultures) and tried to explain the role and 
position of banks, through combining existing economic theories. This 
was considered relevant as it is the banks through which a large 
majority of cross border finance is being channelled. The position and 
the role banks in this aspect has been analyzed and researched.  
New international regulation, referred to as Basel II, seeks to 
improve on existing international standards (Basel I), which only set 
minimum capital standards for banks, and ought to be implemented by 
2006 in more than 100 countries. It does not require national 
supervisors to impose capital requirements automatically, but they have 
significant flexibility to determine how best to ensure that banks are 
sufficiently capitalized in relation to their unique risk. To measure the 
risk of the individual banks, internal credit ratings systems are being 
developed which must ensure that risks are appropriately measured 
and accounted for. It is here where credit rating and their effectiveness 
are being reviewed, and questions are raised whether they are 
appropriate and effective, particularly given that so-called soft factors 
are barely considered by both regulators (Basel II) and current credit 
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rating practice. In the area of cross border finance it was supposed that 
cross culture consequences needed to be considered.  
Culture and coping with its differences is still debated. Both in 
the field of cross-cultural studies, scholars still argue on concepts and 
adequate or inadequate methodologies, whereas practitioners in 
business and politics continue to display relative little interest to its 
concept and consequences. Bankers all over the world are being trained 
on how to read balance sheets, yet little attention is being paid as to by 
whom and how precisely these balance sheets came to existence, other 
than the accountancy standards applied, but also their existing 
research suggests that cultural factors come in play.  
Bankers furthermore seem to agree on the fact that credit risks in 
large part are related to the management competencies, effective 
corporate governance and integrity of management and organization. 
The argument could however be made that the assessment of 
management capabilities, governance and integrity may be hindered in 
those cases where the culture is little understood. In other words, how 
do bankers evaluate management of another culture, if they understand 
little of it? This aspect has been further explored in this research. 
  
5.2. Discussion of the findings: 
 
Given the exploratory nature of this thesis some may argue that 
the thesis is perhaps too broad in scope. Although this argument could 
be made, it is the complexity of the cross border lending, which makes 
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that the concepts can hardly be more focused or – alternatively - 
individually researched. Findings especially those confirming a 
hypothesis not previously reported in literature may give reason for 
excitement. Yet, it is often not in the acceptance of a hypothesis were 
the actual problem or interesting finding is hidden. An example of this 
kind can be the outcome of the first hypothesis, that “in general banks 
seem to be very competent with regard to understanding risks”, where 
the responses of banks and companies re late in a rather asymmetric 
way (Banks considering that they do, and companies viewing that they 
don’t). In line with the philosophical underpinning of the research 
guided by ontological relativism, interpretation of the results may be 
different according to different social constructs. The results therefore 
are open for debate and different kinds of interpretation.  
The approach will be consistent with the remaining structure of 
the thesis in that results will be discussed by sections on banks and 
cross border lending (paragraph 5.2.1.), on credit and credit rating and 
their effectiveness, in particular in view of the 2006 Basel II regulations 
to be implemented (paragraph 5.2.2.) and last but not least the impact 
of culture differences (paragraph 5.2.3.). 
  
5.2.1. On the notion of why banks exist: 
 
The most notable finding under this heading is the conclusion 
about the findings that both clients of banks would be benefited, if 
banks were rated in terms of clients or clients’ satisfaction, and that – 
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asked separately - the quality of the banks should also be rated in 
accordance with client satisfaction. It is argued that these findings are 
first of all relevant to the marketing side of a bank, which is a complex 
area. Perhaps transparency of banks could be improved using the tool 
of providing rating of banks in terms of clients’ satisfaction. Secondly 
these findings perhaps should be relevant for ratings agencies – and 
supervisory institutions – as to consider client satisfaction as an 
additional factor measuring the quality of a bank. 
Banking has existed and stood the test of times over thousands of 
years and given the fact that their key function has been an 
intermediary one, this could not have been otherwise possible had 
markets not been imperfect. Hypothesis 1.3.; “The long history in 
banking and the lack of alternatives means that banks will continue to 
exist for many more years”, provided convincing evidence of the finding 
with 75% of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing to the 
hypothesis.   
Additionally asked (hypothesis 1.5.) whether the role of banks is 
considered crucial and mostly constructive within the world economy, 
the findings suggest that respondents do agree with the hypothesis, 
such in line with current economic theories. An interesting difference 
although could be observed between banks and companies, whereby 
banks seem to be rather more convinced about their positive and 
constructive role in the world economy, whilst companies tend to 
remain undecided. 
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Fundamental to understanding these aspects of why banks exist, 
both transactions cost theory as well as agency theory is considered to 
be of importance.  
Relevant quotes from the conference in view of distinguishing 
opportunism as explained by Williamson (1985); (1) Mr. Ricardo Zerbino 
(page 81); On management quality: we believe that this is very important, 
it has been mentioned here in other presentations, the quality of the 
people is the most important element of the company and (2) Conference 
quote Mr. Osvaldo Bertone (page 52);  I believe that knowing people is at 
least as important as the figures on the balance sheet, especially 
concerning their professionalism and their honourability. I think that 
when people are honourable, there may be problems, but they can be 
solved easily.  
Two executives of rather large companies, arguing in the same 
direction, pointing out what according to them should be the most 
important aspect. The question then could be raised: how to do this? 
One way of approaching this phenomena is illustrated by the emphasis 
on relationship banking, by Mr. Bengt Hallqvist; ...and this is really 
relationship banking, that you are so involved with this that you feel it, 
you can smell it (Bengt Hallqvist, conference quote page 74).   
Transaction cost theory explains why organizations exist and 
that, sometimes, the cost of managing economic exchanges across 
markets is greater than the cost of managing economic exchanges 
within the boundaries of an organisation. This simple logic seems to 
have worked for banks. Transaction cost theory also has its limitations 
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as it focuses on cost minimisation, whereby economising is more 
fundamental than strategizing (Williamson 1976). It furthermore 
neglects the role of social relationship in economic transactions (highly 
relevant for banking) that discounts the impact of social relationships 
and culture. Granovetter (1985) for example pointed out that 
transactions are influenced by expectations that are formed by the 
history of the relationship.   
According to the next hypothesis (H.1.6.3.); “housebanks play an 
important and largely positive role in the process of corporate control; 
and borrowers with a strong bank–borrower relationship receive more 
competitive credit on average”, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
Although the concept of housebanks may not be universally known 
(specially refers to findings in North Western European countries) the 
acceptance of the hypothesis, with nearly 72% confirming that a 
housebank (strong relationship bank), is expected to produce positive 
results and effects on either improved corporate control as well as more 
competitive credit for the client, suggest that indeed according to 
Granovetter (1985) transactions are influenced by expectations that are 
formed by the history of the relationship and that according to these 
findings it bears a positive influence not only on price, but also on 
quality of the relationship. 
Given the complexity of banks, their large history, the central role 
in economies, and the interdependency of various relationships, agency 
theory comes in play and helps to analyse what motivates different 
principals and agents to organise themselves in the ways they do.   
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Barth et al (2004) provide helpful insights in the supervision of 
banks and agency problems, indicating that: First, banks are costly and 
difficult to monitor. This leads to too little monitoring of banks, which 
implies sub-optimal performance and stability.  These insights are 
consisting with the findings of Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), where they 
report on systemic banking crises in both non-OECD as well as high 
income OECD countries.  Official supervision can ameliorate this 
market failure. Second, because of informational asymmetries, banks 
are prone to contagious and socially costly bank runs (for example 
Argentina 2001, Uruguay 2002).  Supervision in such a situation serves 
a socially efficient role. Third, many countries choose to adopt deposit 
insurance schemes. This situation (1) creates incentives for excessive 
risk-taking by banks, and (2) reduces the incentives for depositors to 
monitor banks. Strong, official supervision under such circumstances 
can help prevent banks from engaging in excessive risk-taking 
behaviour and thus improve bank development, performance and 
stability (Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003).  
Alternatively, powerful supervisors may exert a negative influence 
on bank performance. Powerful supervisors may use their powers to 
benefit favoured constituents, attract campaign donations, and extract 
bribes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Djankov et al., 2002 and Quintyn 
and Taylor, 2002). Under these circumstances, powerful supervision 
will be positively related to corruption and will not improve bank 
development, performance and stability. From a different perspective 
Kane (1990) and Boot and Thakor (1993) focus on the agency problem 
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between taxpayers and bank supervisors. In particular, rather than 
focusing on political influence, Boot and Thakor (1993) model the 
behaviour of a self-interested bank supervisor when there is uncertainty 
about the supervisor's ability to monitor banks. Under these conditions, 
they show that supervisors may undertake socially sub-optimal actions. 
Thus, depending on the incentives facing bank supervisors and the 
ability of taxpayers to monitor supervision, greater supervisory power 
could hinder bank operations (Barth et al, 2004). This has also been 
confirmed in a report (CSFI, 2005) where 440 respondents rank the rise 
of regulation to be the number one risk facing the (banking) industry 
and the costs and distractions of regulation as well as the false sense of 
security it brings were the main reasons cited for its strong showing.  
The industry according to this report clearly believes that regulators are 
getting it wrong both from a cost perspective, driven by what banks see 
as an excessive focus on consumer protection, and from too much 
complexity, which is seen as killing competition and promoting a herd 
instinct in financial institutions (CSFI, 2005).    
Intermediation theory, transaction cost theory and agency theory 
combined helps us understand why banks exist, what is their role in 
societies and the role of regulation and supervision, as well as their 
effectiveness.   
5.2.2. On credit and credit rating: 
 
Credit risk, or the risk of default, has always been a major topic of 
concern for banks and other financial intermediaries, and any agent 
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committed to a financial contract for that matter. While concern for the 
possible default of counterparty on an agreed-upon financial contract is 
centuries old, modern techniques and models have arisen in the last 
decades that help master the problem. Whereas external credit rating 
exists for already 100 years, only in recent years banks have started to 
formalize their own internal credit rating, inspired by changing 
regulatory frameworks. What credit rating actually entails is best 
described by one of the speakers at the conference; 
Mr. Ricardo Zerbino (page 80);  we should consider that credit 
rating, with all its imperfections, is a tool which is very useful for private 
investors, for institutional investors who act in the capital market and 
also for financial institutions, particularly banks, because it is a reference 
element which is very important, which complements auditing, which 
only gives us a vision of what has happened up to that moment, and can 
give us a glimpse of the solidity and the financial structure of the 
company, but it does not look beyond in general terms.   
Before credit rating and credit ratings agencies came into play, all 
financing was either done on a transactional basis, i.e. commodity 
finances for example or on the basis of a relationship between borrower 
and financier. At the beginning of the relationship, as in Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981), there is no possibility to select borrowers according to 
their quality. Hence, problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
have to be considered. In this research the argument was made whether 
Basel II improved regulation could help to solve these problems, and – 
alternatively - whether they may become counterproductive to the 
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suggested strengths and the position of housebanks (relationship 
banking) – in a close long term relationship with the borrower, as 
pointed out by Hendrik Lühl (conference paper Annex 1).   
A credit rating is not, in general, an investment recommendation 
concerning a given security and as has been illustrated by the findings 
on hypothesis H.2.1., the role of credit rating agencies can be described 
as a constructive and valuable complementary tool. While the rating 
agencies use similar methods and approaches to rate debt, they 
sometimes however come up with different ratings of the same debt 
investment. In their studies of the credit rating industry Cantor and 
Packer (1994) illustrated this.  
The dominant paradigm seems to suggest that increasing 
application of technology and modelling, whilst measuring credit risk, in 
large part inspired by market developments, such as derivative market 
development, globalisation, the liberalisation of financial markets, and 
last but not least the suggestion that with stricter controls, through 
Central Bank and Basel II regulation, credit risk and secondary 
systemic risks may be better managed. It is made clear however that 
through the findings of hypothesis 2.2., arguing that credit rating 
agencies, despite their long history and expertise do not really possess 
competencies, which may prevent default risk, the role of ratings 
agencies is limited and relative, as illustrated by Mr. Rafael Bonasso; 
Conference quote (page 58); We know that a rating at the end of the day 
is a third party that analyzes how the bank is today, things might change 
in the future. 
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In addition through the acceptance of hypothesis 2.3., the 
conclusion could be drawn that the role of credit rating agencies should 
be more critically assessed and their influence in finance should be 
reduced. Although given the oligopoly in the market of rating agencies 
(more than 80% of the business being conducted by only three 
companies), it is clear that the influence of these agencies can be very 
high and perhaps sometimes too high. Given the specific sample 
however, consisting of not too many credit rated companies in rather 
immature markets on one side and bankers banking that same market, 
the outcome of this question could substantially differ should the issue 
be posed in mature capital market surroundings. It shows us that here 
too it all depends from which perspective the issue is being approached, 
as the following two statements from the conference illustrate; 
Conference quote Mr. Ricardo Zerbino (page 81); So to conclude, 
credit rating is a necessary tool, as all tools it is imperfect, and we have 
already seen that it does not necessarily provide security, nor has it 
prevented crises in different markets of the world………… and I would 
say that it is indispensable for the development of the capital market. 
Conference quote Mr. Karl Weinfurtner (page 85); Most companies 
in Germany have no ratings.  Most are family-owned companies, medium-
size companies, and for them I think there was no necessity in the past 
for a rating, because of the close ties they had to banks, what was called 
housebank, principal bank relationship.  But this will change in the 
future, with Basel II coming. 
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The findings on hypothesis H.2.5., “The new Basel II regulations, 
to be implemented in 2006, will further contribute to a better risk 
management and control of financial institutions and markets”, 
remained undecided.  The most striking observation here being that 
70% of the companies were still undecided, meaning that they seemed 
to have no opinion yet on the meaning and impacts of Basel II. While 
over 50% of the banks support the claim that Basel II would contribute 
to better risk management of banks and markets, this seems to 
contradict the findings of the Center for Study of Financial Innovation.  
In this report (Banana Skins 2005) 440 respondents rank the rise of 
regulation  to be the number one risk facing the (banking) industry and 
the costs and distractions of regulation as well as the false sense of 
security it brings were the main reasons cited for its strong showing 
(CSFI, 2005).  The industry according to this report clearly believes that 
regulators are getting it wrong both from a cost perspective, driven by 
what banks see as an excessive focus on consumer protection, and from 
too much complexity, which is seen as killing competition and 
promoting a herd instinct in financial institutions (CSFI, 2005). The 
possibility of their being a problem with implementing Basel II is 
illustrated by the following quote; Conference quote Mr. Hendrik Lühl 
(page 59); I think that the problem is that the internal approval 
procedures at least in the banks, and DEG is also governed in Germany 
by the banking commission, are changing.  You have a veto right in these 
days by a credit department and even if the big bosses say “Well, we 
should do that”, they have a veto and these are people who do not travel.  
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I mean, you can be lucky if they have some experience…..  But this is 
something that is imposed to us by law and it is very difficult to 
overcome. 
Ferri et al (2001) suggested that the Basel II proposals would 
increase the volatility of capital needs of banks in non-high-income 
countries vs. high-income countries' banks. In fact, bank and corporate 
ratings in non-high-income countries appear to be strongly related – 
and in an asymmetric way – to changes in sovereign ratings. This 
aspect has been looked at through hypothesis H.2.6., “The new Basel II 
regulations carry the risk of a further widening of the gap between high 
income and low income countries”, which did find that separated in 
groups, Latin American respondents did accept the hypothesis. 
Obviously it is here that the question can be asked to which extent the 
Basel II framework is a result of a truly global effort, or whether the 
influence of OECD countries is dominant.  
The thesis also illustrated to which extent the dominant paradigm 
in this particular field seems to re-enforce the belief that improved 
regulation and an even more refined approach to credit and credit 
rating, both internal as well as external, may improve agency costs. It 
has been suggested that for the particular field of finance and 
consistent with the positivist paradigm – especially the functionalist 
approach – the field seems to run the risk of producing more and more 
facts confirming a status quo of the science and their belief systems. 
Any adequate analysis of the nature and role of the mathematical 
language in finance necessarily requires fundamental understanding of 
 293 
the worldviews underlying the views expressed with respect to the 
nature and role of language (Ardalan, 2002).  
5.2.3. On cross cultural differences: 
 
Culture in the organization literature may be the great taboo of 
today, Hofstede wrote already in 1980 and a taboo is something we are 
all involved in but not supposed to speak about. It is this premise from 
Hofstede (1980) which has in part inspired this particular research.  
Speaking on codes of best practice (comparable with what Basel II 
intends to do to financial markets) Former President of Volvo Latin 
America, co- founder of the Brazilian institute of Corporate Governance, 
member of the board of a range of different companies, both in location 
and size, and thus a man of great experience, worded the importance of 
culture difference (and its core values) in the most appropriate way;   
Conference quote Mr. Bengt Hallqvist (page 95); ……the way to go 
from your current situation to best practice - it’s a long way and a lot of 
companies will never get there.  A lot of cultural differences make some of 
these requirements inadequate or impossible.  ……. Now the way to 
apply it, you have to adjust to the situation, you have to adjust to the 
country, to cultural differences, to the size of the company, to the values 
of the company and so on and so forth .  
Hall, in “The dance of life” (1983), argues that humans live in a 
single world of communication, but that they divide that world into two 
parts; words and behaviour (verbal and non-verbal). Words representing 
perhaps 10 percent of the total emphasize the unidirectional aspects of 
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communication – advocacy, law, and adversarial relationships- while 
behaviour, the other 90 percent, stresses feedback on how people are 
feeling, ways of avoiding confrontation, and the inherent logic that is 
the birthright of all people. Words are the medium of business, 
politicians, and our world leaders, all of whom in the final analysis deal 
in power, so that words become instruments of power. Hall (1983) asks; 
how is it possible to maintain a stable world in the absence of feedback 
from the other 90 percent of communication?  
The concept of power and more in particular the dimension found 
or confirmed by Hofstede (1980) called power distance, varies according 
to different (national) cultures and makes that people familiar with 
organizations in different countries are often struck by the variety of 
organizational solutions to the same task problem.  Its consequences to 
organizations may imply more or less centralization, taller or flatter 
organization pyramids and larger or smaller proportions of supervisory 
personnel (Hofstede 1980). Unfortunately, no previous studies in the 
relationship of cross-border finance with culture differences have been 
found, upon which this concept could then be further explored. The 
thesis then took the shape of a more exploratory journey. 
It would be good (for bankers) to be aware of the observation 
made by Hall (1976) where he argued that the part of man’s nervous 
system that deals with social behaviour is designed according to the 
principle of negative feedback. One is completely unaware of the fact 
that there is a system of controls as long as the program is followed (see 
also Hofstede, 1991 – software of the mind). Ironically – according to 
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Hall (1976) this means that the majority of mankind is denied 
knowledge of important parts of the self by virtue of the way the control 
system works. The only time one is aware of the control system is when 
things do not follow the hidden program. Most cultural exploration 
however begins with the annoyance of being lost. The control system of 
the mind signals that something unexpected has arisen, that we are in 
uncharted water and are going to have to switch off the automatic pilot 
and man the helm ourselves (Hall, 1976). This was illustrated by a 
comment from one the speakers at the conference;  
Conference quote Mr. Hans Hanegraaf (page 123); and cultural 
differences mainly become apparent when things don’t develop as you 
want or expect………  
These observations should be applied to this field of research and 
inevitably raise a number of interesting issues. How for example do 
banks cope with these processes? Do they actually seek to work in 
cultures which are different from their own, or – alternatively - does 
their lending policy implicitly lead to a selection of cultures which seem 
similar? How much flexibility is needed for uniform regulations (Basel II) 
to be adequately and meaningful applied in more than 100 countries by 
2006? How much understanding of the other culture is needed, in cross 
border lending, in order to make an informed judgment on the quality of 
the company, the integrity and capabilities of management and all other 
aspects relevant to the corporate governance?  
Chapter 2, section 2.3. reviewed the more prominent publications, 
dealt with the relative strengths and weaknesses of the different 
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methodologies in research, and outlined some of the current issues in 
cross-cultural research. Hall (1976) describes his views on low- and 
high context cultures (very much in line with Trompenaars’s dimension 
of universalism and particularism) and suggests that if one could get 
behind the scenes one would find context dependant results in the 
majority of research projects. Coincidentally this has been one of the 
key criticisms on Hofstede work by Segalla et al (2000), where they 
found that scores on dimensions of culture varied according to the 
context of the question and that the context of the questions was clearly 
as important as the answer. Western science, according to Hall (1976) is 
striving for replicability and rigor (!) in methods and is conducted with a 
view to eliminating context.  
In their study Segalla et al (2000) plea for the need of better cross-
cultural knowledge, built on understanding how cultural values are tied 
to real organizational problems. This is perhaps one the reasons why 
also in the field of cross border finance there is still quite a lot of work 
to do.  
 
 
5.3. Discussions of the key findings: 
 
Under hypothesis H.3.1.: “Cultural differences have played a role 
in there having been so many accidents (defaults) throughout history in 
international finance”, a fairly qualitative opinion has been asked from 
the respondents. One of the underlying problems here is that statistics 
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on banking and finance do not reveal specific data on credit losses, for 
example at BIS and or the World Bank). Only in the last decade there 
has been a trend of somewhat more disclosure of balance sheet and 
profit and loss data by banks. However, for a number of reasons banks 
do not disclose specific origin of profits (for example country or product 
wise) and limit statements to; “contribution of in profits from 
international ……”, or as the case may be distribution of profitability to 
divisions, such as investment banking, retail banking and whole 
banking. Banks neither disclose origin of losses, either be these related 
to specific credit losses, nor losses in propriety trading, nor losses 
related to the disposal of previously acquired banks or finance units (for 
example ING Group, with Barings and BHF (Germany).  The statement 
on credit losses usually is being restricted to the mere mentioning of 
“Additions to the provision for loan/investment losses”. 10 
More and more banks provide links towards the specific external 
rating agencies report, however these reports neither provide any more 
information than; “Financial performance in 2003 is also benefiting 
from lower credit and investment losses and efficiency gains” 
(Moody’s/ING data).  As argued in Chapter 2, section 2.2., there seems 
to be another aspect of agency problem in this regard. 
 Despite the more qualitative nature of the question, whilst 
discriminating to European and Latin American respondents, we find 
                                                 
10 (see for example  http://www.ing.com/index.jsp or 
http://www.abnamro.com/com/ir/ir.jsp   
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clear results in accepting the hypothesis, despite a rather high 25% of 
undecided. This can be understood by the arguments given above. 
Interesting questions can be raised here, whether international banks 
working with high profile cases like for example Parmalat, or with Enron 
and Worldcom11, simply sustain that the causes are fraud or whether 
other elements of wrong risk assessment may have been in play. In fact 
we do not know.   It can be argued however that it is convenient to the 
banks to refer to fraud, every time credit losses are reported.   
If the bank does not understand the cultural context of a 
particular country or region, it becomes highly doubtful it will 
understand the risks, and this has been at the core of this thesis 
(Hypothesis H.3.2.). This last one was the clearest of all responses 
which confirmed that, whereas there seems to be an agreement on the 
fact that credit risks in large part are related to the management 
competencies - effective corporate governance and integrity of 
management and organization - the argument can be made that the 
assessment of management capabilities, governance and integrity may 
be hindered in those cases where the culture is little understood. In 
other words, if the bank does not understand the cultural context of a 
particular country or region, it becomes highly doubtful it will 
understand the risks.  Rightfully the contributors to the conference 
observed the following key aspects; 
                                                 
11 Bernie Ebbers, the former boss of WorldCom, has been found guilty in a federal 
court in New York of a massive fraud, and faces up to 85 years in jail, The 
Economist, March 16, 2005  
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Conference quote Mr. Nanno Kleiterp (page 7); We have learnt a 
lot of lessons from that experience because always in a crisis you see a 
test for the choices you make and it is a test for the relationships you 
have.   
Mr. Osvaldo Bertone (page 53); With regard to risks, I spoke about 
two types:  company risk and country risk.  Unfortunately I am old 
enough to refer to my experience…..  I have gone through crises, as many 
as those of you who are not so young either may recall… 
The key conclusion here is recognition of the importance of a 
bank not understanding the cultural context of a particular country or 
region; it becomes highly doubtful it will understand the risks. Now 
some may argue that this is too obvious. Or they may say; so what? We 
knew this all along and we mitigate those risks by choosing the right 
strategy, appropriate credit rating, risk adverse account management.   
For illustrating purposes some of these examples displayed in the 
conference, are summarized below, with the aim to demonstrate that 
most of those observations,  strategies, recommendations or however we 
should label them, contain elements of soft factors, things which are 
hard to measure, most of them however implicitly acknowledge that 
understanding the culture context is relevant, if not fundamental;  
1. Our strategies are built on knowing our business and 
environment, recognizing and adequately mitigating, and 
building on selected local and international partnerships with 
specialized and focused experience (Kleiterp).   
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2. We have always privileged long-term relationships with 
banks.  In spite of the fact that the people have changed, we 
have relationships of more than 30 years with certain banks, 
very fruitful relationships, with ups and downs, and with a 
few arguments in the middle, as it should be (Bertone).  
3. Knowing people is at least as important as the figures on the 
balance sheet, especially concerning their professionalism 
and their honourableness (Bertone). 
4. .. it depends on the rating agency and on the attitude of the 
company that is being rated.  It depends on the two parties, 
because there has to be interaction, in-depth interaction.  A 
certain amount of information has to be generated beyond 
the audited balance sheets, there has to be regular reporting 
(Zerbino)  
5. The quality of the people is the most important element of the 
company (Zerbino). 
6. The most important rule of establishing a relationship is to 
show an interest in your subject (Arnold). 
7. This is really relationship banking, that you are so involved 
with this that you feel it; you can smell it (Hallqvist). 
8. We want them to know who their partner is. We have tried to 
create trust, beyond the figures (Bertone) 
9. The problems that were reported were due to insufficient 
corporate governance and or fraud (Lühl) 
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In conclusion it seems to be that practitioners acknowledge the 
relevance of culture in their practice, which is not only confirmed by the 
findings of the questionnaire, but also illustrated by the comments from 
the conference, as outlined above as well as in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
 It remains therefore to be questioned how regulators – and in 
particular credit risk managers in banks – will go forward. It has been 
argued that current regulations in the making do not provide solutions 
to these issues, as was also found by Grunert et al (2005). They found 
that even in domestic lending and analyzing credit file data from four 
major German banks, evidence that the combined use of financial and 
non-financial factors leads to a more accurate prediction of future 
default events than the single use of each of these factors. Perhaps it 
would be recommendable to check why the industry according to the 
report of CSFI (2005), clearly believes that regulators are getting it 
wrong both from a cost perspective, driven by what banks see as an 
excessive focus on consumer protection, and from too much complexity, 
which is seen as killing competition and promoting a herd instinct in 
financial institutions (CSFI, 2005).  
It could be argued though that culture in the organization 
literature still remains the great taboo of today as Hofstede wrote 
already in 1980, something we are all involved in but not supposed to 
speak about. This research showed that the subjects of this research in 
majority acknowledged such: it is now up to the regulators to do the 
same.  
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5.4. Limitations:  
 
This study shares most of the limitations of any piece of research 
and the two quotes from the introduction of this thesis still hold: 
“The ideas which are here expressed so laboriously are extremely 
simple and should be obvious. The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, 
but in escaping from the old ones, which ramify, into every corner of 
our minds” (J.M. Keynes, The General Theory, l973). 
 
“The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its 
solution” (L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, p. 149). 
 
This research has been guided by the belief that the role of this 
research was exploratory, a more qualitative enquiry and that of an 
advisable first step to be taken before a real enquiry – a quantitative 
enquiry – can be undertaken. The hypotheses formulated and the 
applied methodology, both combined, intended to establish a reasonable 
and plausible argument whether practitioners share the view that 
cultural impacts influence the effectiveness of cross border lending and 
whether further credit rating (of hard factors), as a result of Basel II, will 
sufficiently, according to Grunert et al (2005); “alleviate asymmetric 
information problems between borrowers and lenders”.  
For the purpose if this exploratory research the use of the 
questionnaire, with its strengths and weaknesses as has been described 
before, was considered an adequate instrument for the exploratory 
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objectives of the this research. They are certainly limitations to both the 
sample as well as the sample size regarding the validity of the findings, 
the sample to consist of both bankers and senior company executives 
operating in cross border finance, but limited between a small part of 
Western Europe and an even smaller part of Latin America.  
Especially the organization of a conference to test hypothesis 
brings with it several limitations, as just a few of the hypotheses could 
discussed and or tested and several key concepts, even in a conference 
which lasted three days, could not be sufficiently explored. The 
conclusions, validity and reliability of findings in a conference setting 
are open for debate. The quotes which have been used may be 
considered by their authors as being taken out of perspective and 
perhaps in some cases a different meaning was their intent. Should this 
have occurred; my well intended and sincere apologies are hereby 
offered. The abstract of the entire conference however is enclosed with 
this thesis (annex 1). It should however be stressed that all statements 
and opinions are personal ones and do not represent the formal position 
of any the companies which could directly or indirectly be related to this 
study.  
All the limitations and restrictions mentioned above are accepted 
to be the exclusive responsibility of the author.   
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5.5. Recommendations for further research: 
 
Following the main findings from this research the following 
recommendation could be made: 
On agency theory and agency problems, to expand on research by 
Kane (1990) and Boot and Thakor (1993) who focus on the agency 
problem between taxpayers and bank supervisors. In particular, rather 
than focusing on political influence, Boot and Thakor (1993) model the 
behaviour of a self-interested bank supervisor when there is uncertainty 
about the supervisor's ability to monitor banks. Under these conditions, 
they show that supervisors may undertake socially sub-optimal actions. 
Thus, depending on the incentives facing bank supervisors and the 
ability of taxpayers to monitor supervision, greater supervisory power 
could hinder bank operations (Barth et al, 2004). Greater transparency 
and accountability seems to be the way to go forward. What we have 
seen in the banking crises here12 in Argentina and Uruguay (2001, 
2002), which were clear bank runs, common depositors were still under 
the assumption that their savings (mostly in US$ billets) were just kept 
by the banks in the safe.  For as long as taxpayers are still that illiterate 
in this respect, the agency relation between them and central bank (or 
supervisory institution), remains unacceptably high. Greater 
transparency was required here, as no-one cared to explain that 
depositors money had went (85%) to buy government bonds, which were 
declared in default. 
                                                 
12 The author lives in Uruguay 
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Both qualitative as well as quantitative research is needed in 
order to get insight as to how successful banks have been in the last 
decennia with cross border lending. How does profitability of these 
activities relate to the amount of credit losses? How much hobby is 
involved? What conclusions could be drawn from these data? In an 
earlier pilot study for this thesis, it was considered using case studies of 
corporate failures and subsequent bank losses, and to interview 
different actors from different perspectives as to establish an 
understanding of the reasons behind those failures. Such type of 
research is only being done at a rather limited (and confidential) scale in 
some financial institutions. Those investigations however have a more 
internal character, whereas an external approach would be considered 
more useful.   
On Credit and Credit rating, especially in view of Basel II; how 
would it be possible, given the findings of Grunert et al (2005), the 
conclusions of the report from the CSFI (2005) and the findings of this 
research, that the structure of the Basel II framework be amended, for it 
to include these reported soft factors, including and specifically culture 
aspects in case of cross-border lending in order to alleviate asymmetric 
information problems between borrowers and lenders.   
Instead of banks rating clients, the findings of this study show 
that companies (clients) should be rating the banks as well. It should be 
researched why this is not being done, as reported in this thesis, and 
secondly how this could be done (broadly and institutionally). Opinions 
of both regulators and rating agencies should be considered. Rating 
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banks in terms of client satisfaction would – as has been argued – 
improve transparency of bank services. In consultancy it has been 
frequently suggested to companies to perform such analysis, and 
obviously large multinational companies have done this already for 
many years. It is in this way that they decide whether a bank may be 
considered a core bank, or housebank and which banks are to be 
invited when a specific transaction comes to the market. Some generic 
criteria for rating the bank could be: 
· Commitment with - and understanding of the bank with the 
company/sector/country 
· Standing of the bank, including rating 
· Quality and pricing of the products  
· Insight in how and by whom decisions are being made 
regarding the credit for the company; is there any contact 
with these decision makers 
· Level and commitment of account management, including 
job rotation 
 
It has been argued that culture in the organization literature still 
remains the great taboo of today as Hofstede wrote already in 1980, 
something we are all involved in but not supposed to speak about. This 
research showed that the subjects of this research in majority 
acknowledged such and it would be an advisable first step for the 
regulators to do the same. A follow up on the suggestion by Segalla et al 
(2000) who plead for the need of better cross-cultural knowledge, built 
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on understanding how cultural values are tied to real organizational 
problems. In such research related to cross border finance it seems that 
some aspects of culture will be more relevant to the subject than others. 
Particularly aspects of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism, universalism versus particularism, as well as high versus 
low context are expected to play a more prominent role than some of the 
other culture dimensions. Perhaps such research may also identify 
other specific aspects of culture – differences – for example as to how 
different cultures handle asymmetry of information, adverse selection, 
opportunism and moral hazard; issues which are perhaps more relevant 
to the type of cross-cultural relationships in banking and credit. 
In their study Segalla et al (2000) plea for the need of better cross-
cultural knowledge, built on understanding how cultural values are tied 
to real organisational problems. Given that culture is considered 
relevant within cross-border lending (and this could perhaps be 
extended to all cross border activities of banks) how can bankers be 
educated and trained in the field cross-cultural studies? 
5.6. Conclusions: 
 
Behaviour is at the roots of cross cultural studies and it is in this 
field where the core hypotheses of the thesis were formulated and 
tested. Economics is known to be a behavioural science and it is for 
example transaction cost theory, which rests on two essential 
assumptions about the behaviour of economic actors (be they 
individuals or firms) engaged in transactions: bounded rationality and 
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opportunism (Barney and Hesterley, 1996). Bounded rationality means 
that those who engage in economic transactions are ‘intendedly 
rational, but only limitedly so’ (Simon 1947: xxiv). 
Opportunism is also a departure from the behavioural 
assumptions used in mainstream economics.  While traditional 
economics assumes simply that economic actors behave out of self-
interest, transaction cost theory assumes the possibility of self-interest 
seeking with guile (Williamson 1975:26). For Williamson (1985:47), 
opportunism includes lying, stealing and cheating, but it more generally 
refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially 
calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise 
confuse’ partners in an exchange.  
Relevant quotes from the conference in view of distinguishing 
opportunism as explained by Williamson (1985); (1) Mr. Ricardo Zerbino 
(page 81); On management quality: we believe that this is very important, 
it has been mentioned here in other presentations, the quality of the 
people is the most important element of the company and (2) Conference 
quote Mr. Osvaldo Bertone (page 52);  I believe that knowing people is at 
least as important as the figures on the balance sheet, especially 
concerning their professionalism and their honourability. I think that 
when people are honourable, there may be problems, but they can be 
solved easily.  
Two executives, of rather large companies, arguing in the same 
direction, pointing out what according to them should be the most 
important aspect. The question to be raised could be then:  how to do 
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this? One way of approaching this phenomena is illustrated by the 
emphasis on relationship banking, by Mr. Bengt Hallqvist; …………..and 
this is really relationship banking, that you are so involved with this that 
you feel it, you can smell it (Bengt Hallqvist, conference quote page 74).   
The Basel committee which published the new Basel II framework 
on bank regulation and supervision is considered an excellent product 
by its Chairman Jaime Caruana, and was agreed by all Committee 
members and the result of long and careful discussions, wide 
consultations and comprehensive impact studies (The Banker, 2004).  
Whereas Basel II covers the entire risk profile and supervision of 
financial institutions, this research was limited to the cross border 
lending by banks to companies and provides the views from both 
practicing international bankers and their customers on their 
expectations regarding Basel II, credit rating and the relevance of 
context and culture differences.  
Boot and Thakor (1993) model the behaviour of a self-interested 
bank supervisor when there is uncertainty about the supervisor's ability 
to monitor banks. Under these conditions, they show that supervisors 
may undertake socially sub-optimal actions. Thus, depending on the 
incentives facing bank supervisors and the ability of taxpayers to 
monitor supervision, greater supervisory power could hinder bank 
operations (Barth et al, 2004). This has also been confirmed in a report 
(CSFI, 2005) in which 440 respondents rank the rise of regulation to be 
the number one risk facing the (banking) industry and the costs and 
distractions of regulation as well as the false sense of security it brings 
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were the main reasons cited for its strong showing.  The industry 
according to this report clearly believes that regulators are getting it 
wrong both from a cost perspective, driven by what banks see as an 
excessive focus on consumer protection, and from too much complexity, 
which is seen as killing competition and promoting a herd instinct in 
financial institutions (CSFI, 2005).    
The findings on hypothesis H.2.5., “The new Basel II regulations, 
to be implemented in 2006, will further contribute to a better risk 
management and control of financial institutions and markets”, 
remained undecided.  The most striking observation here being that 
70% of the companies were still undecided, meaning that they seemed 
to have no opinion yet on the meaning and impacts of Basel II.  
Speaking on codes of best practice (comparable with what Basel II 
intends to do to financial markets) Former President of Volvo Latin 
America, co- founder of the Brazilian institute of Corporate Governance, 
member of the board of a range of different companies, both in location 
and size,  and thus a man of great experience, worded the importance of 
culture difference (and its core values) in the most appropriate way;  
Conference quote Mr. Bengt Hallqvist (page 95); …… it’s a long way and 
a lot of companies will never get there.  A lot of cultural differences make 
some of these requirements inadequate or impossible….  …Now the way 
to apply it, you have to adjust to the situation, you have to adjust to the 
country, to cultural differences, to the size of the company, to the values 
of the company and so on and so forth.  
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 In a three days conferences titled; “The future of 
relationship banking”, 80 senior executives from international banks 
and large companies were gathered in Punta del Este, Uruguay 13 and 
were asked to speak about these aspects. A transcript of the conference 
is provided as annex to this thesis (Annex 1) and serves to triangulate 
the other findings of this research. Main findings of three management 
papers were presented by the researcher during the conference. A 
survey was performed during the conference and in addition, through 
an online survey, in total 106 practitioners in the field participated in 
the survey. Results show a variation of conclusions, but very especially 
seem to confirm the view, contrary to the approach taken in Basel II, 
that cultural differences and context are felt to be highly relevant in 
cross border lending.   
The relationship between banks, credit rating and culture is not 
an area which has been thoroughly explored by scholars and 
practitioners.  Cross border lending however can not be undertaken 
without crossing cultures. This research explored this particular 
relationship (lending to other cultures) and explained the role and 
position of banks, through combining existing economic theories.  
Grunert et al (2005) have found that even in domestic lending the 
role of non-financial factors in internal credit ratings remain 
ambiguous, whilst the eligibility of financial factors as inputs for 
internal credit ratings is widely accepted. Analyzing credit file data from 
four major German banks, they found evidence that the combined use 
                                                 
13 Conference sponsored by FMO, DEG and DBA March 21-24, 2004, Hotel Conrad Punta del Este 
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of financial and non-financial factors leads to a more accurate 
prediction of future default events than the single use of each of these 
factors. It is argued in this thesis that in case of cross border lending 
these non-financial factors may be even more relevant.  
The key argument of this research was that within the context of 
banks and credit – culture seems to be receiving little attention from 
practitioners as well as scholars, which in part is reflected through the 
Basel II accords, but also can be observed in published work in the field 
of finance. Bankers all over the world however seem to agree on the fact 
that corporate credit risks in large part are related to the competencies 
of management of companies and organizations. The argument was 
made that the assessment of management capabilities may be hindered 
in those cases where the culture is little understood. In other words, 
how do banks evaluate management of another culture for example, if 
they understand little of it? 
This research in the area of banks, credit and culture started off 4 
years go more ambitious, where replication of subsequent findings of 
Hofstede’s type of research have not been found and the mere 
relationship between credit (risks) and culture (differences) had not 
been studied so far. Instead, the focus of the study needed to be 
gradually amended into an exploratory research as to being able to 
answer the key hypothesis of this study whether culture should be a 
concept to be taken into consideration, according to practitioners in the 
field of cross border finance.   
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One of the findings regarding banks and cross border finance was 
the conclusion that both clients of banks would be benefited, if banks 
were rated in terms of clients or clients’ satisfaction, and that – asked 
separately - the quality of the banks should also be rated in accordance 
with client satisfaction. It was argued that these findings are first of all 
relevant to the marketing side of a bank, which is a complex area. 
Perhaps transparency of banks could be improved using the tool of 
providing rating of banks in terms of clients’ satisfaction. Secondly 
these findings perhaps should be relevant for rating agencies – and 
supervisory institutions – as to consider client satisfaction as an 
additional factor measuring the quality of a bank. 
Although the concept of housebanks may not be universally know 
(specially refers to findings in North Western European countries) the 
acceptance of the hypothesis that a housebank (strong relationship 
bank), is expected to produce positive results and effects on either 
improved corporate control as well as more competitive credit for the 
client, suggest that indeed according to Granovetter (1985) transactions 
are influenced by expectations that are formed by the history of the 
relationship and that according to these finding it bears a positive 
influence not only on price, but also on quality of the relationship. 
 It would be good (for bankers) to be aware of the observation 
made by Hall (1976) where he argued that the part of man’s nervous 
system that deals with social behaviour is designed according to the 
principle of negative feedback. One is completely unaware of the fact 
that there is a system of controls as long as the program is followed (see 
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also Hofstede, 1991 – software of the mind). Ironically – according to 
Hall (1976) this means that the majority of mankind is denied 
knowledge of important parts of the self by virtue of the way the control 
system works. The only time one is aware of the control system is when 
things do not follow the hidden program. Most cultural exploration 
however begins with the annoyance of being lost. The control system of 
the mind signals that something unexpected has arisen, that we are in 
uncharted water and are going to have to switch off the automatic pilot 
and man the helm ourselves (Hall, 1976). This was illustrated by a 
comment from one the speakers at the conference;  
Conference quote Mr. Hans Hanegraaf (page 123); and cultural 
differences mainly become apparent when things don’t develop as you 
want or expect……….. 
These observations should be applied to this field of research and 
inevitably raises a number of interesting issues. How for example do 
banks cope with these processes? Do they actually seek to work in 
cultures which are different from their own, or – alternatively - does 
their lending policy implicitly lead to a selection of cultures which seem 
similar? How much flexibility is needed for uniform regulations (Basel II) 
to be adequately and meaningful applied in more than 100 countries by 
2006? How much understanding of the other culture is needed, in cross 
border lending, in order to make an informed judgment on the quality of 
the company, the integrity and capabilities of management and all other 
aspects relevant to the corporate governance?  
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“If the bank does not understand the cultural context of a 
particular country or region, it becomes highly doubtful it will 
understand the risks, and this has been at the core of this thesis” 
(Hypothesis H.3.2.). By far the clearest of all responses which confirmed 
that, whereas there seems to be an agreement on the fact that credit 
risks in large part are related to the management competencies - 
effective corporate governance and integrity of management and 
organization - the argument can be made that the assessment of 
management capabilities, governance and integrity may be hindered in 
those cases where the culture is little understood. In other words, if the 
bank does not understand the cultural context of a particular country 
or region, it becomes highly doubtful it will understand the risks. 
Going back to the original conceptual framework given below, 
cross border lending is a complex field, which demands careful 
processes and controls. In this thesis cross border lending was limited 
to lending by banks to companies across their borders. Given the 
specific responsibility of banks towards their depositors, their 
stakeholders, the regulatory authorities and perhaps society at large, 
due consideration needs to be given as to if credit is being granted and 
risks are being assumed.   
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Figure 14 Adjusted conceptual framework 
 
 
As can be derived from the above figure, cross cultural risks as a 
result of cultural differences should be considered by regulators and 
banks. This research explored whether the exclusion of theses risks was 
considered correct by practitioners and evidence showed that this 
exclusion was found incorrect. Therefore the implicit views 
underpinning the Basel II accords are not being shared by the 
participants in this research.   
In conclusion it seemed to be that practitioners acknowledge the 
relevance of culture in their practice, which is not only confirmed by the 
findings of the questionnaire, but also illustrated by the comments from 
the conference, as outlined above as well as in the Chapter 4. It remains 
therefore to be questioned how regulators – and in particular credit risk 
managers in banks – will go forward.  
It could be argued though that culture in the organization 
literature still remains the great taboo of today as Hofstede wrote 
already in 1980, something we are all involved in but not supposed to 
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speak about. This research showed that the subjects in this study in 
majority realised this.  
5.7. Implications of research findings: 
 
 Cross cultural risks as a result of cultural differences 
should be considered by regulators and banks as has been 
demonstrated in this research.  The Basel II regulations as well as 
current banking practices overemphasize the effects of improved 
regulations. It is assumed that an enhanced architecture of risks 
management techniques and practices will produce convincing positive 
results. Whereas it is undeniable that the new regulations will be rather 
adequate to better measure the different risks banks undertake, 
differentiated amongst operational risks, market risks as well as credit 
risks, and where capital adequacy for each individual bank will be more 
appropriately aligned to the aggregated risks the particular bank 
supposedly carries, these improvement in regulations will not improve 
the quality of cross border lending, given that risk assessment is being 
done without properly considering soft factors, including cultural 
differences. It also remains to be seen whether the improved regulations 
will help banks to improve their assessment of risks in case of very large 
high profile cases such as Worldcom, Parmalat and the like.  
Basel II and the current banking practices are the result of bad 
banking in recent banking history and the accurate recognition that 
every bank carries a different risk profile and thus requires capital – 
adequate - to cover the specific risks of that specific bank. This 
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approach however should not have been a purely technical exercise 
only, predominantly influenced by the risk management and credit 
rating areas of financial and capital markets.  The marketing side of the 
financial business has had too little influence on the outcome of Basel 
II, as was recognised by several participants in this research. It is rather 
disturbing that according to the research by the CSFI (2005), 
overregulation already forms the major threat of the financial industry, 
even one year before Basel II will be officially introduced.  
 
Based on the previous observations and the findings of this 
research the following specific recommendations could be made; 
5.7.1. Implications for banks; 
· Management of banks need to recognize that in recent 
years too much autonomy and decision making power has 
been with the risk management and internal controls of 
their banks.   
· Marketing and product management of the banks, need to 
get involved in the interpretation and application of the 
new Basel II regulations, instead of passively accepting the 
new rules and restrictions. They have to defend the 
business side of their banks and need to protect the 
interests of their customers more adequately. So far new 
Basel II regulations have been often used as an argument 
why banks could not provide the kind of services clients 
requested for. At times these new regulations were used in 
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negotiations with clients in order to leverage to position of 
the bank even further.  
· A new consensus and equilibrium needs to be established 
which will reconcile the benefits of good regulation with the 
marketing opportunities and needs of the banks, including 
sufficient flexibility for innovation.  
· As with any other business, management of banks should 
put their clients’ needs (again) central to their decision 
making and strategy formulation.  
· Banks should consider how to measure their business 
success in terms of client satisfaction, as was shown in 
this research. 
5.7.2. Implications for regulators and Central Bankers; 
· The new Basel II regulations are the result of many years of 
hard work and an enormous amount of consultation with 
markets. BIS and Central Banks need to recognize however 
that their consultation with markets has been too much 
dependant on risk avoidance and risk measurement and 
that the business side of the financial market has had little 
to no voice.  
· It is never too late to recognize criticism to the new 
regulations and some adaptations need to be considered, 
especially in creating sufficient flexibility for the banks to 
continue operating successfully in cross border lending 
and markets. A realisation of the fact that soft factors, 
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such as cultural differences are relevant risk drivers would 
be an advisable first step.  
· Basel II is a complex change to markets which causes 
confusion and sometimes sets in fear. This research 
showed that up to 70% of the banks larger customers did 
not know much about Basel II and even at operational 
levels within the banks, confusion is still at large. It would 
be helpful for Central Banks to assist banks to explain 
better to the markets the aims and benefits of the new 
regulations.  
5.7.3. Implications for the corporate clients; 
· Too much autonomy and decision making power with the 
risk management of the banks, has not been good for the 
account managers to defend your business within their 
organisations. Ensure that your concerns reach 
management of your main banks, as the consequences of 
unwanted regulatory changes will affect your relationship 
with your banks.  
· Companies would be benefited according to this research if 
banks would be rated according to client satisfaction. This 
observation should be voiced in contacts with your banks 
and more specifically each individual company should have 
a clear policy and opinion with regard to rating their own 
banks and find appropriate ways to communicate both 
negative as well as positive experiences. 
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· Be aware of the fact that in accessing the credit risks of 
your company, foreign bankers have to understand your 
context, your cultural background; they should be able to 
understand why you do the things in the way that you do 
them. Besides, they have enormous problems 
understanding the cultural background of the country you 
are operating in. Already by recognizing and talking about 
these aspects you can be helpful to your banker to do a 
better job at home, defending your credit.     
 
  
 
----------- 
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